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HighMalware · 24 min read

SafePay Ransomware: Inside the Global Campaign Targeting Business Networks and Critical Infrastructure

SafePay ransomware is a financially motivated cyber threat that has targeted organizations across multiple regions since August 2024. According to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advisory published on October 20, 2026, SafePay has affected at least 600 victims, including organizations operating across North America, South America, Europe, and Australia. The campaign targets business environments and critical infrastructure, using several methods to gain initial access, including stolen or guessed credentials, phishing, exploitation of vulnerable security appliances and backup software, and access through virtual private networks (VPNs) and other remote services. Once inside a network, SafePay operators may create or manipulate accounts, use legitimate administrative tools to discover systems and move laterally, disable security protections, collect sensitive information, exfiltrate data, interfere with backups, and encrypt files. The ransomware uses ChaCha20 and RSA cryptographic techniques and typically appends the .SafePay extension to encrypted files. Victims may also face data exposure through the group's leak site and pressure through ransom communications. The advisory highlights vulnerabilities affecting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD), Veeam Backup & Replication, and SonicWall SonicOS. Organizations should prioritize patching affected systems, securing remote access, enforcing multifactor authentication, maintaining isolated and immutable backups, monitoring suspicious administrative activity, and preparing an effective ransomware incident-response process.

Written by Sai Swetha·Published Oct 21, 2026

1. Description

SafePay is a ransomware threat associated with intrusions into business networks and organizations operating critical infrastructure. Its activity combines unauthorized access, credential abuse, exploitation of vulnerabilities, network reconnaissance, defense evasion, lateral movement, data theft, and file encryption.

CISA reports that SafePay has been active since August 2024 and has victimized at least 600 organizations. Reported victims span North America, South America, Europe, and Australia, indicating that the activity is not restricted to one geographic region or a single industry.

The SafePay campaign illustrates how ransomware incidents can develop from an initial weakness in an organization's security controls into a broader compromise of its network. Attackers may enter through exposed remote services, compromised credentials, phishing, or vulnerable internet-facing systems. They can then use legitimate system utilities and administrative software to explore the environment, obtain additional access, and prepare for data theft and encryption.

A significant concern is the targeting of security and backup infrastructure. If attackers gain access to backup platforms or interfere with recovery mechanisms before encrypting production systems, organizations may find it substantially more difficult to restore operations.

SafePay incidents can therefore involve more than the loss of access to files. They may also expose confidential information, interrupt business operations, compromise administrative accounts, and create regulatory, financial, and reputational consequences.

2. Technical Description

SafePay operations involve multiple stages that can be grouped into the following attack lifecycle:

  1. Initial access: Attackers use stolen or guessed passwords, phishing, vulnerable public-facing systems, VPNs, and other remote-access services.

  2. Account and privilege abuse: They manipulate existing accounts, create new accounts, and attempt to obtain elevated privileges.

  3. Discovery and reconnaissance: They identify systems, accounts, shared folders, network resources, and other valuable targets.

  4. Defense evasion: They may disable security tools, obfuscate or pack code, delete files, and use legitimate Windows utilities to conceal malicious activity.

  5. Lateral movement: They access additional systems through remote desktop, SMB, Windows administrative shares, WinRM, and other remote services.

  6. Credential access: They may use credential-related tools and authentication material to expand access.

  7. Collection and staging: They gather relevant files and prepare information for transfer outside the compromised network.

  8. Data exfiltration: They use tools and external services to move stolen data to infrastructure controlled by, or accessible to, the attackers.

  9. Recovery inhibition: They target backup and recovery capabilities to make restoration more difficult.

  10. Encryption and extortion: They encrypt files, leave ransom instructions, and may threaten to publish stolen information.

Not every incident necessarily contains every stage, and the order may vary. These stages describe the behaviors reported in the CISA advisory rather than a guarantee that all SafePay intrusions follow an identical sequence.

2.1 Encryption and Ransomware Behavior

The advisory reports that SafePay uses ChaCha20 and RSA in its encryption process. These cryptographic techniques are used together as part of the ransomware's file-encryption mechanism.

Encrypted files typically receive the .SafePay extension. The ransomware may leave a ransom note in a victim's desktop or in the root directory of an affected system. The note directs victims toward a Tor-based portal and includes a victim identifier.

The reported extortion methods include pressure through telephone communications and the threat of publishing stolen data on a SafePay leak site. The advisory also indicates that the ransomware may delete itself after encryption, which can complicate the recovery of evidence from the original execution location.

File encryption and data exfiltration are separate activities. Recovering encrypted files does not, by itself, establish that stolen information has been deleted or that the threat of public disclosure has been resolved.

3. Affected Products and Reported Vulnerabilities

CISA identifies vulnerabilities relevant to the SafePay threat activity. The advisory specifically describes automated-script exploitation involving CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, and CVE-2024-40766 as observed initial-access activity.

CVEAffected productCWE listed in the advisorySecurity concern
CVE-2020-3259Cisco ASA and Cisco FTDCWE-200Exposure of sensitive information
CVE-2023-20269Cisco ASA and Cisco FTDCWE-288Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel
CVE-2023-27532Veeam Backup & ReplicationCWE-306Missing authentication for a critical function
CVE-2024-40711Veeam Backup & ReplicationCWE-502Deserialization of untrusted data
CVE-2024-40766SonicWall SonicOSCWE-284Improper access control

Important: The table reflects the affected products and CWE classifications supplied in the CISA advisory. Organizations should consult the applicable vendor advisories to determine affected versions, available patches, and any product-specific remediation requirements. The presence of a CVE in this advisory does not mean every affected product was exploited in every SafePay incident.

3.1 Cisco ASA and Firepower Threat Defense

Cisco ASA and FTD are security technologies used to protect network boundaries and enforce access policies. Vulnerabilities affecting these devices can be particularly important because the devices may sit at the perimeter of an organization's network.

The advisory includes CVE-2020-3259 and CVE-2023-20269 among the vulnerabilities relevant to the campaign. The associated CWE classifications concern information exposure and authentication bypass, respectively.

Organizations using these products should identify their deployed versions, determine whether the vulnerabilities apply, install the appropriate vendor fixes, and review available security logs for suspicious access.

3.2 Veeam Backup & Replication

Veeam Backup & Replication supports enterprise backup and recovery operations. Its security is especially important during ransomware incidents because attackers may target backup systems to undermine an organization's ability to recover.

The advisory lists CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711. It specifically identifies automated-script exploitation involving these vulnerabilities as observed initial-access activity.

A compromise of a backup environment can increase the consequences of a ransomware incident by exposing backup data, creating opportunities for unauthorized access, or interfering with recovery processes.

Organizations should patch applicable deployments, restrict access to backup infrastructure, separate backup administration from ordinary user networks, and monitor backup-related authentication and configuration changes.

3.3 SonicWall SonicOS

CVE-2024-40766 affects SonicWall SonicOS and is associated in the advisory with CWE-284, improper access control. The advisory identifies automated-script exploitation of this vulnerability as an observed initial-access method.

Organizations using affected SonicWall products should review vendor guidance, apply the appropriate remediation, and investigate suspicious activity involving exposed management interfaces and remote-access infrastructure.

4. Attack Overview

The SafePay campaign demonstrates how attackers can combine weaknesses in remote access, account security, endpoint protection, and backup infrastructure to achieve a broader organizational compromise.

Stage 1: Initial Access

Attackers may obtain an initial foothold through:

  • Stolen credentials or passwords that can be guessed.

  • Phishing and other credential-compromise techniques.

  • Exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing applications and security appliances.

  • Compromised VPN accounts and other remote-access services.

  • Automated scripts targeting vulnerable systems.

The advisory identifies CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, and CVE-2024-40766 as vulnerabilities exploited through automated scripts in observed initial-access activity.

Stage 2: Account Manipulation

After obtaining access, attackers may modify existing accounts or create new ones. These actions can help them maintain access, obtain additional permissions, and continue operating if their original entry point is discovered.

New or modified accounts may resemble legitimate administrative activity, making it important to review account changes alongside authentication logs, source addresses, and associated process activity.

Stage 3: System Discovery

Attackers use command-line utilities and scripts to understand the environment. They may enumerate systems, domains, user accounts, network shares, and other accessible resources.

Discovery helps attackers identify high-value systems, administrative paths, sensitive data, and backup infrastructure.

Stage 4: Defense Evasion

The advisory describes behaviors such as disabling security software, packing or obfuscating code, deleting files, and using legitimate system utilities to execute commands.

These activities may reduce detection opportunities and make malicious activity appear similar to routine system administration.

Stage 5: Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement

Attackers may attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC), impersonate authentication tokens, and use credentials or administrative tools to reach other systems.

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Server Message Block (SMB), Windows administrative shares, Windows Remote Management (WinRM), and other remote services can provide paths between systems when they are accessible and insufficiently protected.

Stage 6: Data Collection and Exfiltration

The operators may locate and collect valuable information, compress it into archives, and transfer it outside the organization using available tools and external services.

Data theft creates an additional extortion mechanism: victims may face threats of public disclosure even if they restore encrypted systems.

Stage 7: Backup Interference

Attackers may target backup systems and recovery mechanisms before deploying ransomware. Disrupting backups can delay restoration, extend downtime, and increase pressure on the victim.

Stage 8: Encryption and Extortion

SafePay encrypts files, typically appending .SafePay. Ransom instructions may direct victims to a Tor-based portal and include a victim ID. The operators may use telephone pressure and threats of publication through their leak site.

5. Technical Analysis

5.1 Initial Access Through Remote Services and Vulnerabilities

The advisory identifies multiple initial-access pathways. Weak or compromised passwords can allow attackers to enter systems without exploiting a software vulnerability. Vulnerable remote services and internet-facing applications can provide another entry point when they are accessible to an attacker.

The reported automated exploitation of selected Veeam and SonicWall vulnerabilities is particularly important because exposed security and backup systems may provide access to sensitive infrastructure.

Defensive focus:

  • Inventory internet-facing appliances and remote-access services.

  • Patch vulnerable systems according to vendor instructions.

  • Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) for VPNs, webmail, and critical services.

  • Review unusual authentication attempts and administrative logins.

  • Restrict management interfaces to approved networks and authorized administrators.

5.2 Account Manipulation and Account Creation

CISA reports account manipulation and the creation of accounts as behaviors associated with the campaign.

Attackers may change account properties, create additional accounts, or use compromised identities to maintain access. These changes can persist beyond the initial compromise if defenders only remove the original malware or block the initial entry point.

Defensive focus:

  • Alert on unexpected account creation and privilege changes.

  • Review newly created, inactive, unfamiliar, and unrecognized accounts.

  • Audit privileged-group membership and administrative permissions.

  • Investigate account changes that occur near suspicious logins or remote sessions.

  • Disable unauthorized accounts and reset affected credentials after preserving relevant evidence.

5.3 Discovery and Use of Legitimate Tools

The advisory describes the use of living-off-the-land techniques: using legitimate operating-system utilities, administrative applications, and scripting environments to perform malicious tasks.

Reported tools and utilities include PowerShell, Windows Command Shell, network-scanning utilities, share-enumeration scripts, and remote-management software.

Because these tools can be legitimate, detecting their presence alone is insufficient. Analysts should consider the parent process, command-line arguments, account context, execution time, destination systems, and whether the activity matches the user's role.

Defensive focus:

  • Collect endpoint process and command-line telemetry.

  • Monitor unusual PowerShell and command-shell activity.

  • Investigate network discovery followed by new remote sessions.

  • Restrict administrative utilities to approved users and systems.

  • Correlate endpoint alerts with identity, firewall, VPN, and server logs.

5.4 Defense Evasion and Security-Tool Interference

SafePay-related activity includes attempts to disable security software, pack or obfuscate code, and delete files. Such actions can interfere with monitoring and complicate forensic reconstruction.

A sudden loss of endpoint protection, changes to security configurations, unexpected service stoppages, or deletion of logs should therefore be treated as potentially significant when combined with other suspicious behavior.

Defensive focus:

  • Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) with tamper protection where available.

  • Alert on disabled security agents and unexpected configuration changes.

  • Restrict the permissions needed to modify security products.

  • Preserve logs and endpoint artifacts before rebuilding affected systems.

  • Correlate security-tool interference with suspicious processes and remote logins.

5.5 Privilege Escalation and Authentication Abuse

The advisory describes User Account Control bypass and token impersonation. It also identifies credential-related tools and activity involving authentication material.

Privilege escalation can allow an attacker to perform actions unavailable to an ordinary user. Token impersonation can enable activity under a different security context, while stolen or reused credentials may provide access to additional systems.

Defensive focus:

  • Apply least privilege to ordinary users and service accounts.

  • Review privileged logons and unexpected elevation events.

  • Monitor suspicious token and authentication activity.

  • Use just-in-time administrative access where feasible.

  • Reset compromised credentials and revoke affected sessions or authentication material as appropriate.

5.6 Lateral Movement

The advisory associates SafePay activity with remote services including RDP, SMB and Windows administrative shares, and WinRM. Attackers can use these mechanisms to move from one compromised host to another.

Unrestricted administrative connectivity can allow one compromised account or system to affect many machines. This is especially dangerous when workstations, servers, backup systems, and domain administration infrastructure share broad trust relationships.

Defensive focus:

  • Segment user, server, administrative, and backup networks.

  • Restrict remote management to approved source systems.

  • Monitor unusual RDP, SMB, and WinRM sessions.

  • Investigate repeated authentication failures followed by successful remote logins.

  • Limit administrative accounts and avoid using the same privileged credentials across the environment.

5.7 Collection, Archiving, and Exfiltration

Before data theft, attackers may gather files and package them for transfer. CISA lists tools such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, FileZilla, RClone, and Backblaze's b2.exe among tools associated with the activity.

Legitimate file-transfer and archiving tools are not inherently malicious. However, unexpected use on sensitive servers, large archive creation, unusual outbound traffic, or transfers to unapproved external destinations may indicate data staging or exfiltration.

The advisory describes exfiltration over alternative protocols and through web services. These methods can allow stolen data to leave an organization using channels that may otherwise support normal business activity.

Defensive focus:

  • Monitor unusual outbound traffic and large data transfers.

  • Investigate archive creation on servers that do not normally perform such operations.

  • Restrict access to cloud-storage and file-transfer services based on business requirements.

  • Review DNS, proxy, firewall, VPN, and endpoint telemetry.

  • Preserve evidence of data access, staging, and transfer for incident-response and reporting purposes.

5.8 Backup Sabotage and Recovery Inhibition

The campaign's reported targeting of backup and recovery capabilities creates a serious operational risk. Attackers may attempt to compromise backup infrastructure or interfere with mechanisms that would otherwise support restoration.

If backups are accessible using the same credentials or network paths as production systems, a single compromise can threaten both the primary data and the recovery copies.

Defensive focus:

  • Maintain offline, encrypted, and immutable backups.

  • Keep backup administration separate from ordinary user and production environments.

  • Use separate privileged identities for backup operations.

  • Test restoration procedures regularly.

  • Monitor unexpected changes to backup jobs, repositories, retention policies, and administrative accounts.

5.9 File Encryption and Extortion

SafePay uses ChaCha20 and RSA according to the CISA advisory. Encrypted files typically receive the .SafePay extension, and ransom instructions may be placed on the desktop or in a root directory.

The advisory describes a Tor-based portal, victim identifiers, telephone pressure, and a leak site. These behaviors indicate that the incident may involve both disruption through encryption and pressure based on the potential exposure of stolen data.

Defensive focus:

  • Isolate affected systems promptly.

  • Preserve ransom notes, suspicious binaries, logs, and communications.

  • Determine whether data was accessed or exfiltrated.

  • Validate backup integrity and recovery options.

  • Coordinate incident handling with appropriate internal teams and law-enforcement or government agencies.

5.10 Anti-Forensics and Evidence Preservation

CISA notes that the ransomware may delete itself after encryption and maps file deletion to a relevant adversary technique. This can make evidence collection more difficult if responders wait until after systems are rebuilt or wiped.

Defensive focus:

  • Preserve endpoint and network logs as early as possible.

  • Record affected hostnames, user accounts, timestamps, and observed network connections.

  • Retain ransom notes and copies of relevant files for analysis.

  • Follow established evidence-handling procedures.

  • Avoid unnecessary shutdowns, reimaging, or cleanup before responders determine which evidence must be preserved.

6. Tools Associated With the Campaign

The CISA advisory identifies the following legitimate utilities and tools as associated with SafePay activity. Their presence alone does not prove malicious activity; context, execution behavior, and the affected environment must be considered.

Tool or utilityReported or relevant role
7-ZipFile compression and archiving
FileZillaFile transfer
MimikatzCredential and authentication-material access
PowerShellCommand execution and scripting
PsExecRemote execution and administration
RCloneFile synchronization and transfer
ScreenConnectRemote access and support
ShareFinder.ps1Network-share discovery
WinRARFile compression and archiving
WinRMRemote Windows administration
AnyDeskRemote access
TeamViewerRemote access
AcronisDiskDirectorDisk and system administration
SharpShares.exeShare discovery
NetExecNetwork and authentication-related operations
Backblaze b2.exeCloud-storage interaction and file transfer

Why These Tools Matter

Several of these tools are commonly used by system administrators and IT teams. Attackers may exploit their legitimate functionality to reduce the need for custom malware, blend into normal activity, and carry out actions using available software.

Security teams should investigate whether tool execution is expected for a given user, host, and time. For example, an administrator using a remote-management utility during an approved maintenance window is different from an unfamiliar account launching remote-access software on multiple servers shortly before ransomware deployment.

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The indicators below are transcribed from the CISA advisory text supplied for this article. IP addresses are defanged to reduce the risk of accidental navigation. File hashes are preserved as supplied.

Important IOC handling guidance: CISA cautions that IP addresses may be reassigned or shared. Investigate the surrounding activity and validate each indicator before blocking or taking other action. A filename by itself is not proof of compromise, and hashes should be matched exactly.

7.1 IP Addresses

IndicatorActivity described in the advisory
104.26.2[.]223SafePay victim intrusion
140.82.114[.]4SafePay victim intrusion
185.199.108[.]133SafePay victim intrusion
77.37.49[.]40SafePay victim intrusion
173.194.194[.]94Hosting victim data
167.235.225[.]149Client login panels
5.255.11[.]134Used in exfiltration
88.119.167[.]239soc.dll command and control
37.10.71[.]188Used in exfiltration

The advisory's observations span November 2024 through August 2026. These addresses should be treated as investigation leads, not as proof that every connection to them is malicious in every context.

7.2 SHA-1 File Hashes

SHA-1Associated filename or description
07353237350c35d6dc2c8f143b649cd07c71f62b1.exe — ransomware binary
b498a2683640c983bb069fa2ea9e67cef4a3797dLocker.dll — PE32 executable
BBFED53E3BB1F306F4DA97D995CF4AE5B73AD081locker.dll
d711a5af5aed48a3b36b98f4fcf52809aebef7a2nxc

7.3 SHA-256 File Hashes

SHA-256Associated filename or description
921df888aaabcd828a3723f4c9f5fe8b8379c6b7067d16b2ea10152300417eaesoc.dll
6c1d36df94ebe367823e73ba33cfb4f40756a5e8ee1e30e8f0ae55d47e220a6aRunPE bundled DLL
e79608cf1d6b51324c14bef8883054c1238ed5f080222cc464810e6e14adc346Injected PE
327b8b61eb446cc4f710771e44484f62b804ae3d262b57a56575053e2df67917locker.dll — PE32 executable
a0dc80a37eb7e2716c02a94adc8df9baedec192a77bde31669faed228d9ff526locker.dll
BBDD3620A67AEDEC4B9A68B2C9CC880B6631215E129816AEA19902A6F4BC6F41SharpShares.exe

7.4 Hostname Indicators

The advisory lists the following hostnames:

  • WIN-SBOE3CPNAL

  • WIN-3IUUOFVTQAR

  • WIN-DK18BI83M0S

  • WIN-I1HRRJHCEIV

Investigators should search endpoint, authentication, DNS, and network logs for these hostnames and correlate any matches with the incident timeline. Hostnames can be reused or appear in environments unrelated to the reported activity, so context remains important.

7.5 Suspicious Filenames and Artifacts

The CISA advisory includes the following filenames and file patterns in its IOC material:

  • 1 - Copy.bat

  • CCleaner.exe

  • CCleaner64.exe

  • CCleaner*.exe

  • *.dll

  • dcsync.exe

  • domains.txt

  • DYRasWtb.exe

  • libsmb2.dll

  • Libwa*.dll

  • License.txt

  • locker.dll

  • netscan.exe

  • netscan.lic

  • netscan.xml

  • netscanNEW.zip

  • nltest.exe

  • oui.txt

  • ping.txt

  • portable.dat

  • scan.xml

  • sharefinder.ps1

  • Socks.exe

  • Socks_werfault.exe

  • subs.txt

  • svchost.exe

  • wa_3rd_party_host_*.exe

  • winrar.exe

  • AnyDesk.exe

  • SharpShares.exe

  • AcronisDiskDirector-12.5

  • acro.exe

  • DiskDirector.exe

  • Acronis.exe

  • b2.exe

  • nxc.exe

Some entries are generic filenames or wildcard patterns. They should be used for contextual hunting rather than treated as conclusive indicators on their own. In particular, legitimate applications can share names with suspicious artifacts. Verify file location, signature, hash, parent process, command-line arguments, user context, and execution history before classifying a file as malicious.

7.6 IOC Investigation Workflow

Security teams can use these indicators in a structured workflow:

  1. Search endpoint telemetry for the listed hashes and filenames.

  2. Search DNS, proxy, firewall, VPN, and network logs for the listed IP addresses.

  3. Review whether the listed hostnames occur in the organization's environment.

  4. Correlate matches with suspicious authentication, remote access, account creation, or security-tool interference.

  5. Investigate unusual archive creation and outbound data transfers.

  6. Preserve relevant logs and artifacts before remediation removes evidence.

  7. Document confirmed findings separately from unverified matches.

  8. Block or isolate confirmed malicious infrastructure according to incident-response procedures, after considering the advisory's warning about IP reassignment and shared hosting.

8. Potential Impact

A SafePay incident can affect an organization at several levels.

8.1 Operational Disruption

File encryption may prevent employees and systems from accessing business-critical data. If servers, shared storage, or essential applications are affected, normal operations may be interrupted.

8.2 Data Exposure

If information is collected and exfiltrated before encryption, sensitive organizational or customer data may be exposed. Threats to publish stolen information can continue to create pressure even after systems have been restored.

8.3 Backup and Recovery Failure

Compromise of backup infrastructure or interference with recovery mechanisms may increase restoration time and reduce the number of usable recovery options.

8.4 Financial Loss

Organizations may incur costs associated with incident response, forensic analysis, system restoration, business interruption, legal support, and security improvements. Additional costs may arise from contractual obligations or regulatory requirements, depending on the organization and the information involved.

8.5 Credential and Identity Compromise

Unauthorized access to accounts, credential theft, and privilege abuse may enable continued access or compromise additional systems if affected credentials and sessions are not addressed.

8.6 Reputational Damage

Public disclosure of an incident or stolen data can undermine customer and partner confidence. Organizations may also need to communicate with affected stakeholders and demonstrate that appropriate containment and remediation measures were taken.

8.7 Critical-Infrastructure Consequences

Where affected organizations support critical infrastructure, an incident can have implications beyond individual endpoints, potentially affecting service availability and dependent organizations.

9. Recommendations

Organizations should combine vulnerability management, identity security, endpoint monitoring, network segmentation, backup resilience, and incident-response readiness.

9.1 Immediate Actions

1. Prioritize patching of vulnerable systems

Identify affected Cisco ASA/FTD, Veeam Backup & Replication, and SonicWall SonicOS deployments. Follow the applicable vendor advisories and prioritize remediation of vulnerabilities relevant to the organization's exposure and risk.

2. Secure remote access

Review VPNs, RDP, WinRM, webmail, and other remote services. Disable unnecessary exposure, restrict access to approved sources, and enforce MFA wherever supported.

3. Investigate suspicious accounts

Review recently created accounts, unexpected privilege changes, unusual administrator activity, and accounts that do not correspond to known personnel or service requirements. Disable unauthorized accounts after collecting relevant evidence.

4. Hunt for reported indicators

Search endpoint, identity, DNS, firewall, proxy, and VPN telemetry for the listed IOCs. Correlate any match with the affected host, user, timestamp, process, and network connection.

5. Examine endpoint security status

Investigate unexpected EDR or antivirus shutdowns, changes to security configurations, and unusual service or process activity. Restore protection after determining the cause and preserving required evidence.

6. Check for data staging and exfiltration

Look for suspicious archives, unexpected file-transfer tools, large outbound transfers, unusual cloud-storage activity, and connections to infrastructure associated with the reported incident.

7. Protect backups

Review the security of backup management systems, repositories, privileged accounts, retention policies, and recent backup-job changes. Ensure that recovery copies are not directly exposed to compromised production credentials.

8. Isolate affected systems

If ransomware activity or a credible active compromise is detected, isolate affected hosts and restrict compromised accounts or remote-access paths according to the organization's incident-response procedures. Avoid actions that unnecessarily destroy evidence.

9. Preserve evidence

Retain relevant system and security logs, ransom notes, suspicious files, authentication records, network indicators, and attacker communications. Record a timeline of observed events and actions taken.

10. Coordinate incident response

Engage the organization's security, IT, legal, communications, and business-continuity teams as appropriate. Report the incident to relevant authorities and follow the applicable response guidance.

9.2 Preventive Actions

A. Vulnerability and Patch Management

  • Maintain an accurate inventory of hardware, operating systems, firmware, applications, and exposed services.

  • Prioritize vulnerabilities listed in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog and other applicable high-risk advisories.

  • Apply security patches to operating systems, security appliances, backup platforms, and remote-access infrastructure.

  • Follow relevant CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-04 guidance where applicable.

  • Verify remediation and document systems that cannot be patched immediately, along with compensating controls.

B. Identity and Access Management

  • Implement MFA for VPNs, webmail, critical applications, and administrative access.

  • Use long passwords; the advisory recommends passwords between 15 and 64 characters.

  • Avoid password reuse and use a password manager where appropriate.

  • Apply suitable password-storage practices, including secure hashing and salts for systems that manage passwords.

  • Configure failed-login protections and account lockout controls appropriate to the environment.

  • Disable password hints where supported.

  • Follow the advisory's guidance to avoid password changes more frequently than once per year as a routine policy, while changing compromised or exposed credentials immediately and complying with applicable organizational requirements.

  • Review account creation, privilege changes, and inactive or unrecognized accounts.

  • Apply least privilege and use just-in-time administrative access where feasible.

C. Network Segmentation and Remote-Service Security

  • Separate user workstations, critical servers, administrative systems, and backup infrastructure into appropriately controlled network segments.

  • Restrict RDP, SMB, WinRM, and other remote services to authorized users and approved source systems.

  • Block or restrict remote connections from untrusted origins where feasible.

  • Disable unused ports, services, and remote-access pathways.

  • Monitor lateral movement and unusual connections between network segments.

  • Protect administrative interfaces from direct exposure to the public internet.

D. Endpoint and Security Monitoring

  • Deploy and maintain endpoint protection and EDR capabilities.

  • Enable tamper protection where available.

  • Alert on unexpected disabling of security tools, suspicious script execution, unusual process creation, and unauthorized administrative changes.

  • Collect command-line and process telemetry where supported.

  • Monitor execution of remote-management, archive, network-discovery, and file-transfer tools.

  • Restrict scripting and command-line activities or permissions where operationally feasible, without unnecessarily disrupting legitimate business operations.

E. Backup and Recovery Resilience

  • Maintain offline, encrypted, and immutable backups.

  • Keep secure backup copies separate from production networks.

  • Use separate administrative identities and tightly controlled permissions for backup systems.

  • Protect backup-management interfaces and apply security patches promptly.

  • Monitor unexpected changes to backup configurations and retention policies.

  • Test recovery procedures regularly and verify that backups are usable.

  • Document recovery priorities, dependencies, and the process for restoring critical business services.

F. Email and User Awareness

  • Use external-email banners where appropriate to help recipients recognize messages originating outside the organization.

  • Train users to identify phishing, suspicious attachments, unexpected links, and credential-harvesting attempts.

  • Provide a clear process for reporting suspicious messages.

  • Review email security controls and investigate suspicious authentication activity associated with potential phishing.

G. Administrative and Operational Controls

  • Audit privileged accounts and remove unnecessary administrative access.

  • Restrict remote administration to approved tools, accounts, and systems.

  • Review access to critical data and sensitive repositories.

  • Monitor unusual data collection, archive creation, and outbound transfers.

  • Maintain an incident-response plan that covers ransomware, data exfiltration, identity compromise, and backup recovery.

  • Conduct exercises to test technical response, business continuity, evidence preservation, and communication procedures.

10. Incident Response and Reporting

10.1 If SafePay Activity Is Suspected

Organizations should follow a coordinated response rather than focusing exclusively on removing the ransomware executable.

Step 1 — Contain the incident: Isolate affected hosts and restrict compromised access paths. Avoid allowing suspected systems to continue communicating freely with the rest of the network.

Step 2 — Preserve evidence: Retain relevant logs, files, ransom notes, account records, security alerts, and network information. Document the incident timeline.

Step 3 — Establish scope: Identify affected systems, users, credentials, network segments, applications, and backup infrastructure. Determine whether the incident includes data access or exfiltration as well as encryption.

Step 4 — Investigate the initial access: Review suspicious remote logins, VPN activity, exposed systems, phishing evidence, and vulnerable appliances or backup platforms. Determine whether credentials were compromised or a vulnerability was exploited.

Step 5 — Identify persistence and lateral movement: Examine newly created accounts, privilege changes, remote sessions, suspicious scripts, administrative tools, and connections between hosts.

Step 6 — Eradicate and recover: Remove unauthorized access, remediate the entry point, reset affected credentials, rebuild compromised systems where necessary, and restore from verified clean backups.

Step 7 — Validate recovery: Confirm that restored systems are secure, security monitoring is functioning, unauthorized access has been removed, and backup and recovery controls are protected against renewed compromise.

Step 8 — Report and improve: Coordinate with appropriate authorities, meet applicable reporting obligations, and use the findings to improve patching, identity security, monitoring, and recovery procedures.

CISA recommends its Eviction Strategies Tool, including Playbook-NG and COUN7ER, to support relevant response and remediation activities. If encryption has occurred, organizations should also consult CISA's Ransomware and Data Extortion Response Checklist.

10.2 Reporting Channels

The advisory identifies the following reporting routes:

United States

  • FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or a local FBI field office.

  • U.S. Secret Service field office.

  • CISA Incident Reporting System or CISA's 24/7 Operations Center.

  • CISA contact email: contact@cisa.dhs.gov

  • CISA phone: 1-844-729-2472

United Kingdom

  • Report Fraud or the local police through 101, as appropriate.

Organizations should follow applicable legal, regulatory, contractual, and sector-specific reporting requirements. The advisory notes that reporting is not necessarily mandatory in every case.

10.3 Information to Preserve for Reporting

The FBI requests relevant information that can help investigators understand the intrusion and identify associated activity. Items described in the advisory include:

  • Network boundary logs.

  • Ransom notes.

  • Communications with the threat actor.

  • Bitcoin wallet information, if present.

  • Any decryptor received.

  • A benign sample of an encrypted file, where available and safe to provide.

  • A point of contact for the affected organization.

  • The scope of the incident and estimated losses.

  • Operational impact.

  • Transaction IDs and dates, if relevant.

  • The suspected initial-access vector.

  • Host and network indicators associated with the incident.

Evidence should be preserved and shared through appropriate channels, with sensitive organizational information handled according to applicable procedures.

10.4 Ransom-Payment Considerations

Paying a ransom does not guarantee that an organization will receive a working decryptor, recover all files, prevent stolen information from being published, or avoid another attack. Payment can also create additional legal, financial, and operational considerations.

Organizations should coordinate with incident-response specialists, legal counsel, leadership, insurers where applicable, and law enforcement before making decisions. The priority should be containment, evidence preservation, safe recovery, and reducing the likelihood of reinfection.

11. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

The following techniques are drawn from the CISA advisory's reported behaviors and mappings. They should be understood as advisory-reported associations, not a claim that every technique appears in every SafePay incident.

MITRE ATT&CK IDTechniqueRelevance to reported activity
T1133External Remote ServicesInitial access through exposed or compromised remote services
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExploitation of vulnerable internet-facing systems
T1110Brute ForcePassword guessing or related credential attacks
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution through command interpreters and scripts
T1059.001PowerShellPowerShell-based command and script execution
T1059.003Windows Command ShellWindows command-shell activity
T1569.002Service ExecutionExecution through services
T1098Account ManipulationModification of accounts or their permissions
T1136Create AccountCreation of additional accounts
T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlAttempted UAC bypass
T1027.002Software PackingPacking or obfuscation of software
T1070.004File DeletionDeletion of files, including potential self-removal
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionUse of trusted system binaries to execute activity
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsDisabling or modifying security tools, as mapped in the supplied advisory
T1021Remote ServicesMovement through remote services
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolRemote access through RDP
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesUse of SMB and Windows administrative shares
T1021.006Windows Remote ManagementRemote access through WinRM
T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityPackaging collected data using archiving utilities
T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via LibraryMapping included in the advisory's tool-related material
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolData transfer using alternative protocols
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceExfiltration using web services
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEncryption of files to disrupt access
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryInterference with recovery and backup capabilities

The advisory also discusses token impersonation or theft and the use of alternate authentication material in its behavioral descriptions. These behaviors should be investigated where relevant, but exact technique assignments should be checked against the current MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base before being represented as independently validated mappings.

12. Conclusion

SafePay ransomware represents a significant threat to organizations because its reported activity combines multiple methods of initial access with account abuse, system discovery, defense evasion, lateral movement, data exfiltration, backup interference, and file encryption.

The CISA advisory reports at least 600 victims since activity began in August 2024 and identifies vulnerabilities affecting Cisco ASA/FTD, Veeam Backup & Replication, and SonicWall SonicOS. The exploitation of selected vulnerabilities, especially in exposed security and backup infrastructure, reinforces the need for timely patching and careful control of remote access.

Organizations should not rely on a single defensive measure. Effective protection requires layered security: vulnerability remediation, MFA, least privilege, network segmentation, endpoint monitoring, controlled administrative tools, secure and tested backups, and an incident-response plan that addresses both encryption and data theft.

If an incident occurs, rapid containment, evidence preservation, careful scoping, secure recovery, and appropriate reporting can help reduce the damage and support follow-up investigation. Because ransomware operations and indicators can change, defenders should use the supplied IOCs as investigation leads and validate them against current telemetry and reliable threat-intelligence sources.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1133 — External Remote ServicesT1190 — Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1110 — Brute ForceT1059 — Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001 — PowerShellT1059.003 — Windows Command ShellT1569.002 — Service ExecutionT1098 — Account ManipulationT1136 — Create AccountT1548.002 — Bypass User Account ControlT1027.002 — Software PackingT1070.004 — File DeletionT1218 — System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1685 — Disable or Modify ToolsT1021 — Remote ServicesT1021.001 — Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.006 — Windows Remote ManagementT1560.001 — Archive via UtilityT1560.002 — Archive via LibraryT1048 — Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolT1567 — Exfiltration Over Web ServiceT1486 — Data Encrypted for ImpactT1490 — Inhibit System Recovery