Introduction
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant investigated a software supply-chain compromise campaign targeting AOMEI Technology's update infrastructure between April and July 2026. The threat cluster, tracked as UNC7017, repeatedly modified remote update configuration files for short periods of five to ten minutes before restoring their legitimate contents.
The campaign abused AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer update and notification mechanisms to deliver malicious payloads to systems polling the affected servers during these windows. The attack chain involved the CROSSROAD downloader, the SHINYROAD backdoor, modified Radmin administration utilities, and the Adaptix command-and-control framework.
The campaign also incorporated WebDAV-based NTLM credential coercion through an invisible notification window, potentially exposing authentication hashes without requiring visible user interaction.
This investigation highlights how temporary configuration tampering can evade conventional point-in-time investigations and why endpoint-level threat hunting remains essential even after a vendor restores its update infrastructure.
Key Highlights
Target: AOMEI Technology's software update and notification infrastructure.
Activity period: April–July 2026.
Threat cluster: UNC7017.
Primary access technique: Software supply-chain compromise through remote configuration tampering.
Initial downloader: CROSSROAD.
Secondary backdoor: SHINYROAD.
Additional framework: Adaptix C2.
Credential theft technique: WebDAV-based NTLM authentication coercion.
Persistence: Windows scheduled tasks and DLL search-order hijacking.
Evasion: Short-lived server modifications, configuration restoration, timestomping, and malware self-deletion.
Affected sectors: IT services, telecommunications, higher education, and related organizations.
Observed geographic reach: Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United States.
Vendor response: AOMEI reported taking corrective action following notification from Mandiant.
Why This Campaign Matters
Traditional software supply-chain attacks frequently involve malicious source-code changes, compromised build systems, or trojanized software releases. UNC7017 instead abused the configuration and distribution layer used by legitimate software clients.
The attacker temporarily redirected update downloads to malicious infrastructure and manipulated notification settings to trigger execution of downloaded files. Once the brief tampering window ended, the server configuration returned to its authentic state.
This approach created three significant challenges:
Limited detection window: Investigators checking the vendor's configuration files after the attack might find only legitimate content.
Persistent endpoint compromise: Malware already downloaded and executed could remain active after server-side remediation.
Blended malicious activity: Legitimate administration utilities and familiar software names helped conceal backdoors and command-and-control activity.
The campaign demonstrates that HTTPS connections and checksum validation alone are insufficient when update metadata itself can be tampered with and the checksum is supplied through the same compromised channel.
Understanding the AOMEI Update Mechanism
AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer rely on background processes and remote configuration files to handle updates and notifications.
Update Configuration: down_html.ini
The client retrieves update information from:
https://www2.aomeisoftware.com/download/abpopup/down_html.ini
The configuration identifies the update package, its version, and the expected MD5 checksum.
Notification Configuration: Notifycfg.ini
The client retrieves notification instructions from:
https://account.aomeitech.com/Notifycfg.ini
This file controls promotional notifications and specifies actions or programs that the local notification process, ABNotify.exe, can execute.
Under normal conditions, these mechanisms direct clients to legitimate AOMEI resources. UNC7017 modified both configurations to redirect downloads and abuse the notification workflow.
Attack Chain Overview
The observed campaign can be summarized as follows:
Temporary server compromise
↓
Modification of down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini
↓
Malicious update redirection and notification-triggered execution
↓
CROSSROAD downloader execution
↓
Secondary payload retrieval and scheduled-task persistence
↓
Radmin DLL search-order hijacking and SHINYROAD execution
↓
Command-and-control communications and possible follow-on activity
A separate branch used a hidden notification window to coerce WebDAV/NTLM authentication. Later activity also involved Adaptix C2 payloads masquerading as Nitro PDF utilities.
Ephemeral Update Configuration Tampering
GTIG and Mandiant documented three specific tampering windows:
| Date | Observed window (UTC) | Duration |
|---|---|---|
| May 28, 2026 | 05:40–05:50 | 10 minutes |
| July 16, 2026 | 08:33–08:39 | 6 minutes |
| July 20, 2026 | 10:35–10:40 | 5 minutes |
During these windows, UNC7017 redirected update downloads, incremented the minor build identifier, and replaced the expected MD5 checksum to match the malicious package.
On July 16, the attacker also expanded Notifycfg.ini with more than 35,000 repetitive configuration sections. This configuration manipulation forced update behavior and triggered execution of the CROSSROAD dropper from the local HTML directory.
At the end of each observed window, the actor restored the legitimate remote configuration files, complicating retrospective server-side investigation.
Infrastructure Evolution
UNC7017 changed its delivery infrastructure throughout the campaign.
April–May 2026: Early CROSSROAD samples used Alibaba Cloud Object Storage at
serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com.July 1–7, 2026: The actor used vendor-themed domains, including
storage-data.com,promotion.storage-data.com, andaomei.storage-data.com.July 20, 2026: Initial payload delivery used a Google Cloud Storage bucket at
storage.googleapis.com/aomeiupdate/upgrade-now.zip, while secondary payload retrieval and command-and-control activity continued to use actor-controlled infrastructure.
The shift to reputable cloud-hosted infrastructure complicated domain-reputation-based blocking and illustrated the limitations of relying exclusively on newly registered domain detection.
WebDAV NTLM Credential Coercion
On July 20, UNC7017 modified Notifycfg.ini to replace a legitimate promotional banner with an invisible 1 × 1 pixel notification window.
The configuration directed the client to load an HTML resource through a WebDAV UNC path:
file://8.210.84.56/DavWWWRoot/campaign/24hour-flash-sale.html
The hidden window was configured with a high execution priority. When the client attempted to access the remote resource, the request could trigger Windows authentication and expose NetNTLMv2 authentication material to the remote server.
This technique is associated with MITRE ATT&CK T1187, Forced Authentication.
Defensive implication: Embedded notification and web-view components should reject untrusted file:// and UNC WebDAV resources. Organizations should also restrict outbound SMB and WebDAV connections to external destinations.
Malware Analysis: CROSSROAD Downloader
CROSSROAD is a 64-bit Windows downloader written in C and delivered in the malicious upgrade-now.zip archive.
The July 16 sample identified in the report has the following SHA-256:
9a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450
Execution and Evasion
CROSSROAD performs several actions before staging its secondary payloads:
Path validation: Checks whether its file path contains the substring
AOMEI. If absent, it initiates self-deletion but continues certain configuration and downloader routines.Geolocation checks: Queries external IP-reflection services and DNS-based checks. In specific execution branches, a country code of
CNcauses the primary payload path to abort.Mutex creation: Uses
Global\{F9E6E3C0-E11A-4F85-9944-AF4AD6E05883}to prevent concurrent instances.Configuration restoration: Resets the local update version parameter and restores a legitimate AOMEI download URL.
Secondary payload retrieval: Downloads a component archive into a temporary directory and extracts it under
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\.Persistence: Creates the scheduled task
RadminComponentRuntime, which launchesFamItrfc.exe --runtimechkevery three hours.Self-deletion: Uses a child process with the
--nitrodparameter and an alternate NTFS data stream named:wtfbbqto complicate recovery and forensic analysis.
The executable also contained the misspelled product metadata string AOMEI Update Compent, which is useful for detection.
SHINYROAD Backdoor and Radmin Abuse
The secondary payload bundle contains components associated with the SHINYROAD modular backdoor.
DLL Search-Order Hijacking
The scheduled task launches a legitimate signed Radmin executable, such as FamItrfc.exe. During startup, the executable loads the attacker's unsigned BlkScrDl.dll through DLL search-order hijacking.
The signed status of the legitimate executable does not establish that the entire execution chain is trustworthy.
In-Memory Payload Execution
The malicious DLL locates config.zip, maps its contents into a shared memory section, and registers csvc\RuntimeComponent.dll as an in-process COM server.
The payload component extracts encrypted metadata from the archive and decrypts it using ChaCha20 with an HMAC-SHA256-derived key and initialization vector. The decrypted content consists of compiled Python bytecode executed using an embedded PocketPy interpreter.
The report identifies the following shared memory artifact:
Local\963d3c60-d406-4ad6-aa1e-dc8e45061ccf
Backdoor Capabilities
Observed SHINYROAD capabilities include:
Remote shell execution.
Hostname and username fingerprinting.
Custom encrypted command-and-control communications.
In-memory extension loading.
Traffic chaffing through randomized junk packets.
Earlier variants used raw TCP communication on port 41397; later activity included communications over port 443.
Adaptix C2 and Nitro PDF Masquerading
In mid-July, UNC7017 deployed ADAPTAGENT, the client component of the Adaptix C2 framework.
The payloads masqueraded as Nitro PDF promotional or scanning utilities, including NitroPromotion.exe. The observed activity created a scheduled task named NitroRuntime that launched the executable through hidden PowerShell.
The payload sideloaded Eztwain4.dll from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\ and established periodic beaconing to:
8.210.84.56:6800
This activity demonstrates how familiar application names, legitimate binaries, and scheduled tasks can obscure malicious post-exploitation activity.
Detection and Hunting Opportunities
Security operations teams should investigate endpoint behavior rather than relying solely on current server responses or file reputation.
Endpoint Artifacts
| Location | Suspicious artifacts | Investigation focus |
|---|---|---|
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\ | BlkScrDl.dll, csvc\RuntimeComponent.dll, config.zip, metadata.dat | Unsigned DLL loading, COM registration, and --runtimechk execution |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Nitro Pro\ | Eztwain4.dll, NitroPromotion.exe | DLL sideloading and unexpected C2 activity |
%TEMP%\ | svc\*.tmp, en\ | Temporary payload staging and self-deletion activity |
| AOMEI installation directories | Tmphtml\, html\, upgrade-now.zip, upgrade-now.exe | Unauthorized update archives and executable drops |
| Windows scheduled tasks | RadminComponentRuntime, NitroRuntime | Unexpected persistence and hidden process execution |
Investigators should preserve cached configuration files from AOMEI installation directories, along with relevant EDR, proxy, firewall, DNS, and process-creation telemetry.
Network Hunting
Review outbound traffic and historical DNS/proxy records for:
promotion.storage-data.comaomei.storage-data.comstorage-data.comserv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com8.210.84.568.218.65.18447.239.60.117
Investigate requests using the user-agent Anyviewer-loader/1.0, connections to the documented staging URLs, and unusual external SMB or WebDAV authentication attempts.
These indicators are based on the reported campaign and should be correlated with timestamps, endpoint context, and additional evidence before attributing activity.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Malicious File Hashes (SHA-256)
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
upgrade-now.zip — May 20 archive | 6670ab3f0434a42f33416f8354150b1701e7615f3cfa2f1635e54f8df0f6eec7 |
upgrade-now.exe — May 20 loader | 11e576df44e9c9eef72b9f5b699291bcdb200a19130778ec231e5b0987b913ad |
upgrade-now.exe — July 16 loader | 9a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450 |
upgrade-now.exe — July 20 loader | b360b6db0c2b668317edc1504a7c39ef047f0d925c8f113b521f6724c157ae21 |
upgrade-now.zip — July 20 archive | 9ed503c6a9a3a493fb859401e9ed469eed77ab9927341964d6dbfbfa6255aeba |
component.zip / en.zip | d167bc898e856da8a4003cb4dfc7de55fea109eee3cd64fc8999710314109464 |
RuntimeComponent.dll | 8fbaa74b27dc1e89abfc694e834378746f0ad37a688098c5f8f511410157c8b8 |
BlkScrDl.dll | 5837bc26a73cfb46ffd466cf889f03ce2f6a48f1f3fd42ec8be22189d51cab1e |
config.zip | 4c0a75e0f62ddc0bb350c224fe996f3b2ab08dcb0d288231c61ffe9406c7045b |
metadata.dat | 4b4d25b3501519476f9a62a88a781e4f446f669280eb5e98c6b96eb6d3743431 |
NitroPromotion.exe | 14b31918075e6130b9123158743db0a81e2d7bfcf6d39731ee7d9200a98cd591 |
Eztwain4.dll | 8c8090aca8ddb1cf968d2b810457e0cfce97c03cd721f70d2eca7f37f2681fc4 |
abe.exe | 7b252be444dee2fb2a57043a823dc5b5e1fae970aea91ee2c8339aa70329969d |
Configuration File Hashes (SHA-256)
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
down_html.ini — July 16 | 924ad92d89dde577d5858b2ebc5703a485467842d78e98b75019b2e2e0ac3fe6 |
Notifycfg.ini — July 16 | d2f9ef2429312667f0512504b6a19ba4a9cc5514f1b2933923dd42f75a1c5934 |
Notifycfg.ini — July 20 | 286e0d8c7bdfaa7c251a3e8f0f2fefbe25c67586c0149d39b1095c89dc6023c8 |
down_html.ini — July 20 | f2a7d0a4c8613a9cdd31ede6131b27040c0571ca97970b245a710191806d7ac4 |
Network Indicators
| Indicator | Context |
|---|---|
8.210.84.56 | WebDAV NTLM coercion target and Adaptix C2 |
8.218.65.184 | Historical SHINYROAD C2; ports 41397 and 443 |
47.239.60.117 | Secondary infrastructure |
96.126.191.98 | IP allowlist address observed in June 2026 |
promotion.storage-data.com | CROSSROAD staging domain |
aomei.storage-data.com | Secondary payload infrastructure |
storage-data.com | Threat-actor-controlled domain |
serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com | Early Alibaba Cloud staging infrastructure |
Additional Detection Artifacts
Mutex:
Global\{F9E6E3C0-E11A-4F85-9944-AF4AD6E05883}Shared memory:
Local\963d3c60-d406-4ad6-aa1e-dc8e45061ccfScheduled task:
RadminComponentRuntimeScheduled task:
NitroRuntimeCROSSROAD execution argument:
--nitrodSHINYROAD execution argument:
--runtimechk
The listed indicators should be validated against the original GTIG/Mandiant publication before operational deployment.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | Observed activity |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1195.002 — Supply Chain Compromise | Tampering with AOMEI update configuration |
| Execution | T1059.001 — PowerShell | Hidden PowerShell execution for Nitro-related payloads |
| Execution | T1059.006 — Python | Embedded PocketPy bytecode execution |
| Execution | T1559.001 — Component Object Model | COM-based loading of RuntimeComponent.dll |
| Persistence | T1053.005 — Scheduled Task | RadminComponentRuntime and NitroRuntime |
| Defense Evasion | T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking | Loading BlkScrDl.dll through a legitimate Radmin executable |
| Defense Evasion | T1036.005 — Masquerading | Radmin and Nitro PDF-themed payloads |
| Defense Evasion | T1027.013 — Encrypted/Encoded File | Encrypted SHINYROAD payload metadata |
| Defense Evasion | T1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Decryption of payloads in memory |
| Defense Evasion | T1070.004 — File Deletion | CROSSROAD self-deletion |
| Defense Evasion | T1564.004 — NTFS File Attributes | Alternate data stream use during deletion |
| Credential Access | T1187 — Forced Authentication | WebDAV-based NTLM credential coercion |
| Discovery | T1016 — System Network Configuration Discovery | External IP discovery |
| Discovery | T1614 — System Location Discovery | Geolocation-based execution checks |
| Discovery | T1082 — System Information Discovery | Host fingerprinting |
| Discovery | T1033 — System Owner/User Discovery | Username-based agent identification |
| Command and Control | T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer | Downloading secondary payload archives |
| Command and Control | T1571 — Non-Standard Port | C2 communication over TCP 41397 and 6800 |
| Command and Control | T1573.001 — Symmetric Cryptography | Encrypted command-and-control traffic |
| Command and Control | T1001.001 — Junk Data | Randomized traffic chaffing |
| Command and Control | T1219.002 — Remote Access Software | Abuse of Radmin administration utilities |
Recommended Mitigations
Endpoint and Network Defenses
Hunt across AOMEI endpoints for CROSSROAD, SHINYROAD, and Adaptix-related artifacts dating from April through July 2026.
Inspect cached
down_html.iniandNotifycfg.inifiles, update directories, and temporary payload locations.Review scheduled tasks for unauthorized
RadminComponentRuntimeandNitroRuntimeentries.Investigate unsigned DLLs loaded by signed Radmin or Nitro-related executables.
Correlate process trees, DNS records, proxy logs, firewall telemetry, and EDR alerts.
Block confirmed malicious domains and IP addresses where appropriate, while validating business impact and reviewing threat intelligence updates.
Restrict outbound SMB and WebDAV traffic to untrusted external destinations.
Preserve forensic evidence before removing malware or rebuilding affected endpoints.
If compromise is confirmed, isolate affected systems, remove persistence, investigate credential exposure, and rotate potentially compromised credentials.
Software Vendor Hardening
Require cryptographic signature verification for downloaded executables and update packages.
Digitally sign remote update configuration files using asymmetric cryptography.
Restrict update destinations to approved vendor domains and trusted distribution infrastructure.
Prevent embedded web views and notification handlers from processing unsafe
file://or UNC WebDAV resources.Separate promotional notification systems from software update and execution mechanisms.
Implement real-time file integrity monitoring, strong access controls, and multifactor authentication for update servers and storage buckets.
Alert on unexpected configuration modifications and preserve versioned configuration history for incident response.
Why Server-Side Remediation Is Not Enough
AOMEI reported that corrective actions had been taken after Mandiant notified the company on July 17, 2026, with a response reported on July 29.
However, restoring the update servers does not remove payloads already installed on endpoints. Systems that checked for updates during a tampering window may still contain scheduled tasks, backdoors, malicious DLLs, or compromised credentials.
Investigators should not dismiss suspicious endpoint detections simply because the vendor's current configuration files appear clean. Historical telemetry and endpoint artifacts are essential for identifying the initial compromise and determining its scope.
Conclusion
The UNC7017 campaign demonstrates a stealthy software supply-chain attack model built around brief configuration changes, trusted update mechanisms, legitimate administration utilities, and persistent endpoint payloads.
CROSSROAD delivered secondary components, SHINYROAD provided covert backdoor functionality, and Adaptix C2 supported later-stage activity. The use of WebDAV authentication coercion added a credential-exposure risk independent of successful malware execution.
The primary defensive lesson is clear: software supply-chain security requires more than trusting HTTPS, checksums, or a clean server at the time of investigation.
Organizations should combine signed update metadata, strict destination validation, endpoint behavioral monitoring, scheduled-task hunting, and retrospective network analysis to detect and contain similar campaigns.
