1. Description
On 29 October 2026, Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) published research detailing a sophisticated malware framework named NetamLoader.
The investigation began during the first half of 2026, when Kaspersky Security Network detected a suspicious configuration file inside a CAB archive stored within the Windows update download directory.
The archive contained several legitimate components, including executables associated with the Patch My PC third-party patch management tool and Microsoft-signed .NET assemblies. However, researchers discovered that modified configuration and resource files could manipulate these legitimate components into loading malicious code.
The operation targeted a customised Windows 10 build reportedly used exclusively by government entities in an Asian country.
Kaspersky identified one victim and stated that it could not connect the activity to any previously known APT group.
Importantly, researchers did not observe how the malicious archive was initially delivered. The findings therefore suggest a possible supply-chain-related attack vector but do not establish that Patch My PC or its distribution infrastructure was compromised.
2. Technical Description
NetamLoader is a multi-stage .NET malware-loading framework that uses legitimate Windows and .NET components to execute malicious instructions.
Its infection chain combines several techniques:
AppDomainManager injection: Abuses .NET application configuration to load an attacker-controlled assembly before the host executable's main function executes.
BinaryFormatter deserialization: Processes a crafted resource file containing a serialized object that triggers a TypeConfuseDelegate attack.
XAML-based execution: Uses XAML objects and .NET APIs to load and execute additional payloads.
AES encryption: Decrypts embedded payloads and protects communications with the C2 infrastructure.
Process manipulation: Uses legitimate Windows processes, including dllhost.exe, to host malicious components.
Anti-analysis mechanisms: Implements execution delays and other checks to make automated analysis more difficult.
The framework uses multiple layers of encoded, compressed and encrypted content, making the complete infection chain difficult to identify through conventional file inspection.
3. Attack Overview
The attack follows a multi-stage execution process.
Stage 1 – Initial infection
A CAB archive is placed in the Windows update download directory:
C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\
The archive contains seven files, including legitimate executables and supporting configuration and resource files.
The researchers did not establish how the archive reached the victim's system.
Stage 2 – Malicious configuration loading
The executable PatchMyPC-ScriptRunner.exe is launched alongside a specially crafted configuration file.
Through AppDomainManager injection, the configuration causes a Microsoft-signed assembly to load and process a maliciously crafted fabric.config file.
Stage 3 – Payload extraction
The Resources.resx file contains a Base64-encoded serialized object.
When processed, the object triggers a BinaryFormatter deserialization vulnerability involving a TypeConfuseDelegate technique.
This leads to the execution of an embedded XAML payload, which decrypts and loads additional stages.
Stage 4 – Execution through legitimate processes
The framework loads further .NET components and moves execution into dllhost.exe.
It also uses registry operations, process checks and object-locking mechanisms to maintain execution and complicate analysis.
Stage 5 – Command-and-control communication
NetamLoader communicates with attacker-controlled infrastructure over HTTPS.
Before its first communication, the framework introduces a random delay of approximately 20–40 minutes.
If a valid response is not received, it can delay subsequent attempts for approximately 22–28 hours.
The C2 server can provide additional XAML payloads and configuration updates.
4. Technical Analysis
4.1 Abuse of legitimate software components
One notable aspect of NetamLoader is its use of legitimate software components as part of the infection chain.
The archive contained components associated with Patch My PC and Microsoft-signed .NET assemblies. The malicious behaviour was introduced through supporting configuration and resource files rather than through an obviously malicious primary executable.
This approach makes it more difficult to identify malicious activity through file reputation or digital-signature checks alone.
4.2 .NET deserialization and XAML execution
The malware abuses the .NET BinaryFormatter deserialization mechanism to trigger a TypeConfuseDelegate attack.
The resulting execution invokes XamlReader.Parse(), which processes embedded XAML content.
The XAML payloads act as loaders for additional components, allowing the framework to progressively extract and execute its stages.
4.3 Encrypted C2 communication
NetamLoader uses AES-128-CBC combined with HMAC-SHA256 to protect its network communications.
Separate encryption and authentication keys are derived from a configured master key.
This provides confidentiality and integrity protection for the exchanged data.
The malware also validates the server certificate against a configured value before establishing its HTTPS communication.
4.4 Evasion and anti-analysis mechanisms
The framework implements several mechanisms intended to make analysis more difficult:
Delayed C2 communication to potentially outlast automated sandbox monitoring.
Checks to confirm execution within the expected host process.
Registry operations that remove selected entries associated with its execution and exception-state logging.
Execution of downloaded XAML within an isolated .NET AppDomain.
Process-lifetime management to prevent the host process from terminating prematurely.
These behaviours demonstrate a carefully engineered loading framework rather than a simple standalone malware executable.
4.5 Targeting specialised government infrastructure
The investigation is particularly notable because the framework was designed for a customised Windows 10 environment used by government entities.
This indicates that the attackers understood aspects of the target environment and tailored their execution chain accordingly.
However, Kaspersky's findings do not establish the identity of the targeted government organisation or the threat actor responsible.
5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The following indicators were published in Kaspersky's technical research.
File hashes (MD5)
| File / Component | MD5 |
|---|---|
| CAB archive | F2458ED133F8D0CA19E22C10F577E98E |
| Resources.resx | E1DC6F1ED193594F2284BE22AE08DFA4 |
| .NET 1 Loader | AB81564BCB8CA7E710C66832DE747556 |
| .NET 2 Plugin | CFB8B281BDF5D9390E64B10C312FB2C1 |
| fabric.config | 67E3617F8709D34F806F8E02BADBA8A5 |
| PatchMyPC-ScriptRunner.exe.config | 514AC0D73B8A1B73488EF5E2E55A75C3 |
| XAML-1 | 514117D536E347560D049CFE0C609632 |
| XAML-2 | 9000820D8153C24CD60D53001D3A97B6 |
| XAML-2-1 | B3C4A635179680EDAFB5D006CF0CFFC6 |
| XAML-2-2 | 4F28622C5E60C01319BF48CF742FE1A5 |
| XAML-3 | C86D53392A87DD3F3E62D62C9B92A9BD |
File paths
C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\PatchMyPC-ScriptRunner.exe.configC:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\fabric.configC:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\Resources.resx
Network indicators
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| C2 domain | openaigpt4v[.]com |
| C2 IP | 104.18.14[.]219 |
| C2 URL pattern | hxxps://openaigpt4v[.]com/model_v4/ |
Note: The IP address is associated with Cloudflare infrastructure. Defenders should correlate domain and network indicators with other evidence before treating shared CDN infrastructure as malicious.
6. Potential Impact
Although Kaspersky identified only one victim through its telemetry, the campaign demonstrates several potential security risks:
Government system compromise: Targeted malware could provide attackers with continued access to sensitive government environments.
Additional payload execution: The modular loading framework can retrieve and execute further attacker-controlled code.
Sensitive information exposure: Continued access could potentially enable data collection or information theft, although the published research does not confirm specific data exfiltration.
Defence evasion: Delayed execution, legitimate process abuse and encrypted communication can complicate detection and incident investigation.
Supply-chain exposure: Organisations operating customised software environments may face risks through their update processes and supporting maintenance tools.
7. Recommendations
Immediate Recommendations
Review Windows update download directories for unexpected CAB archives and suspicious configuration files.
Investigate unusual execution of PatchMyPC-ScriptRunner.exe and unexpected child-process or assembly-loading behaviour.
Monitor dllhost.exe for suspicious execution patterns and unexpected network connections.
Search endpoint telemetry for the published file hashes, file paths and C2 domain.
Review outbound HTTPS traffic for unexpected communication with the identified infrastructure.
Investigate unusual registry modifications and unexpected deletion of diagnostic or logging entries.
Preventive Recommendations
Enforce integrity verification for operating-system update packages and third-party software deployments.
Restrict the execution of untrusted configuration files and assemblies.
Monitor unusual .NET assembly loading, BinaryFormatter deserialization and XAML execution behaviour.
Apply application control and endpoint detection policies to identify suspicious use of legitimate signed applications.
Maintain centralised logging and monitor abnormal process, registry and network activity.
Conduct regular security assessments of customised operating systems and their supporting software ecosystems.
8. Conclusion
The discovery of NetamLoader highlights how sophisticated threat actors can combine legitimate software components, complex .NET loading techniques and encrypted communications to compromise specialised computing environments.
The campaign is particularly significant because it targeted a customised Windows 10 platform reportedly used by government entities in Asia. Its multi-stage architecture and anti-analysis capabilities demonstrate the importance of monitoring application behaviour rather than relying exclusively on file signatures and software reputation.
Although the initial delivery mechanism and threat actor attribution remain unknown, the findings reinforce the need to secure software update processes, validate trusted components and strengthen monitoring across specialised government infrastructure.
