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HighMalware · 7 min read

SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers Armorsteal Malware Through Fake Chocolatey and Massgrave Websites

A September 2026 SEO poisoning campaign distributed Armorsteal malware through fake websites impersonating Chocolatey and Microsoft Activation Scripts (Massgrave). Malicious PowerShell commands installed remote-access, surveillance, and information-stealing components capable of capturing keystrokes, monitoring clipboard activity, hijacking cryptocurrency addresses, stealing browser credentials and cookies, collecting Discord tokens and SSH keys, and maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks. Users and organizations should avoid untrusted software-download websites, verify installation commands, and monitor for suspicious PowerShell activity, unauthorized scheduled tasks, and connections to the reported command-and-control infrastructure.

Written by Battula Bhanu Prakash·Published Oct 23, 2026

Executive Summary

In September 2026, Zscaler Threat Hunting identified an SEO poisoning campaign distributing Armorsteal, a Python-based malware family, through fraudulent websites impersonating the Chocolatey package manager and Microsoft Activation Scripts (MAS), also known as the Massgrave project.

The campaign targeted users searching for software installation instructions. The fraudulent websites presented malicious PowerShell commands that downloaded and executed installers. These installers deployed a Python 3.11 environment and multiple malware components protected with Pyarmor, enabling remote access, surveillance, and information theft.

Armorsteal's capabilities include keystroke logging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, cryptocurrency wallet address replacement, browser credential theft, Discord token collection, and the theft of SSH keys and cryptocurrency recovery phrases. The malware also uses scheduled tasks for persistence and HTTPS-based command-and-control (C2) communications to receive tasks and upload collected information.

The campaign demonstrates how search-engine manipulation and trusted software-installation workflows can be abused to deliver malware. Users and organizations should verify software sources, avoid blindly executing installation commands, and investigate the campaign's reported indicators of compromise.

Key Findings

  • SEO poisoning: Fraudulent Chocolatey and Massgrave websites were used to distribute Armorsteal to users searching for installation instructions.

  • Malicious PowerShell commands: The lures delivered installer scripts that deployed the malware while allowing the legitimate Chocolatey installer to run in the Chocolatey-themed variant.

  • Three malware components: The reported components provide remote access, surveillance, and information-stealing capabilities.

  • Persistent execution: Scheduled tasks named SysCheck2 and SysCheckX launch the remote-access component at user logon and system startup.

  • Credential and financial theft: The stealer targets browser credentials, cookies, password managers, Discord tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, seed phrases, SSH keys, and Steam session data.

  • Signed remote tasks: The remote-access component verifies RSA-2048 signatures before executing received Python tasks.

  • Changing infrastructure: The campaign's lure websites and C2 infrastructure changed during September and October 2026.

  • Anti-analysis measures: The malware checks organization information associated with the public IP address and uses Pyarmor to complicate analysis.

Campaign Overview

The attackers used search-engine optimization poisoning to position fraudulent websites in searches related to Windows software installation. Two principal lures impersonated Chocolatey and Microsoft Activation Scripts.

Users searching for terms such as “install Chocolatey,” “Chocolatey PowerShell,” “Microsoft Activation Scripts,” or “Massgrave activation” could encounter these fraudulent sites. The websites displayed PowerShell commands that downloaded and executed malicious installation scripts.

The reported domains were:

  • choclatey[.]org — fraudulent Chocolatey-themed website.

  • massgravel[.]net — fraudulent Massgrave-themed website.

The two lures delivered the same malware family. Shared malware components and an RSA-2048 task-signing key linked them to the same operation, according to the source report.

The fake Massgrave website reportedly went offline on September 25, 2026, while the fake Chocolatey website became unavailable around October 1, 2026. These historical observations do not establish the current status of every associated domain or infrastructure component.

Technical Analysis

1. Initial Access and Malware Delivery

The campaign relied on users executing commands from fraudulent software installation pages. The installer variants requested elevated privileges, hid the PowerShell console window, and downloaded a ZIP archive into:

C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\

The directory was designed to resemble a legitimate Windows system location. The archive contained a Python 3.11 runtime, Pyarmor runtime files, and Armorsteal Python scripts.

The Chocolatey-themed installer also ran the legitimate Chocolatey installer, allowing the expected software installation to appear successful even while malicious components were deployed.

This technique demonstrates the risk of executing commands copied from search results or unfamiliar websites without validating the source and the command's behavior.

2. Persistence and Anti-Analysis

Armorsteal creates two scheduled tasks to maintain execution:

  • SysCheck2: Runs at user logon and launches the remote-access module with the highest privileges available.

  • SysCheckX: Runs at system startup and launches the remote-access module as SYSTEM after a 45-second delay.

The malware also checks public IP and organization information through ipinfo[.]io. If the returned organization matches certain cloud providers, including Google, Amazon, Microsoft, or Azure, the remote-access module displays a fake “Memory is insufficient” message and exits.

Its Python code is protected with Pyarmor 9.1.7, complicating static analysis by encrypting or obfuscating bytecode and string constants.

3. Remote-Access Component — SysMon.py

The remote-access component, SysMon.py, collects system information including the hostname, operating system, processor, memory, disks, local and public IP addresses, and network interfaces. It uses the motherboard serial number to generate a machine identifier for C2 communications.

The component communicates with a hardcoded list of C2 domains over HTTPS. It checks server availability, transmits victim system information, retrieves tasks, and downloads additional modules.

Reported C2 endpoints include:

  • /downloadables/configf.json — Checks C2 availability.

  • /receive_infof — Sends system information.

  • /get-onetime-code/{machine_id} — Retrieves victim-specific tasks.

  • /get-global — Retrieves tasks shared across infected systems.

  • /downloadables/{archive} — Used by earlier builds to download module archives and updates.

The remote-access component polls for victim-specific and global tasks every 60 seconds. Before executing received Python code, it verifies an RSA-2048 signature using an embedded public key. It also tracks task versions locally to avoid re-executing previously processed or older tasks.

The malware can update its own SysMon.py component through signed global tasks. It verifies the SHA-256 hash of a downloaded replacement before updating the local copy.

4. Surveillance Component — basrq.py

The surveillance module, basrq.py, operates using a bundled Python interpreter and provides monitoring and clipboard-manipulation capabilities.

Its reported functionality includes:

  • Recording keystrokes and active-window titles.

  • Monitoring clipboard contents every 0.5 seconds.

  • Replacing copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.

  • Capturing screenshots when configured keywords appear in window titles or captured keystrokes.

  • Displaying fraudulent transaction notifications impersonating Exodus, MetaMask, and Phantom.

The clipboard hijacking functionality supports Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Ethereum, TRON, XRP, Dogecoin, TON, and Solana addresses.

The surveillance module retrieves monitoring keywords and uploads collected data using endpoints including /global_keywords, /keywords/{machine_id}, /black-watch/{machine_id}, and /black-watch/screenshot/{machine_id}.

Reported screenshots are encrypted using an XOR key derived from a hardcoded string's SHA-256 digest before upload.

5. Information-Stealing Component — got.py

The information-stealing module, got.py, collects information from browsers, password managers, cryptocurrency wallets, Discord clients, and Steam installations.

Its reported capabilities include:

  • Stealing and validating Discord tokens from 22 Discord client variants.

  • Collecting data from 21 browser wallet extensions and desktop wallet applications.

  • Searching drives from A: through Z: for BIP39 recovery phrases.

  • Extracting browser cookies through the Chrome DevTools Protocol on port 9222.

  • Collecting saved browser passwords, autofill data, and credit-card metadata.

  • Targeting password managers such as KeePass, 1Password, RoboForm, Password Safe, Enpass, Bitwarden, and Dashlane.

  • Collecting SSH keys and Steam session information.

  • Gathering system and environment information, including geolocation, display details, language settings, time zone, and GPU information.

The reported upload endpoints include /infame/receive/zip, /infame/receive/dt, /ws/{machine_id}, /pwd, and /upload/st.

The combination of browser-data theft, clipboard manipulation, and recovery-phrase collection creates risks of account takeover, cryptocurrency theft, and unauthorized access to organizational systems.

Threat Actor Infrastructure

The source report identified the following domains and their reported purposes.

DomainReported purpose
workerstats[.]netPrimary C2 in earlier campaign activity
datamons[.]orgStandby C2, later observed in use
supertrap[.]netStandby C2
niceer[.]netStandby C2
pymons[.]isC2 observed during later monitoring
massgravel[.]netFraudulent Massgrave lure
choclatey[.]orgFraudulent Chocolatey lure

The report also documented infrastructure changes during the campaign. Early activity used 209.99.186[.]187 for the Chocolatey-themed website, while the lure sites were later moved to 82.153.135[.]80. The primary C2 infrastructure also changed during the analysis period.

During early October, workerstats[.]net became unavailable and the operators reportedly began using pymons[.]is and datamons[.]org for C2 communications.

The later module-download process required a token in the request URL and an X-Verify header. The surveillance and information-stealing packages were retrieved through token-protected paths, with randomized ZIP filenames.

These indicators reflect the source report's observation period. They should be validated against current threat intelligence and local telemetry before being used for blocking decisions.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File Hashes — SHA-256

SHA-256Filename / component
f3846ec2a6ff0a27d9ef2b9bf7908743b81d295ef29344acfb96ff83fff994f9install.ps1 — MAS lure installer
fb1181160e9f10ce1eb5e5dc9bc23e1498a39110ee9ea361fd150454cb01b292install.ps1 — Chocolatey lure installer
3e3b62a9836697d978cbb620dc8af8f6eefdf8cb73fc30d16bb394d1c58f4c97Update.zip / Updatef.zip — Remote-access module
237ba698d7dc8936c43e0e78e7644002375e51e8baf9b3a7d4e18683f871ee31nig20084.zip — Surveillance module
be0329d0795dd62ae587faf97e704bb36413e5c98ddd8fe575f5077db3c84e5fgetthem20084.zip — Stealer module
04d2828155ed2a276cfd3c97d4f966d328391dd818e04e773212cd601e49fa74nig20083.zip — Older stealer module
56f05c4fb1c25c04e0dde60e2e5e41ac164a6dc53688d0f9eb52a55f82106389getthem20083.zip — Older stealer module
0ea99fbbe29af6f797e3866ed5f822c7a5d3e9cdb990a8c382a715069f156499SysMon.py — Remote-access module
8fb7aaf2b9270b8b75f6844aaefd5242b4f926fb89cba10fff3d9b908a769788basrq.py — Surveillance module
5410c2f239c3649928383c4478dea182f90b21f5b258081fec07e9d297ae4b1cgot.py — Stealer module

Network Indicators

IndicatorReported role
choclatey[.]orgFake Chocolatey website
massgravel[.]netFake Massgrave website
workerstats[.]netC2 domain
pymons[.]isC2 domain
datamons[.]orgStandby and later active C2
niceer[.]netStandby C2
supertrap[.]netStandby C2
82[.]153[.]135[.]80Payload host
186[.]2[.]175[.]183C2 IP address
186[.]2[.]163[.]185C2 IP address
190[.]115[.]31[.]69C2 IP address
209[.]99[.]186[.]187Payload host

Recommended Mitigations

  • Isolate suspected infected endpoints from the network while preserving evidence where feasible.

  • Block verified malicious domains and network indicators using appropriate security controls.

  • Investigate and remove unauthorized scheduled tasks and persistence mechanisms after collecting relevant evidence.

  • Reset potentially exposed credentials from a trusted, clean device.

  • Revoke and replace affected sessions, tokens, SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet credentials as appropriate.

Preventive Controls

  • Download software only from verified official websites and trusted package repositories.

  • Inspect PowerShell installation commands before execution, especially commands copied from search results or unfamiliar websites.

  • Apply least privilege and avoid granting administrative access to unverified installation scripts.

  • Monitor scheduled-task creation, suspicious Python execution, browser debugging arguments, and unexpected outbound connections.

  • Review endpoint protection exclusions and investigate unauthorized changes.

  • Educate users about typosquatted domains and fraudulent software-download pages.

Conclusion

Armorsteal demonstrates how SEO poisoning can turn routine software searches into a malware delivery channel. By impersonating Chocolatey and Microsoft Activation Scripts, the campaign encouraged users to execute malicious PowerShell commands that installed remote-access, surveillance, and information-stealing components.

Its ability to collect credentials, browser sessions, cryptocurrency wallet information, recovery phrases, and SSH keys creates risks extending beyond the initially infected endpoint. Scheduled-task persistence, signed remote tasks, obfuscated Python code, and changing C2 infrastructure further complicate investigation and response.

Organizations should combine user awareness, trusted software distribution, endpoint monitoring, network investigation, and credential recovery procedures to reduce exposure.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1059.001 – PowerShell | T1053.005 – Scheduled Task | T1056.001 – Keylogging | T1115 – Clipboard Data | T1555.003 – Credentials from Web Browsers | T1539 – Steal Web Session Cookie | T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer | T1071.001 – Web Protocols | T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel