Executive Summary
ESET Research has identified a previously underreported threat actor tracked as Gorbag, assessed to be Russia-aligned, conducting targeted cyber-espionage operations against Ukrainian organizations. The activity has been observed since at least February 2025, with victim selection concentrated around organizations that may hold strategically valuable government, law enforcement, defense, and regional administrative information.
Gorbag's operations are designed primarily for rapid intelligence collection rather than prolonged system control. The group's toolkit includes Prime ReverseShell, a PowerShell-based reverse shell embedded in a .NET executable, and BeautyStealer, a C++ information stealer capable of collecting browser credentials, session cookies, VPN configurations, and selected files from compromised systems.
During 2025, the group primarily relied on spear-phishing emails containing malicious macro-enabled Excel documents. In early 2026, ESET observed a change in the delivery method involving weaponized RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a WinRAR path traversal vulnerability. The exploit can place malicious files outside the intended extraction directory, including a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder to establish persistence.
The collected information is compressed and exfiltrated through Telegram or a custom command-and-control server. BeautyStealer subsequently attempts to remove itself, reducing the opportunity for forensic investigation.
ESET assesses that Gorbag may be operating as an initial access broker, potentially sharing harvested credentials and sensitive information with other threat actors for follow-on operations. However, this remains an assessment rather than a confirmed operational relationship.
Technical Description
Gorbag uses a relatively small set of tools to compromise systems and collect information of intelligence value. Its operations combine social engineering, malicious document execution, exploitation of a known archive-processing vulnerability, credential harvesting, and data exfiltration.
The group's primary malware components include:
Prime ReverseShell: A PowerShell-based reverse shell embedded in a .NET executable using the PS2EXE utility. It allows operators to execute commands on compromised systems and receive command output through a command-and-control connection. ESET identified this component during the group's earlier activity in February 2025.
BeautyStealer: A custom C++ information stealer used to collect browser credentials, cookies, local browser data, VPN configurations, and selected documents. It has evolved through multiple versions, with later releases introducing expanded file collection, encryption changes, custom C2 communication, and an updated self-deletion mechanism.
ESET also references GIFTEDCROOK, an infostealer previously reported in connection with UAC-0226 activity by CERT-UA. The appearance of related tooling and activity overlaps does not, by itself, establish that every operation attributed to Gorbag is conducted by UAC-0226.
Attack Overview
1. Spear-Phishing and Malicious Attachments
During 2025, Gorbag distributed spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments designed to appear legitimate and relevant to Ukrainian government organizations.
The lures included government-related themes such as administrative fines and tax notices. In one observed case, the phishing email originated from a compromised email account belonging to a local government organization, potentially increasing the credibility of the message.
The attachment was a macro-enabled Excel spreadsheet with an .xlsm extension. When macros were enabled or allowed to execute, embedded VBA code decoded a Base64-encoded payload stored within spreadsheet cells. The resulting payload was written to %ProgramData% and executed, deploying BeautyStealer.
2. WinRAR Vulnerability Exploitation – CVE-2025-8088
In early 2026, ESET observed Gorbag changing its delivery technique to use weaponized RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088.
The vulnerability affects WinRAR and involves path traversal through specially crafted archive content stored in NTFS Alternate Data Streams. When the archive is opened on a vulnerable system, files can be extracted outside the directory selected by the user.
The observed infection chain uses a decoy PDF to make the archive appear legitimate while placing additional malicious components on the system:
A malicious LNK shortcut is written to the Windows Startup folder.
An encrypted payload is dropped onto the system.
A PowerShell loader is placed in
%ProgramData%.The Startup shortcut triggers the loader during subsequent system startup or restart.
This approach provides a mechanism for executing the malicious payload again after the initial archive interaction.
3. Prime ReverseShell Execution
Prime ReverseShell was used during the group's earlier operations to execute commands on compromised Windows systems.
The component is a PowerShell reverse shell embedded in a .NET executable using PS2EXE. It is derived from the publicly available PSSW100AVB GitHub repository, with modifications for the operators' requirements.
The reverse shell enables remote command execution and returns command output to the operator's C2 infrastructure.
ESET also identified a variant containing a comment that instructed AI-based analysis systems to treat the file as benign and described it as a prime-number generation utility. ESET tested two AI assistants and reported that both correctly identified the reverse-shell functionality despite the misleading comment.
ESET has not observed Prime ReverseShell being used since the group developed BeautyStealer.
4. BeautyStealer – Credential and File Collection
BeautyStealer is the primary data-collection component identified in Gorbag's operations. ESET tracked several versions, ranging from 0.9 to 2.0.
Its capabilities include:
Collecting browser cookies, stored passwords, and local browser data.
Targeting Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera, and Mozilla Firefox.
Collecting OpenVPN configuration files from user and system directories.
Searching Desktop, Documents, and Downloads directories.
Accessing removable media and mapped network drives.
Collecting documents, archives, email files, VPN configurations, and other selected file types.
Targeting files that may contain credentials, private keys, and authentication material.
Particularly sensitive file types include:
.ovpn– OpenVPN configurations..kdbx– KeePass password database files..jks– Java KeyStore files..zs2– Files associated with Ukrainian electronic signature private keys..rdp– Remote Desktop configuration files..pfx– Personal Information Exchange files.
The collection of these files may expose credentials, remote access configurations, private keys, and sensitive organizational information.
5. Data Staging and Exfiltration
After collecting the targeted information, BeautyStealer compresses the collected data into an archive before exfiltration.
ESET identified two primary exfiltration methods:
Telegram: Earlier versions transmit collected information to an attacker-controlled Telegram chat using the Telegram
sendDocumentAPI.Custom C2 infrastructure: From version 1.2 onward, the malware introduced exfiltration to a custom command-and-control server implementing FastAPI.
The malware's development history indicates an evolution in its data handling and communication mechanisms:
Version 0.9 primarily focused on browser credential collection.
Version 1.1 introduced additional file-stealing capabilities.
Version 1.2 introduced XOR-based string encryption and custom-server exfiltration.
Version 2.0 introduced broader changes, including RC4 encryption, updated naming conventions, and a revised self-deletion mechanism.
6. Self-Deletion and Operational Cleanup
BeautyStealer attempts to remove itself after completing data collection and exfiltration. Later versions use Windows API calls directly for this purpose instead of relying on the batch scripts used in earlier versions.
This behavior supports the group's apparent preference for short-term intelligence collection rather than maintaining long-term remote access.
It may also complicate incident response by reducing the availability of malware artifacts after execution.
Targeted Organizations and Sectors
ESET reported that all identified Gorbag targets were located in Ukraine. The targeting pattern is concentrated around three broad areas:
Law Enforcement and Justice: Approximately one-quarter of identified targets were Ukrainian government organizations operating in law enforcement and judicial sectors. Access to these environments could expose information related to investigations, prosecution activities, and government operations.
Local Government Near the Front Line: Approximately another quarter of identified targets were local government entities, including city councils located close to the front line. Potential intelligence interests include infrastructure damage assessments, local defense initiatives, and civil defense activities.
Defense and Logistics: Other identified targets included organizations in the defense sector and an entity publicly documented as a major transportation hub for foreign military aid.
The targeting pattern is consistent with intelligence collection against organizations that may hold strategically valuable information during the ongoing conflict.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The following indicators are explicitly listed in ESET's report. Network indicators should be validated against current reputation and organizational telemetry before being used for blocking.
Network Indicators
| Indicator | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
89.44.9[.]186 | IPv4 | Prime ReverseShell C2 server |
142.111.194[.]73 | IPv4 | BeautyStealer exfiltration server |
File Indicators
| SHA-1 | Filename | Detection / Description |
|---|---|---|
C17369B4B49113D07F080DF832E218156FB0940F | N/A | Win64/PSW.Agent.MA – Spear-phishing email |
A5E0A82BF6CC302A20D917235643B748F73FCC27 | Windows Telemetry | PowerShell/ReverseShell.OB – Prime ReverseShell |
E27E0D0A4B308F9B6B0469159931EB5E343E7FF8 | додаток податкова.xlsm | VBA/TrojanDropper.Agent.DAT – XLS lure document |
0589D2079FBEF814DC7BB95C4B3B555C8B933AF6 | Повідомлення 4726-49.rar | PowerShell/Agent.EJI and LNK/Runner.FB – Malicious RAR archive |
Additional IOC reference: ESET provides a comprehensive IOC and sample repository through its official GitHub collection. Refer to the source repository before importing additional indicators into production detection systems.
Potential Impact
Successful compromise involving Gorbag's tooling may result in:
Credential Compromise: Theft of browser-stored usernames, passwords, authentication data, and session cookies could enable unauthorized access to corporate and government services.
VPN and Remote Access Exposure: Theft of OpenVPN configurations and related credentials may provide attackers with opportunities to access internal networks.
Sensitive Document Disclosure: Collection of Office documents, archives, emails, and files from mapped drives may expose confidential organizational information.
Private Key and Digital Signature Compromise: Theft of KeePass databases, Java KeyStore files, PFX certificates, and Ukrainian electronic signature key files may create additional risks for identity and trust infrastructure.
Follow-on Intrusions: Stolen credentials and access information could potentially be shared with other threat actors for subsequent compromise activity.
Reduced Forensic Visibility: Self-deletion mechanisms may remove useful malware artifacts and complicate incident investigation.
Recommendations
Immediate Actions
Patch WinRAR: Identify systems running vulnerable WinRAR versions and update them to a vendor-supported release that addresses CVE-2025-8088. Validate patch deployment across endpoints, including manually installed software.
Hunt for Malicious Archives: Review email gateway, endpoint, and file-access telemetry for suspicious RAR archives, particularly those received through unexpected government-themed or administrative communications.
Inspect Startup Folder Activity: Investigate newly created LNK files in Windows Startup directories, especially when their creation follows archive extraction or an unusual file download.
Review PowerShell Execution: Search for suspicious PowerShell activity originating from
%ProgramData%, unusual .NET executables, encoded commands, and processes communicating with unfamiliar external infrastructure.Investigate Browser Credential Access: Monitor for unusual access to browser credential stores, cookies, and local browser databases by unknown or unexpected processes.
Review VPN Configuration Access: Identify unexpected access to
.ovpnfiles and other remote-access configuration files, particularly when combined with archive creation or outbound network connections.Monitor Data Exfiltration: Investigate unusual outbound Telegram API traffic and connections to unfamiliar external servers, including unexpected FastAPI-based services.
Rotate Exposed Credentials: If compromise is suspected, reset affected credentials, revoke active sessions and tokens, rotate VPN credentials, and review authentication logs for unauthorized access.
Preserve Forensic Evidence: Collect endpoint telemetry, suspicious archives, LNK files, PowerShell logs, process execution records, and network evidence before attempting remediation or cleanup.
Preventive Actions
Strengthen Email Security: Implement phishing detection, attachment sandboxing, sender authentication checks, and controls against emails originating from compromised accounts.
Restrict Office Macros: Disable or restrict macros from untrusted sources and apply policies preventing internet-originated Office documents from executing macros.
Apply Application Control: Restrict execution of unauthorized binaries and monitor executables launched from user-writable and temporary directories.
Harden PowerShell: Enable PowerShell logging, script-block logging, and appropriate execution controls. Monitor suspicious PowerShell-to-network communication.
Protect Browser Credentials: Enforce enterprise browser security policies, restrict unauthorized access to browser data stores, and use managed credential storage where possible.
Secure Remote Access: Enforce MFA for VPN and remote access services, regularly rotate credentials, and review access permissions.
Improve Endpoint Monitoring: Deploy EDR detections for suspicious archive extraction, Startup folder modifications, credential-store access, bulk file collection, and self-deleting executables.
Maintain Network Visibility: Monitor outbound connections to Telegram and unfamiliar hosting infrastructure, correlating network activity with endpoint process execution.
Conduct Threat Hunting: Search historical SIEM and EDR telemetry for the published IOCs and behavioral indicators associated with Prime ReverseShell and BeautyStealer.
Conclusion
The Gorbag campaign demonstrates how relatively simple malware can support targeted cyber-espionage operations when combined with carefully selected victims and effective credential-harvesting techniques. Its focus on Ukrainian law enforcement, local administrations near the front line, and defense-related organizations highlights the intelligence value of the information held by these environments.
The group's transition from macro-enabled Excel attachments to weaponized RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088 also demonstrates the importance of maintaining software patch levels and monitoring archive extraction behavior.
Organizations should prioritize WinRAR patching, phishing defenses, endpoint monitoring, browser credential protection, and investigation of suspicious PowerShell and Startup folder activity. Because the malware is designed to collect information and remove itself, timely detection and preservation of endpoint evidence are particularly important.
