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CriticalSupply Chain · 10 min read

Investigating Ephemeral Supply Chain Tampering in AOMEI Update Infrastructure

GTIG and Mandiant documented a supply-chain compromise campaign in which UNC7017 temporarily tampered with AOMEI update configurations to deliver CROSSROAD, SHINYROAD, and Adaptix-related payloads. The campaign combined short-lived update redirection, scheduled-task persistence, DLL search-order hijacking, and WebDAV-based NTLM credential coercion.

Written by Battula Bhanu Prakash·Published Oct 20, 2026


Introduction

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant investigated a software supply-chain compromise campaign targeting AOMEI Technology's update infrastructure between April and July 2026. The threat cluster, tracked as UNC7017, repeatedly modified remote update configuration files for short periods of five to ten minutes before restoring their legitimate contents.

The campaign abused AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer update and notification mechanisms to deliver malicious payloads to systems polling the affected servers during these windows. The attack chain involved the CROSSROAD downloader, the SHINYROAD backdoor, modified Radmin administration utilities, and the Adaptix command-and-control framework.

The campaign also incorporated WebDAV-based NTLM credential coercion through an invisible notification window, potentially exposing authentication hashes without requiring visible user interaction.

This investigation highlights how temporary configuration tampering can evade conventional point-in-time investigations and why endpoint-level threat hunting remains essential even after a vendor restores its update infrastructure.

Key Highlights

  • Target: AOMEI Technology's software update and notification infrastructure.

  • Activity period: April–July 2026.

  • Threat cluster: UNC7017.

  • Primary access technique: Software supply-chain compromise through remote configuration tampering.

  • Initial downloader: CROSSROAD.

  • Secondary backdoor: SHINYROAD.

  • Additional framework: Adaptix C2.

  • Credential theft technique: WebDAV-based NTLM authentication coercion.

  • Persistence: Windows scheduled tasks and DLL search-order hijacking.

  • Evasion: Short-lived server modifications, configuration restoration, timestomping, and malware self-deletion.

  • Affected sectors: IT services, telecommunications, higher education, and related organizations.

  • Observed geographic reach: Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United States.

  • Vendor response: AOMEI reported taking corrective action following notification from Mandiant.

Why This Campaign Matters

Traditional software supply-chain attacks frequently involve malicious source-code changes, compromised build systems, or trojanized software releases. UNC7017 instead abused the configuration and distribution layer used by legitimate software clients.

The attacker temporarily redirected update downloads to malicious infrastructure and manipulated notification settings to trigger execution of downloaded files. Once the brief tampering window ended, the server configuration returned to its authentic state.

This approach created three significant challenges:

  1. Limited detection window: Investigators checking the vendor's configuration files after the attack might find only legitimate content.

  2. Persistent endpoint compromise: Malware already downloaded and executed could remain active after server-side remediation.

  3. Blended malicious activity: Legitimate administration utilities and familiar software names helped conceal backdoors and command-and-control activity.

The campaign demonstrates that HTTPS connections and checksum validation alone are insufficient when update metadata itself can be tampered with and the checksum is supplied through the same compromised channel.

Understanding the AOMEI Update Mechanism

AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer rely on background processes and remote configuration files to handle updates and notifications.

Update Configuration: down_html.ini

The client retrieves update information from:

https://www2.aomeisoftware.com/download/abpopup/down_html.ini

The configuration identifies the update package, its version, and the expected MD5 checksum.

Notification Configuration: Notifycfg.ini

The client retrieves notification instructions from:

https://account.aomeitech.com/Notifycfg.ini

This file controls promotional notifications and specifies actions or programs that the local notification process, ABNotify.exe, can execute.

Under normal conditions, these mechanisms direct clients to legitimate AOMEI resources. UNC7017 modified both configurations to redirect downloads and abuse the notification workflow.

Attack Chain Overview

The observed campaign can be summarized as follows:

Temporary server compromise
↓
Modification of down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini
↓
Malicious update redirection and notification-triggered execution
↓
CROSSROAD downloader execution
↓
Secondary payload retrieval and scheduled-task persistence
↓
Radmin DLL search-order hijacking and SHINYROAD execution
↓
Command-and-control communications and possible follow-on activity

A separate branch used a hidden notification window to coerce WebDAV/NTLM authentication. Later activity also involved Adaptix C2 payloads masquerading as Nitro PDF utilities.

Ephemeral Update Configuration Tampering

GTIG and Mandiant documented three specific tampering windows:

DateObserved window (UTC)Duration
May 28, 202605:40–05:5010 minutes
July 16, 202608:33–08:396 minutes
July 20, 202610:35–10:405 minutes

During these windows, UNC7017 redirected update downloads, incremented the minor build identifier, and replaced the expected MD5 checksum to match the malicious package.

On July 16, the attacker also expanded Notifycfg.ini with more than 35,000 repetitive configuration sections. This configuration manipulation forced update behavior and triggered execution of the CROSSROAD dropper from the local HTML directory.

At the end of each observed window, the actor restored the legitimate remote configuration files, complicating retrospective server-side investigation.

Infrastructure Evolution

UNC7017 changed its delivery infrastructure throughout the campaign.

  • April–May 2026: Early CROSSROAD samples used Alibaba Cloud Object Storage at serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com.

  • July 1–7, 2026: The actor used vendor-themed domains, including storage-data.com, promotion.storage-data.com, and aomei.storage-data.com.

  • July 20, 2026: Initial payload delivery used a Google Cloud Storage bucket at storage.googleapis.com/aomeiupdate/upgrade-now.zip, while secondary payload retrieval and command-and-control activity continued to use actor-controlled infrastructure.

The shift to reputable cloud-hosted infrastructure complicated domain-reputation-based blocking and illustrated the limitations of relying exclusively on newly registered domain detection.

WebDAV NTLM Credential Coercion

On July 20, UNC7017 modified Notifycfg.ini to replace a legitimate promotional banner with an invisible 1 × 1 pixel notification window.

The configuration directed the client to load an HTML resource through a WebDAV UNC path:

file://8.210.84.56/DavWWWRoot/campaign/24hour-flash-sale.html

The hidden window was configured with a high execution priority. When the client attempted to access the remote resource, the request could trigger Windows authentication and expose NetNTLMv2 authentication material to the remote server.

This technique is associated with MITRE ATT&CK T1187, Forced Authentication.

Defensive implication: Embedded notification and web-view components should reject untrusted file:// and UNC WebDAV resources. Organizations should also restrict outbound SMB and WebDAV connections to external destinations.

Malware Analysis: CROSSROAD Downloader

CROSSROAD is a 64-bit Windows downloader written in C and delivered in the malicious upgrade-now.zip archive.

The July 16 sample identified in the report has the following SHA-256:

9a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450

Execution and Evasion

CROSSROAD performs several actions before staging its secondary payloads:

  • Path validation: Checks whether its file path contains the substring AOMEI. If absent, it initiates self-deletion but continues certain configuration and downloader routines.

  • Geolocation checks: Queries external IP-reflection services and DNS-based checks. In specific execution branches, a country code of CN causes the primary payload path to abort.

  • Mutex creation: Uses Global\{F9E6E3C0-E11A-4F85-9944-AF4AD6E05883} to prevent concurrent instances.

  • Configuration restoration: Resets the local update version parameter and restores a legitimate AOMEI download URL.

  • Secondary payload retrieval: Downloads a component archive into a temporary directory and extracts it under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\.

  • Persistence: Creates the scheduled task RadminComponentRuntime, which launches FamItrfc.exe --runtimechk every three hours.

  • Self-deletion: Uses a child process with the --nitrod parameter and an alternate NTFS data stream named :wtfbbq to complicate recovery and forensic analysis.

The executable also contained the misspelled product metadata string AOMEI Update Compent, which is useful for detection.

SHINYROAD Backdoor and Radmin Abuse

The secondary payload bundle contains components associated with the SHINYROAD modular backdoor.

DLL Search-Order Hijacking

The scheduled task launches a legitimate signed Radmin executable, such as FamItrfc.exe. During startup, the executable loads the attacker's unsigned BlkScrDl.dll through DLL search-order hijacking.

The signed status of the legitimate executable does not establish that the entire execution chain is trustworthy.

In-Memory Payload Execution

The malicious DLL locates config.zip, maps its contents into a shared memory section, and registers csvc\RuntimeComponent.dll as an in-process COM server.

The payload component extracts encrypted metadata from the archive and decrypts it using ChaCha20 with an HMAC-SHA256-derived key and initialization vector. The decrypted content consists of compiled Python bytecode executed using an embedded PocketPy interpreter.

The report identifies the following shared memory artifact:

Local\963d3c60-d406-4ad6-aa1e-dc8e45061ccf

Backdoor Capabilities

Observed SHINYROAD capabilities include:

  • Remote shell execution.

  • Hostname and username fingerprinting.

  • Custom encrypted command-and-control communications.

  • In-memory extension loading.

  • Traffic chaffing through randomized junk packets.

Earlier variants used raw TCP communication on port 41397; later activity included communications over port 443.

Adaptix C2 and Nitro PDF Masquerading

In mid-July, UNC7017 deployed ADAPTAGENT, the client component of the Adaptix C2 framework.

The payloads masqueraded as Nitro PDF promotional or scanning utilities, including NitroPromotion.exe. The observed activity created a scheduled task named NitroRuntime that launched the executable through hidden PowerShell.

The payload sideloaded Eztwain4.dll from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\ and established periodic beaconing to:

8.210.84.56:6800

This activity demonstrates how familiar application names, legitimate binaries, and scheduled tasks can obscure malicious post-exploitation activity.

Detection and Hunting Opportunities

Security operations teams should investigate endpoint behavior rather than relying solely on current server responses or file reputation.

Endpoint Artifacts

LocationSuspicious artifactsInvestigation focus
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\BlkScrDl.dll, csvc\RuntimeComponent.dll, config.zip, metadata.datUnsigned DLL loading, COM registration, and --runtimechk execution
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\Eztwain4.dll, NitroPromotion.exeDLL sideloading and unexpected C2 activity
%TEMP%\svc\*.tmp, en\Temporary payload staging and self-deletion activity
AOMEI installation directoriesTmphtml\, html\, upgrade-now.zip, upgrade-now.exeUnauthorized update archives and executable drops
Windows scheduled tasksRadminComponentRuntime, NitroRuntimeUnexpected persistence and hidden process execution

Investigators should preserve cached configuration files from AOMEI installation directories, along with relevant EDR, proxy, firewall, DNS, and process-creation telemetry.

Network Hunting

Review outbound traffic and historical DNS/proxy records for:

  • promotion.storage-data.com

  • aomei.storage-data.com

  • storage-data.com

  • serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com

  • 8.210.84.56

  • 8.218.65.184

  • 47.239.60.117

Investigate requests using the user-agent Anyviewer-loader/1.0, connections to the documented staging URLs, and unusual external SMB or WebDAV authentication attempts.

These indicators are based on the reported campaign and should be correlated with timestamps, endpoint context, and additional evidence before attributing activity.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Malicious File Hashes (SHA-256)

FileSHA-256
upgrade-now.zip — May 20 archive6670ab3f0434a42f33416f8354150b1701e7615f3cfa2f1635e54f8df0f6eec7
upgrade-now.exe — May 20 loader11e576df44e9c9eef72b9f5b699291bcdb200a19130778ec231e5b0987b913ad
upgrade-now.exe — July 16 loader9a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450
upgrade-now.exe — July 20 loaderb360b6db0c2b668317edc1504a7c39ef047f0d925c8f113b521f6724c157ae21
upgrade-now.zip — July 20 archive9ed503c6a9a3a493fb859401e9ed469eed77ab9927341964d6dbfbfa6255aeba
component.zip / en.zipd167bc898e856da8a4003cb4dfc7de55fea109eee3cd64fc8999710314109464
RuntimeComponent.dll8fbaa74b27dc1e89abfc694e834378746f0ad37a688098c5f8f511410157c8b8
BlkScrDl.dll5837bc26a73cfb46ffd466cf889f03ce2f6a48f1f3fd42ec8be22189d51cab1e
config.zip4c0a75e0f62ddc0bb350c224fe996f3b2ab08dcb0d288231c61ffe9406c7045b
metadata.dat4b4d25b3501519476f9a62a88a781e4f446f669280eb5e98c6b96eb6d3743431
NitroPromotion.exe14b31918075e6130b9123158743db0a81e2d7bfcf6d39731ee7d9200a98cd591
Eztwain4.dll8c8090aca8ddb1cf968d2b810457e0cfce97c03cd721f70d2eca7f37f2681fc4
abe.exe7b252be444dee2fb2a57043a823dc5b5e1fae970aea91ee2c8339aa70329969d

Configuration File Hashes (SHA-256)

FileSHA-256
down_html.ini — July 16924ad92d89dde577d5858b2ebc5703a485467842d78e98b75019b2e2e0ac3fe6
Notifycfg.ini — July 16d2f9ef2429312667f0512504b6a19ba4a9cc5514f1b2933923dd42f75a1c5934
Notifycfg.ini — July 20286e0d8c7bdfaa7c251a3e8f0f2fefbe25c67586c0149d39b1095c89dc6023c8
down_html.ini — July 20f2a7d0a4c8613a9cdd31ede6131b27040c0571ca97970b245a710191806d7ac4

Network Indicators

IndicatorContext
8.210.84.56WebDAV NTLM coercion target and Adaptix C2
8.218.65.184Historical SHINYROAD C2; ports 41397 and 443
47.239.60.117Secondary infrastructure
96.126.191.98IP allowlist address observed in June 2026
promotion.storage-data.comCROSSROAD staging domain
aomei.storage-data.comSecondary payload infrastructure
storage-data.comThreat-actor-controlled domain
serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.comEarly Alibaba Cloud staging infrastructure

Additional Detection Artifacts

  • Mutex: Global\{F9E6E3C0-E11A-4F85-9944-AF4AD6E05883}

  • Shared memory: Local\963d3c60-d406-4ad6-aa1e-dc8e45061ccf

  • Scheduled task: RadminComponentRuntime

  • Scheduled task: NitroRuntime

  • CROSSROAD execution argument: --nitrod

  • SHINYROAD execution argument: --runtimechk

The listed indicators should be validated against the original GTIG/Mandiant publication before operational deployment.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueObserved activity
Initial AccessT1195.002 — Supply Chain CompromiseTampering with AOMEI update configuration
ExecutionT1059.001 — PowerShellHidden PowerShell execution for Nitro-related payloads
ExecutionT1059.006 — PythonEmbedded PocketPy bytecode execution
ExecutionT1559.001 — Component Object ModelCOM-based loading of RuntimeComponent.dll
PersistenceT1053.005 — Scheduled TaskRadminComponentRuntime and NitroRuntime
Defense EvasionT1574.001 — DLL Search Order HijackingLoading BlkScrDl.dll through a legitimate Radmin executable
Defense EvasionT1036.005 — MasqueradingRadmin and Nitro PDF-themed payloads
Defense EvasionT1027.013 — Encrypted/Encoded FileEncrypted SHINYROAD payload metadata
Defense EvasionT1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDecryption of payloads in memory
Defense EvasionT1070.004 — File DeletionCROSSROAD self-deletion
Defense EvasionT1564.004 — NTFS File AttributesAlternate data stream use during deletion
Credential AccessT1187 — Forced AuthenticationWebDAV-based NTLM credential coercion
DiscoveryT1016 — System Network Configuration DiscoveryExternal IP discovery
DiscoveryT1614 — System Location DiscoveryGeolocation-based execution checks
DiscoveryT1082 — System Information DiscoveryHost fingerprinting
DiscoveryT1033 — System Owner/User DiscoveryUsername-based agent identification
Command and ControlT1105 — Ingress Tool TransferDownloading secondary payload archives
Command and ControlT1571 — Non-Standard PortC2 communication over TCP 41397 and 6800
Command and ControlT1573.001 — Symmetric CryptographyEncrypted command-and-control traffic
Command and ControlT1001.001 — Junk DataRandomized traffic chaffing
Command and ControlT1219.002 — Remote Access SoftwareAbuse of Radmin administration utilities

Recommended Mitigations

Endpoint and Network Defenses

  1. Hunt across AOMEI endpoints for CROSSROAD, SHINYROAD, and Adaptix-related artifacts dating from April through July 2026.

  2. Inspect cached down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini files, update directories, and temporary payload locations.

  3. Review scheduled tasks for unauthorized RadminComponentRuntime and NitroRuntime entries.

  4. Investigate unsigned DLLs loaded by signed Radmin or Nitro-related executables.

  5. Correlate process trees, DNS records, proxy logs, firewall telemetry, and EDR alerts.

  6. Block confirmed malicious domains and IP addresses where appropriate, while validating business impact and reviewing threat intelligence updates.

  7. Restrict outbound SMB and WebDAV traffic to untrusted external destinations.

  8. Preserve forensic evidence before removing malware or rebuilding affected endpoints.

  9. If compromise is confirmed, isolate affected systems, remove persistence, investigate credential exposure, and rotate potentially compromised credentials.

Software Vendor Hardening

  • Require cryptographic signature verification for downloaded executables and update packages.

  • Digitally sign remote update configuration files using asymmetric cryptography.

  • Restrict update destinations to approved vendor domains and trusted distribution infrastructure.

  • Prevent embedded web views and notification handlers from processing unsafe file:// or UNC WebDAV resources.

  • Separate promotional notification systems from software update and execution mechanisms.

  • Implement real-time file integrity monitoring, strong access controls, and multifactor authentication for update servers and storage buckets.

  • Alert on unexpected configuration modifications and preserve versioned configuration history for incident response.

Why Server-Side Remediation Is Not Enough

AOMEI reported that corrective actions had been taken after Mandiant notified the company on July 17, 2026, with a response reported on July 29.

However, restoring the update servers does not remove payloads already installed on endpoints. Systems that checked for updates during a tampering window may still contain scheduled tasks, backdoors, malicious DLLs, or compromised credentials.

Investigators should not dismiss suspicious endpoint detections simply because the vendor's current configuration files appear clean. Historical telemetry and endpoint artifacts are essential for identifying the initial compromise and determining its scope.

Conclusion

The UNC7017 campaign demonstrates a stealthy software supply-chain attack model built around brief configuration changes, trusted update mechanisms, legitimate administration utilities, and persistent endpoint payloads.

CROSSROAD delivered secondary components, SHINYROAD provided covert backdoor functionality, and Adaptix C2 supported later-stage activity. The use of WebDAV authentication coercion added a credential-exposure risk independent of successful malware execution.

The primary defensive lesson is clear: software supply-chain security requires more than trusting HTTPS, checksums, or a clean server at the time of investigation.

Organizations should combine signed update metadata, strict destination validation, endpoint behavioral monitoring, scheduled-task hunting, and retrospective network analysis to detect and contain similar campaigns.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply ChainT1071.001 — Web ProtocolsT1059 — Command and Scripting InterpreterT1105 — Ingress Tool TransferT1543.003 — Windows ServiceT1053.005 — Scheduled TaskT1218 — System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1071.004 — DNS