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HighMalware · 19 min read

MALFEX npm Malware Campaign Delivers Three Payloads Through Malicious JavaScript Packages

Checkmarx researchers uncovered MALFEX, a long-running npm supply-chain malware campaign associated with an operator who has been publishing packages to the npm registry since August 2023. The campaign uses malicious JavaScript packages to deliver three distinct types of payloads to Windows systems: the Overlord Remote Access Trojan (RAT), the movinlike information stealer, and a downloader distributed through the function-flag package. According to Checkmarx, 12 npm packages were associated with the operator, of which eight contained malicious code. The remaining four packages were described as benign cover packages. The malicious packages used multiple execution methods, including npm installation hooks and code that executes when a package is loaded by an application. As of October 1, 2026, the eight malicious packages had accumulated 40,767 recorded downloads, including 3,017 downloads during the preceding week. These figures measure package downloads rather than confirmed infections. Checkmarx reported that three malicious packages remained live and installable as of September 29 and October 1, 2026: function-flag, function-color, and cdn-img-fetch. The campaign presents a significant software supply-chain risk because its payloads can steal credentials, establish remote access, collect browser and messaging data, and download additional executables. The researchers also found that advisory coverage was incomplete, meaning security tools that rely exclusively on vulnerability or malware advisory feeds could miss some affected package versions.

Written by Vedanabhatla Sai Swetha·Published Oct 26, 2026

1. Description

MALFEX is an npm supply-chain campaign in which malicious packages masquerade as ordinary JavaScript development dependencies. Once installed or loaded, the packages can execute code that retrieves and launches additional payloads, collects sensitive information, or establishes remote access to the affected Windows system.

Checkmarx identified three independent delivery paths within the campaign. The first uses the packages tlxbnhd, tldriver, and mxdriver to deliver Overlord RAT. The second uses the dependency chain native-runner, img-to-native, and cdn-img-fetch to retrieve an encrypted payload and ultimately deploy the movinlike information stealer. The third uses function-flag, sometimes introduced through the wrapper package function-color, to download and execute an additional Windows payload.

Although the three paths were linked to what Checkmarx assessed as a common operator, they do not share the same infrastructure. Blocking one delivery path therefore does not automatically stop the others.

The operator's activity was notable for unusually explicit branding. The MALFEX name appeared across several npm publisher accounts, a payload repository's Git author email, a package README, and the decryption key used in the stealer chain.

The campaign also demonstrates why package security cannot rely solely on registry takedowns, download statistics, or installation-script restrictions. Some packages execute during installation, while the stealer chain can run when the package is loaded.

2. Technical Description

2.1 Campaign overview

AttributeDetails
CampaignMALFEX
First reported operator activityAugust 6, 2023
Research publicationOctober 5, 2026
Associated packages12
Malicious packages8
Benign cover packages4
Primary target platformWindows
Main delivery mechanismMalicious npm packages and dependency chains
Payload familiesOverlord RAT, movinlike stealer, and an additional downloader
Recorded malicious-package downloads40,767 as of October 1, 2026
Main riskRemote access, credential theft, information theft, and additional payload execution

2.2 Three independent delivery paths

Path 1: Overlord RAT

The packages tlxbnhd, tldriver, and mxdriver contain obfuscated installation scripts that download and launch a Windows executable. The downloaded file is presented as a PNG image but is actually an IExpress self-extracting archive containing a signed AutoIt interpreter and an encrypted script.

The script decrypts and launches Overlord RAT, which provides remote-access and monitoring capabilities.

Path 2: movinlike information stealer

The package chain native-runner → img-to-native → cdn-img-fetch retrieves an image containing appended encrypted data. The chain extracts and decrypts the embedded content, writes a Go-based downloader to the Windows user's application-data directory, and downloads movinlike.

The stealer targets Discord clients, browser credentials, Telegram session data, and cryptocurrency wallets. Collected information is compressed and sent through a Discord webhook.

Path 3: function-flag downloader

The package function-flag contains a downloader that retrieves and executes an external Windows executable. The function-color package acts as a wrapper that installs function-flag as a dependency.

The downloader has appeared in several malicious versions, each using a different payload URL and, in some cases, a different downloaded filename.

2.3 Execution mechanisms

The campaign uses more than one execution trigger:

  • Pre-install and post-install scripts: Used by the Overlord RAT loaders and the function-flag path.

  • Module-loading execution: Used by the stealer chain, which does not rely on an npm installation hook.

  • Dependency-triggered execution: Wrapper packages introduce other malicious packages as dependencies, potentially obscuring which package contains the malicious behavior.

This distinction is important when assessing exposure. A package may be dangerous even if an installation-script control prevents its lifecycle scripts from executing.

3. Attack Overview

3.1 Campaign timeline

PeriodReported activity
August 2023The operator's npm publishing activity began, according to Checkmarx.
July 2025function-flag had already become malicious, making it the longest-running identified component of the campaign.
September 22–30, 2026OSV malware advisories were issued for six of the eight malicious packages, according to the report.
September 25–26, 2026Checkmarx identified several stealer-chain downloader samples and confirmed that the Discord exfiltration webhook was live; the webhook was created on September 26.
September 29, 2026Three malicious packages remained live and installable, and the advisory coverage was incomplete.
October 1, 2026The eight malicious packages had recorded 40,767 total downloads, including 3,017 in the preceding week.
October 5, 2026Checkmarx published its research report.

3.2 Infection sequence

The precise sequence depends on which delivery path is encountered.

  1. A developer or automated build process installs or loads a malicious npm package.

  2. The package executes its installation hook or module-loading code.

  3. The code retrieves a payload from an external host or a public file repository.

  4. The downloaded content is extracted, decrypted, or launched as appropriate to the delivery path.

  5. The resulting payload runs on the Windows system.

  6. Depending on the payload, the malware establishes persistence, provides remote access, collects sensitive data, or downloads another executable.

  7. Stolen information may be transmitted to an attacker-controlled destination, including a Discord webhook in the movinlike path.

This sequence is a campaign-level summary. Not every package performs every step, and the three paths should be investigated independently.

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 Package inventory and affected versions

Checkmarx associated the following eight packages with malicious activity.

PackageMalicious versions reportedFunctionStatus reported by Checkmarx
function-flag1.7.3, 4.0.0, 3.0.0, 2.3.5–2.3.9Downloads and executes an external payloadLive; no advisory at the reported time
function-color1.7.3, 1.0.0Wrapper for function-flagLive; no advisory at the reported time
cdn-img-fetch1.0.0–1.0.3Retrieves the stealer-chain image payloadLive; advisory covered only 1.0.0 and 1.0.1
img-to-native1.0.0–1.0.3Extracts and decrypts the stealer-chain payloadSeized by npm
native-runner1.0.0–1.0.3Wrapper for img-to-nativeSeized by npm
tlxbnhd0.0.1Overlord RAT loaderUnpublished
tldriver0.0.1Overlord RAT loaderUnpublished
mxdriver0.0.1, 0.0.2Overlord RAT loaderUnpublished

Checkmarx also identified four packages published by the same operator that contained no malicious code and were used as cover:

  • function-ascii

  • malfapi

  • malfex-webhook-node

  • centralizemiddle

Status caveat: The package statuses above reflect the dates in Checkmarx's October 5, 2026 report, including registry observations from September 29 and October 1. They should not be treated as a live registry-status check.

4.2 Operator attribution and branding

Checkmarx linked the packages to what appeared to be a single operator. The MALFEX name appeared across five npm publisher accounts:

  • malfexkkj

  • malfex_user

  • malfexteste2

  • malfexteste3

  • malfexteste4

The researchers also identified the Git author email corpmalfex[@]gmail.com in a payload repository. A package README credited the MALFEX team and identified its owner as Murizada. The stealer chain used the decryption key malfexteam2027.

These details support the researchers' reported linkage between the packages and an operator using the MALFEX branding. They do not, by themselves, establish a verified real-world identity.

4.3 Path 1: Overlord RAT delivery

The packages tlxbnhd, tldriver, and mxdriver each operate as an independent loader. Their obfuscated preinstall.js and postinstall.js scripts execute during npm installation.

The loaders retrieve a payload from api.imghippo.com, save files with names including gldriver_pre_core.exe and gldriver_pre_asset.exe, launch the payload, and then delete the dropped files.

Although the payload is served with a PNG content type, Checkmarx determined that it is an IExpress self-extracting archive. It contains a legitimately signed AutoIt interpreter and an encrypted AutoIt script.

The script uses several layers of decoding and decompression, including XOR-encoded strings, RC4, and LZNT1 compression, to produce the Overlord RAT payload.

Checkmarx's code analysis indicated that the script injects Overlord into the signed Windows binary TapiUnattend.exe through process hollowing and spoofs the parent process as explorer.exe. The researchers explicitly noted that this step was established through code analysis rather than observed during live execution.

The installation scripts include launch commands for multiple operating systems, but the payload is a Windows executable. Checkmarx therefore identified Windows systems as the affected platform.

4.4 Overlord persistence

The Overlord delivery path copies components into a directory designed to resemble a legitimate vendor installation:

  • %LOCALAPPDATA%\ScopeSmart Technologies Inc\AutoIt3.exe

  • %LOCALAPPDATA%\ScopeSmart Technologies Inc\h.a3x

  • %LOCALAPPDATA%\ScopeSmart Technologies Inc\SmartScope.vbs

It also creates the scheduled task \Maiden.

Task propertyReported value
Task name\Maiden
Task action"AutoIt3.exe" "h.a3x"
Repeat intervalEvery five minutes
End timeNo end time
Start dateJanuary 1, 2020, backdated
AuthorWelcome
CommentWichita

Checkmarx reported that ScopeSmart Technologies Inc is not a real company and that the scheduled task's backdated start date could make it less noticeable during reviews focused on recently created tasks.

The report also notes that this infection does not rely on registry Run keys. Consequently, checking only Run-key persistence locations may fail to detect it.

The SmartScope.vbs script constructs the string "Wscript."+"Shell" through concatenation, potentially avoiding simplistic detections that search for the complete CreateObject("Wscript.Shell") expression.

4.5 Overlord command and control

According to Checkmarx, Overlord does not contain a fixed C2 address. Instead, it can retrieve encrypted memos posted by the operator in Solana blockchain transactions, decrypt them, and use the resulting information as its server list.

This design allows the operator to change server information by publishing a new transaction rather than changing the malware binary.

The analyzed build did not contain a configured Solana address or server list, and Checkmarx reported that it observed no C2 traffic during testing. The blockchain-based server-discovery capability was described from the analyzed code; it should not be confused with an observed successful C2 session.

The reported Overlord capabilities include:

  • Screen capture.

  • Keylogging.

  • Clipboard capture.

  • Active-window monitoring.

  • File searching.

  • Remote shell access.

  • A hidden desktop that uses a virtual display driver.

These functions can give an operator substantial visibility and control over an infected Windows endpoint.

4.6 Path 2: The movinlike information-stealer chain

The reported package relationship is:

native-runner → img-to-native → cdn-img-fetch

None of these packages relies on an installation hook in the observed chain. Instead, malicious behavior is triggered when the relevant module is loaded.

native-runner acts as a wrapper that pulls in img-to-native. The latter requires cdn-img-fetch, triggering the image retrieval behavior.

The cdn-img-fetch package downloads banner.png from a public GitHub content URL. The downloaded image contains encrypted data appended after the normal PNG content. img-to-native waits for the image, locates the appended data, and decrypts it using AES with the key malfexteam2027.

The extracted Go executable is written to:

%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\node_runtime_helper.exe

This downloader retrieves setup.exe from 104[.]234.65.75:700. Checkmarx identified the downloaded payload as movinlike, a Node.js information stealer packaged as a Windows executable.

4.7 Data collected by movinlike

Checkmarx reported that movinlike targets eight Discord clients:

  • Discord

  • Discord Canary

  • Discord PTB

  • Discord Development

  • Lightcord

  • Vesktop

  • Nightcord

  • Bluecord

The malware injects code into client startup scripts to obtain authentication tokens. It then collects profile information, saved payment sources, subscriptions, servers, friends, and linked accounts.

The stealer also targets:

  • Browser data: Cookies and saved login information from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, and Yandex.

  • Telegram: Desktop session data stored in %APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdata.

  • Cryptocurrency wallets: Browser extensions including MetaMask, Phantom, and Coinbase Wallet, as well as desktop wallets.

The collected information is compressed, divided into chunks of approximately 25 MB, and sent to a hardcoded Discord webhook.

Checkmarx reported that the webhook was live during its investigation and that it had been created on September 26, 2026, in a newly created Discord server.

4.8 Path 3: function-flag downloader

function-flag represents the longest-running identified part of the campaign. Checkmarx reported that it had been malicious since July 2025.

The package's index.js contains a downloader, and the malicious versions use different URLs to retrieve external executables. In version 1.7.3, the post-install script runs example.js, which calls the package's ASCII-art functionality using the Bloody font. This input triggers the hidden download routine.

The 1.7.3 version attempts to download node.exe from cdnzona[.]discloud.app, save it to %APPDATA%\node.exe, and execute it with its window hidden.

Other reported versions download files named svchost.exe, nocry.exe, or malfex.exe from different URLs.

The routine is wrapped in an empty catch block, allowing the installation to complete without reporting a visible error when the download fails. The code also relies on process.env.APPDATA, which is undefined outside Windows in the described execution context. Checkmarx therefore reported that this payload path affects Windows systems.

The researchers observed that malicious code was padded with whitespace, placing it beyond the visible portion of a typical code editor. They also noted that the operator published a malicious 4.0.0 version before publishing the malicious 1.7.3 version, demonstrating why version ordering alone is not a reliable security check.

The function-color wrapper does not contain its own payload but installs function-flag as a dependency. Blocking only the underlying downloader without identifying wrappers and transitive dependencies can therefore leave an installation route open.

Checkmarx could not recover the node.exe payload from version 1.7.3 because its download host was not responding during the investigation. The researchers did not find evidence linking function-flag to the movinlike stealer.

4.9 Advisory coverage gaps

Checkmarx reported that six of the eight malicious packages had OSV malware advisories issued between September 22 and September 30, 2026.

The report identified two significant gaps:

  1. function-flag and function-color had no advisory at the time of the research.

  2. Advisory MAL-2026-17320 for cdn-img-fetch covered versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1, but not malicious versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.3.

The five removed packages and the advisory coverage reported by Checkmarx were:

PackageAdvisoryStatus in the report
tlxbnhdMAL-2026-16385Unpublished
tldriverMAL-2026-16384Unpublished
mxdriverMAL-2026-16383Unpublished
img-to-nativeMAL-2026-17216Seized by npm
native-runnerMAL-2026-17218Seized by npm
function-flagNoneLive
function-colorNoneLive
cdn-img-fetchMAL-2026-17320, versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 onlyLive

The key defensive lesson is that package blocklists, lockfile review, registry monitoring, and malware advisories should be used together. A missing advisory does not establish that a package is safe.

5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were reported by Checkmarx. URLs are defanged to reduce the risk of accidental access.

5.1 Package indicators

PackageMalicious versions reported
function-flag1.7.3, 4.0.0, 3.0.0, 2.3.5–2.3.9
function-color1.7.3, 1.0.0
cdn-img-fetch1.0.0–1.0.3
img-to-native1.0.0–1.0.3
native-runner1.0.0–1.0.3
tlxbnhd0.0.1
tldriver0.0.1
mxdriver0.0.1, 0.0.2

5.2 URLs and network indicators

IndicatorAssociated role
hxxps[:]//api.imghippo.com/files/hOG8244hc.pngOverlord RAT payload served as image/png
www.image.comSecond Overlord RAT delivery domain associated with mxdriver
hxxps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/cavecrew/proj/main/banner.pngStealer-chain payload used by cdn-img-fetch versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.2
hxxps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/cavecrew/proj/main/banner.jpgPayload associated with cdn-img-fetch version 1.0.3
hxxp[:]//104.234.65.75:700/setup.exemovinlike download
hxxp[:]//104.234.65.75/setup.exeAlternate movinlike download path
hxxps[:]//cdnzona.discloud.app/node.exefunction-flag version 1.7.3 payload
hxxps[:]//apicdn.squareweb.app/attachments/1392577835742265576/1395570372077682768/svchost.exefunction-flag version 4.0.0 payload
hxxps[:]//bypasscdn.onrender.com/hxxps[:]//cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/1392577835742265576/139557037…Reported function-flag version 3.0.0 payload route; source URL is truncated
hxxp[:]//45.89.30.194/attachments/1242231519943069778/1270557692171128915/nocry.exefunction-flag version 2.3.9 payload
hxxp[:]//45.89.30.194/attachments/1255944996503158885/1263421457598386237/malfex.exefunction-flag version 2.3.8 payload
hxxp[:]//191.96.81.101/attachments/1255944996503158885/1259416184265244682/malfex.exefunction-flag version 2.3.7 payload
hxxps[:]//apizona.onrender.com/attachments/1255944996503158885/1259416184265244682/malfex.exefunction-flag version 2.3.6 payload
hxxp[:]//51.137.158.178/downloadfunction-flag version 2.3.5 payload
discord.com/api/webhooks/1553545982975811594/…movinlike exfiltration webhook; token portion is not reproduced

Blocking note: Checkmarx specifically warns that api.imghippo.com, raw.githubusercontent.com, discord.com, and onrender.com are shared services. Where network controls allow it, prioritize the specific malicious paths rather than blocking these entire domains indiscriminately.

5.3 SHA-256 file hashes

ArtifactSHA-256
Overlord RAT loader served as PNG9aba4685af072231aee049e1a5e294965580001b364d7d00152d84fcec1ce793
Signed AutoIt3.exe from archive5d69a932a077fee044b193c28e84564143f5c7e51079ab48e88fef74ab0b77b7
Oxygen.a3x / h.a3x encrypted scriptfd199d3977e1a2945b6031fc8696660a980e4f4617899baa045efe7ccbc8de67
Decoded Overlord RAT2989244eac2a4bc7a13a09dec003e5c05ef7c80b2afe0958ce25042d5b804210
Current banner.png4f4f7d64139bde6d458a061c7fb7dd247f70f60a1ab47d87fd3634656586c106
Stealer-chain downloader, September 25 sample 1889e13e227bc2b762178b88c35c691db3256e72be64d92ff1f381d29a2789849
Stealer-chain downloader, September 25 sample 2e7f86f6cc4380db66d333eaf6f7dfc2c12d232c2bcd526434681245dea25efa4
Stealer-chain downloader, September 25 sample 3ff826d2778ea1d40ce8ebfd9d66ecc86d4c811f5654b8a466a7e220ebbbc6807
Stealer-chain downloader, September 26 sample2f268ca76ab27971d8b16bd4ded26e1f9cd3d4460b894af2d4bdf89f0ab7ec4b
tlxbnhd/scripts/postinstall.js7acf331117900179b483142f216fdcb22c671eb0b1971abd57f01bc036248a6e
movinlikec9c374afba4658dff15f71801e88c4d199c91dd2622d72c7b0c55577c8f73437
native-runner package index.jsc7cf2323e4923428984297db7715d75fec5b964fe65c325b53e3fa360f3b8d86
img-to-native package index.js, including version 1.0.1430300450f5acbd69c29f02d8c2e243f7d1d6202d1826f6e4d7715f95c47299b
cdn-img-fetch package index.js4cba0c785e66d517eabd0164f34a9c2d04549da93b5ee3eebdce5558daa2f47c
cdn-img-fetch package index.js5c933aa533721fa293b284170dd4611a4d88f88cc89f2d9c28ea4e22305b1f75
cdn-img-fetch version 1.0.3 banner.jpg8f7ed69fb5505b57f06e673826779d459f7735739756de73a6d3347a9c8ea0cc
cdn-img-fetch package index.jsd54853d6be467567d9f22d7f22ac48214df52c1f9c7a503930e901286423044a
cdn-img-fetch package example.js886b84f83a0f760e664046ba40d8c800b7d0cf72190e13ca031ee5cf50f45bee

Checkmarx notes that movinlike can be rebuilt relatively easily. File-hash matching should therefore be combined with behavioral, package, and host-artifact detection.

5.4 Host artifacts and persistence indicators

ArtifactSignificance
%LOCALAPPDATA%\ScopeSmart Technologies Inc\Overlord loader installation directory
Scheduled task \MaidenOverlord persistence
<package dir>\gldriver_pre_core.exeOverlord payload file, reported to be deleted after launch
<package dir>\gldriver_pre_asset.exeOverlord payload file, reported to be deleted after launch
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\node_runtime_helper.exeDecrypted stealer-chain downloader
%TEMP%\._cif_dataStealer-chain intermediate file
%APPDATA%\node.exefunction-flag version 1.7.3 payload

These paths are indicators to investigate, not proof by themselves that a host is infected. Preserve relevant evidence and correlate findings with package installation records, file timestamps, process execution, and network telemetry.

6. Potential Impact

6.1 Remote access to Windows endpoints

The Overlord RAT path can provide remote shell access, screen capture, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, file searching, and other monitoring capabilities. Successful execution could allow an operator to observe user activity and interact with an affected system.

6.2 Credential and account theft

The movinlike stealer targets Discord authentication tokens and account data, browser cookies and saved credentials, Telegram sessions, and cryptocurrency wallet information. Exposed credentials may enable account takeover and unauthorized transactions.

6.3 Cryptocurrency and financial risk

The collection of browser-based and desktop wallet data increases the risk of unauthorized access to cryptocurrency assets. Discord data collection can also expose saved payment information and subscription details.

6.4 Additional payload execution

The function-flag path downloads and executes external Windows files. Because Checkmarx could not recover the 1.7.3 payload during its investigation, the full behavior of that particular downloaded executable was not confirmed in the report.

6.5 Persistence and detection evasion

The Overlord path uses a scheduled task with a backdated start date and does not rely on registry Run keys. Some payloads also use obfuscation, whitespace padding, misleading file extensions, and silent error handling, which may complicate superficial source-code or endpoint reviews.

6.6 Software supply-chain exposure

Developers, build agents, and Windows workstations that install the affected packages may be exposed. A compromised development environment can place source code, package credentials, cloud credentials, and downstream build processes at risk, depending on the access available to the affected machine.

6.7 Incomplete advisory visibility

Because Checkmarx reported missing or incomplete advisories for certain packages and versions, organizations that depend exclusively on advisory feeds may fail to identify all affected dependencies.

6.8 Scope limitations

The 40,767 download figure represents package downloads, not confirmed infected devices or unique victims. Checkmarx reported no legitimate or widely used packages depending on the operator's packages and found no geographic or organizational targeting. Exposure was therefore associated with systems that installed the named packages, rather than an identified targeted victim list.

7. Recommendations

7.1 Immediate Actions

1. Check direct and transitive dependencies

Inspect the complete dependency tree for every malicious package and affected version. Review lockfiles as well as package.json, since malicious versions may remain pinned after registry removal.

Run the following command from the relevant Node.js project:

npm ls function-flag function-color cdn-img-fetch img-to-native native-runner tlxbnhd tldriver mxdriver --all

Search common lockfiles:

rg -n 'function-flag|function-color|cdn-img-fetch|img-to-native|native-runner|tlxbnhd|tldriver|mxdriver' package-lock.json npm-shrinkwrap.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock

2. Block all eight malicious packages

Block the identified malicious packages at the registry proxy or dependency-management layer. Include wrapper packages such as function-color and native-runner; blocking only one underlying dependency may not prevent other entry points.

3. Investigate Windows hosts

Check for the reported host artifacts, scheduled task, and payload files. Correlate any findings with package installation history and endpoint telemetry.

Example PowerShell checks:

Test-Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\ScopeSmart Technologies Inc"
Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\node_runtime_helper.exe"
Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\node.exe"
schtasks /query /tn "\Maiden" /fo LIST /v

A positive result warrants investigation. A negative result does not rule out infection because some payloads delete dropped files or use different versions and paths.

4. Isolate potentially infected Windows systems

If a malicious package was installed and its payload may have executed, isolate the host from the network and preserve logs and filesystem evidence. Treat the system as potentially compromised even if node_modules has since been deleted.

5. Remove persistence and malicious artifacts

After preserving relevant forensic evidence, remove confirmed malicious scheduled tasks, files, and persistence mechanisms as part of the incident-response process. Consider rebuilding the affected host if the extent of compromise cannot be established confidently.

6. Rotate exposed credentials from a clean system

From a known-clean device, change passwords and revoke sessions for affected accounts. Prioritize Discord, browser-saved accounts, developer credentials, cloud credentials, and other secrets available on the compromised machine. Terminate active Telegram sessions and follow wallet-provider guidance if cryptocurrency wallet information may have been exposed.

7. Review account activity

Examine Discord accounts for unexpected payment activity and review affected accounts for unfamiliar sign-ins, session changes, or other suspicious behavior.

8. Review network telemetry

Search DNS, proxy, firewall, and endpoint records for the specific defanged URLs and associated hosts listed in the IOC section. Avoid indiscriminate blocking of shared services when a more precise path-based control is available.

7.2 Preventive Actions

1. Enforce malicious-package blocking

Use registry proxies, dependency controls, and software composition analysis to block all eight malicious package names and their identified versions.

2. Monitor advisory feeds and package intelligence

Do not rely on OSV or another single advisory source as the sole source of package-risk decisions. Check package versions against multiple intelligence sources and maintain an internal blocklist for confirmed malicious packages.

3. Review package behavior before installation

Inspect package scripts, lifecycle hooks, dependency chains, and code executed at module load time. Investigate suspicious use of network requests, encoded payloads, executable downloads, and unexpected native binaries.

4. Restrict installation-script execution where practical

Disabling npm lifecycle scripts can reduce exposure to packages that execute through preinstall or postinstall. However, Checkmarx explicitly warns that --ignore-scripts alone does not protect against the movinlike chain because its malicious code executes when the package is loaded.

5. Apply least privilege to developer environments

Limit the credentials available to developer workstations and CI agents. Avoid exposing production secrets or broad cloud credentials to builds that do not need them.

6. Strengthen endpoint monitoring

Monitor for suspicious scheduled tasks, executables appearing in application-data directories, unusual AutoIt execution, unexpected Node.js child processes, and outbound connections to suspicious download or exfiltration endpoints.

7. Protect browser and messaging credentials

Use appropriate endpoint protection, avoid storing highly privileged credentials unnecessarily, and enforce multifactor authentication where supported. Investigate suspicious sessions and revoke potentially exposed tokens promptly.

8. Preserve dependency and build evidence

Retain lockfiles, package archives, build logs, endpoint telemetry, and registry-proxy records. This supports investigation even if a malicious package is later unpublished or removed from the registry.

9. Verify remediation across caches

Remove malicious packages from private registries, dependency proxies, and internal caches. Registry takedowns do not automatically remove copies that have already been mirrored or cached.

8. Detection and Threat Hunting

A robust investigation should correlate package-level evidence with host behavior and network activity.

Detection areaWhat to look for
Dependency inventoryAny of the eight malicious packages or reported versions in direct or transitive dependencies
LockfilesPackage names and versions retained after registry takedown
npm lifecycle activityUnexpected downloads and executable launches during package installation
Module-loading behaviorNetwork activity or payload execution when requiring a package
Scheduled tasks\Maiden, especially with the reported action and backdated start date
Host filesystemScopeSmart Technologies Inc, node_runtime_helper.exe, %APPDATA%\node.exe, and related files
Process activityUnexpected AutoIt, Node.js, or downloaded executable behavior
Network activityConnections to the specific reported payload URLs and IP addresses
Data theftUnexpected Discord webhook traffic or suspicious access to browser, Telegram, and wallet data

Registry and lockfile checks

Use the npm ls and rg commands in the Immediate Actions section to identify package references. Repeat these checks in CI environments and repositories that share dependency manifests.

Windows artifact checks

Use the PowerShell checks listed above, then investigate any matching artifact. Confirm the scheduled task's action, author, creation details, and execution history instead of relying solely on its name.

Network checks

Search for the specific URL paths in the IOC section, with particular attention to the reported Overlord delivery path, movinlike download endpoints, the function-flag payload URLs, and the Discord webhook path.

Because some indicators use shared infrastructure, detections should combine URL paths with process, package, and endpoint context.

9. Conclusion

The MALFEX campaign illustrates how malicious npm packages can remain a supply-chain threat by using multiple package names, different execution triggers, and separate payload-delivery paths. The three identified paths deliver Overlord RAT, the movinlike information stealer, or an additional downloader. Their shared attribution does not mean that they share infrastructure or can be disrupted through a single block.

The reported download volume indicates meaningful exposure potential, but it should not be confused with a confirmed infection count. Organizations should identify the affected packages and versions, inspect Windows hosts for the documented artifacts, block every malicious package—including wrappers—and rotate credentials from a clean system when compromise is suspected.

Most importantly, package security requires more than disabling installation scripts or relying on public advisory feeds. Developers and security teams should inspect dependency trees, monitor package behavior, restrict credential access, and retain endpoint and build telemetry to detect malicious code that executes after installation or when a module is loaded.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1195.001 — Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsT1059.007 — JavaScriptT1105 — Ingress Tool TransferT1053.005 — Scheduled TaskT1055 — Process InjectionT1555.003 — Credentials from Web BrowsersT1528 — Steal Application Access TokenT1115 — Clipboard DataT1113 — Screen CaptureT1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel