Description
On October 9, 2026, CERT-In, through its financial-sector coordination function CERT-In/CSIRT-Fin, issued Advisory CIAD-2026-0046 regarding cyberattacks exploiting payment and disbursement APIs.
The campaigns primarily target:
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Digital lending platforms
Fintech organizations
Payment service providers
Digital wallet operators
CERT-In observed that attackers exploit weaknesses in internet-facing applications, application server middleware and exposed APIs to gain access to financial infrastructure.
After obtaining access, they steal credentials belonging to payment gateways, payment aggregators and partner banks. Using these credentials, attackers directly execute disbursement and fund-transfer operations without following the normal transaction approval process.
The fraudulent transactions may contain dummy reference identifiers that do not correspond to legitimate loan or transaction records. Funds are then transferred to attacker-controlled mule accounts across multiple banks, often followed by immediate withdrawals.
CERT-In also observed that the time between initial compromise and fraudulent fund transfers has reduced significantly in recent incidents, indicating increasingly rapid attack execution.
Technical Description
The attack campaigns exploit weaknesses in financial application infrastructure and API security.
Modern financial platforms rely on APIs to connect lending applications, payment gateways, banking partners and internal transaction-processing systems.
These APIs perform operations such as:
Loan disbursement
Payment processing
Fund transfers
Beneficiary management
Transaction verification
Bank account integration
Attackers target weaknesses in these integrations to obtain legitimate API credentials and invoke sensitive financial operations directly.
One of the most significant aspects of these campaigns is the abuse of trusted infrastructure.
Instead of sending malicious requests from an unfamiliar external system, attackers invoke APIs from infrastructure already trusted or whitelisted by the financial organization. This can make suspicious transactions more difficult to distinguish from legitimate internal operations.
The attackers also bypass the application workflow that normally validates whether a transaction has been approved.
Attack Overview
Based on the CERT-In advisory, the observed attack sequence includes the following stages:
1. Initial Access
Attackers gain access through several weaknesses:
Exploitation of exposed internet-facing applications.
Exploitation of application server middleware vulnerabilities.
Abuse of deprecated, unauthenticated or unused APIs.
Abuse of APIs with unrestricted file-upload functionality.
Use of stolen credentials and exposed API tokens.
Access to applications and remote services without MFA.
Supply-chain compromise of source-code repositories through forged commits.
2. Persistence Establishment
After obtaining initial access, attackers establish persistence using web shells and backdoors.
This allows them to maintain access to compromised systems and continue interacting with internal infrastructure.
3. Internal Reconnaissance
Attackers investigate payment databases, application configurations and API integrations.
Their objective is to identify payment-processing workflows, privileged endpoints, stored credentials and connections to external financial service providers.
4. Credential Theft
Attackers obtain sensitive credentials, including:
Payment aggregator API credentials.
Payment gateway API keys.
Partner-bank API credentials.
Long-lived static API tokens.
Credentials stored in configuration files, source code or databases.
5. Direct API Invocation
Using the stolen credentials, attackers directly invoke disbursement and fund-transfer APIs from within the organization's whitelisted infrastructure.
This bypasses the normal application workflow and its transaction validation mechanisms.
6. Unauthorized Fund Transfers
Attackers submit fraudulent transactions using dummy reference identifiers that have no corresponding approved records.
They also execute multiple high-value transactions through IMPS and NEFT payment channels.
7. Fund Movement and Anti-Forensics
The funds are transferred to attacker-controlled mule accounts across multiple banks, sometimes followed by immediate withdrawals.
CERT-In also observed log deletion or truncation, EDR tampering and anti-forensic cleanup intended to conceal malicious activity.
Technical Analysis
1. Abuse of Payment and Disbursement APIs
The central technique in these campaigns is the direct invocation of financial APIs using valid but stolen credentials.
Normally, a disbursement request should pass through several verification stages, including loan creation, KYC, sanction approval, beneficiary verification and transaction-limit checks.
However, attackers bypass these stages and invoke the final fund-transfer API directly.
This creates a significant security weakness when the payment API trusts the caller's credentials without independently validating whether the underlying transaction has been approved.
2. Exploitation of Exposed Applications and APIs
Attackers initially compromise internet-facing applications and exposed endpoints.
Deprecated APIs, unauthenticated services and unrestricted file-upload functionality provide additional opportunities for unauthorized access.
Once attackers gain access to the application environment, they can investigate internal integrations and retrieve sensitive information.
3. Theft and Abuse of Static API Credentials
CERT-In specifically identifies long-lived static API tokens hard-coded in source code as an attack vector.
Credentials may also be exposed through plaintext configuration files, databases and application repositories.
If these credentials are stolen, attackers may be able to invoke financial APIs without needing to compromise the end-user interface.
4. Bypassing Transaction Validation
A major characteristic of the attacks is the bypassing of application-level financial controls.
The advisory identifies several controls that attackers circumvent:
KYC verification.
Loan creation and sanction approval.
Beneficiary verification.
Balance sufficiency checks.
Per-transaction limits.
Attackers also submit dummy transaction reference identifiers that do not correspond to genuine records.
This indicates that financial APIs must independently validate transaction authorization rather than relying entirely on preceding application workflows.
5. AI-Assisted Offensive Tooling
CERT-In reports the possible use of AI-assisted offensive frameworks and large numbers of custom scripts.
The advisory also highlights a significant reduction in the interval between initial compromise and fraudulent fund transfers.
This suggests that automation may be helping attackers execute reconnaissance, credential abuse and financial transactions more rapidly.
However, CERT-In does not identify a specific AI tool, model or threat actor in this advisory.
6. Anti-Forensic Activity
Attackers attempt to conceal their activities by:
Deleting or truncating logs.
Tampering with Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools.
Performing anti-forensic cleanup.
These activities can make incident investigation more difficult and delay the detection of fraudulent transactions.
Key Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)
The following behaviours are highlighted in the CERT-In advisory:
Direct invocation of disbursement and fund-transfer APIs from whitelisted infrastructure.
Use of valid but stolen API credentials.
Bypassing KYC, loan sanction and beneficiary verification controls.
Submission of dummy transaction reference identifiers.
Execution of multiple high-value transfers through IMPS and NEFT.
Transfer of funds to mule accounts across multiple banks.
Establishment of persistence using web shells and backdoors.
Deletion or truncation of logs and tampering with EDR tools.
Possible use of AI-assisted offensive frameworks and automated scripts.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The CERT-In advisory does not provide a specific public list of malicious IP addresses, domains, file hashes or malware samples.
However, it identifies several suspicious behaviours that financial institutions should monitor.
Behavioural indicators:
Direct fund-transfer API calls without corresponding approved loan or transaction records.
Dummy or invalid transaction reference identifiers.
Unexpected API requests originating from whitelisted infrastructure.
Multiple high-value IMPS or NEFT transactions within a short period.
Transfers to newly introduced or suspicious beneficiary accounts.
Unusual access to payment gateway and partner-bank credentials.
Unexpected creation or modification of web shells and backdoors.
Log deletion, truncation or unexpected EDR tampering.
These are detection indicators derived from the advisory, not confirmed technical IOCs.
Potential Impact
Financial Loss: Unauthorized fund transfers can result in significant financial losses for NBFCs, fintech companies, payment service providers and digital lending platforms.
Payment Infrastructure Compromise: Stolen API credentials may allow attackers to abuse trusted payment integrations and execute unauthorized financial operations.
Operational Disruption: Financial institutions may need to suspend affected APIs, disable compromised accounts and temporarily interrupt payment or disbursement operations.
Customer and Business Impact: Fraudulent transactions can affect financial operations, customer confidence and relationships with banking partners.
Regulatory Consequences: Security incidents involving financial infrastructure may trigger regulatory reporting obligations, forensic investigations and compliance reviews.
Extended Compromise: Web shells, backdoors and stolen credentials can provide attackers with continued access if persistence mechanisms are not identified and removed.
Recommendations
Immediate Recommendations
Enforce MFA: Enable multi-factor authentication for payment platforms, administrative portals, payment APIs, banking APIs and remote-access services.
Audit API Credentials: Identify exposed, stolen or hard-coded API credentials and rotate potentially compromised keys immediately.
Review API Inventory: Identify all active, deprecated, unused and unauthenticated APIs. Decommission unnecessary endpoints.
Validate Transactions: Reject fund-transfer requests that do not correspond to valid, approved loan or transaction records.
Implement Transaction Verification: Apply maker-checker or second-level approval for fund movement.
Monitor Fund Transfers: Investigate unusual transaction volumes, high-value transfers and newly added beneficiaries.
Restrict Network Access: Apply outbound traffic restrictions and allowlisting for production infrastructure.
Preserve Evidence: Retain authentication records, API logs, transaction records and endpoint telemetry for forensic investigation.
Deploy EDR Protection: Ensure endpoint detection and response solutions have tamper protection enabled.
Respond to Suspicious Activity: Disable compromised accounts, suspend affected APIs, preserve forensic evidence and rotate credentials.
Preventive Recommendations
Implement Secure API Authentication: Enforce per-session authentication and eliminate unnecessary long-lived static tokens.
Cryptographically Bind Transaction Stages: Ensure that debit-stage or disbursement APIs cannot execute without successful completion of the required preceding validation stages.
Enforce Transaction Limits: Apply per-transaction and daily cumulative ceilings at the API and payment-processing levels.
Validate Beneficiaries: Implement penny-drop verification, name-to-account matching and transaction velocity limits.
Secure Secrets: Store API keys and credentials in dedicated secret-management solutions or Hardware Security Modules (HSMs).
Implement Real-Time Monitoring: Monitor transaction velocity, amount patterns and newly introduced beneficiaries, with automated blocking or holding mechanisms.
Enable Financial Reconciliation: Reconcile internal transaction records with bank and payment-aggregator statements in near real time.
Centralize Logging: Maintain centralized logging and retain logs for at least 180 days, as recommended by CERT-In.
Strengthen Application Security: Conduct regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing, including API security testing.
Isolate Environments: Separate development, testing and production environments.
Restrict Internet Exposure: Remove unnecessary internet exposure of internal applications and apply geofencing under formal change control.
Introduce Anti-Automation Controls: Implement rate limiting and transaction sequence-binding to disrupt automated API abuse.
Incident Reporting
Organizations detecting suspicious activity related to these campaigns are advised to report the incident to CERT-In/CSIRT-Fin.
Reporting email: incident@cert-in.org.in
Relevant logs and forensic evidence should be included in the incident report.
Conclusion
The CERT-In advisory highlights an increasingly serious threat to India's financial ecosystem: attackers are exploiting weaknesses in payment APIs and trusted integrations to execute unauthorized fund transfers.
Rather than relying exclusively on conventional customer-account compromise, these campaigns target the underlying infrastructure responsible for processing financial transactions.
The direct invocation of payment APIs using stolen credentials is particularly concerning because it can bypass application-level controls that financial institutions depend on to prevent fraudulent disbursements.
The possible use of AI-assisted offensive tooling further emphasizes the need for faster detection, stronger authentication and continuous monitoring.
Financial institutions must ensure that every payment API independently validates transaction authorization, beneficiary information and financial limits. Securing the entire API ecosystem—not just the user-facing application—is essential to protecting financial infrastructure.
