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HighSecurity Advisory · 17 min read

Star Blizzard Refines Phishing and Malware Delivery with the RedFlick Technique

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified significant changes in the operational techniques of Russian state-linked threat actor Star Blizzard (also known as SEABORGIUM). Since January 2026, the group has expanded its phishing campaigns, abused compromised websites to distribute malicious emails, and introduced the RedFlick malware delivery technique. RedFlick uses scheduled tasks to deploy the CosmicPulse Python backdoor, reducing the victim interaction required for successful compromise. The campaigns have targeted Ukrainian organizations, governments, NGOs, think tanks, and financial institutions, with more than 100 organizations reportedly affected.

Written by ThreatBeaconX Threat Intelligence Team·Published Nov 1, 2026

1. Executive Summary

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has reported an evolution in the phishing and malware delivery operations of Star Blizzard, a Russian state-linked cyberespionage group attributed by CISA to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Centre 18.

Since January 2026, the threat actor has expanded from conventional targeted spear-phishing operations to larger-scale phishing campaigns, using compromised websites to create sender accounts and deliver malicious attachments. Microsoft has also identified a new malware delivery technique tracked as RedFlick, which uses scheduled tasks to deploy the group's custom CosmicPulse backdoor.

Unlike earlier ClickFix-based infection chains that required victims to perform multiple actions, the RedFlick technique reduces the infection process to a single user interaction. This change, combined with increased phishing volume and modified payload delivery mechanisms, improves the group's ability to distribute malware and evade security controls.

Microsoft observed at least 13 distinct large-scale phishing campaigns between January and August 2026. The activity primarily targeted Ukrainian individuals and institutions, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, government entities, and financial institutions associated with international policy and support for Ukraine.

More than 100 organizations, primarily in the United States and the United Kingdom, were reportedly affected by this activity.

The malware delivery chain involves password-protected archives, malicious LNK files, VHDX images, MSI installers, scheduled tasks, and DLL-based payload execution. The final payload, CosmicPulse, is a Python-based backdoor also known as NOROBOT, BAITSWITCH, or YESROBOT in related reporting.

2. Threat Actor Overview

Threat actor: Star Blizzard

Other names: SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER

Attribution: Russian state-linked cyberespionage group

Associated organization: Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Centre 18

Star Blizzard has historically conducted targeted social engineering and credential-theft campaigns against individuals and organizations involved in government, diplomacy, international policy, research, and other strategic areas.

The group's earlier operations commonly involved establishing contact with targets through email or messaging platforms, impersonating trusted individuals, and subsequently delivering malicious links designed to steal credentials.

Microsoft's 2026 observations indicate a shift toward more scalable operations, with larger phishing campaigns, compromised website accounts, and modified malware deployment techniques.

The changes demonstrate the group's continued efforts to improve operational efficiency, avoid detection, and maintain access to targeted environments.

3. Campaign Overview and Targeting

Since January 2026, Microsoft has observed at least 13 distinct large-scale phishing campaigns associated with Star Blizzard.

The campaigns initially focused on Ukrainian individuals and organizations before expanding to international targets.

3.1 Targeted Sectors

The reported targeting includes:

  • Ukrainian government institutions and individuals.

  • International NGOs.

  • Think tanks and research organizations.

  • Government officials and diplomatic personnel.

  • Financial institutions and financial researchers.

  • Academia and media organizations.

  • Technology-sector organizations.

  • Organizations involved in international policy and support for Ukraine.

Microsoft reported that more than 100 organizations were affected, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom.

3.2 Campaign Timeline

PeriodObserved activity
January 2026Phishing emails impersonating Ukrainian authorities, using tax audit and outstanding fine notifications. Malicious VHDX-based delivery observed.
February 2026Continued Ukrainian-themed phishing and expansion of CosmicPulse delivery infrastructure.
March 2026Campaigns impersonating think tanks and international organizations through conference invitations. Targeting expanded beyond Ukraine.
April 2026Introduction of multiple scheduled tasks masquerading as legitimate network components to support persistence and malware deployment.
May 2026Conference and event-themed phishing targeting diplomatic and multilateral organizations.
June 2026Campaigns targeting diplomatic personnel, think tanks, NGOs, and parliamentary organizations.
July 2026Use of PDF files containing concealed Base64-encoded PowerShell payloads.
August 2026Payment-related phishing campaigns and continued use of password-protected ZIP files.

Microsoft also observed an August campaign using steganography to conceal identifiers, further demonstrating the actor's evolving evasion capabilities.

A separate March campaign reportedly involved links leading to a DarkSword iOS backdoor installation. This is a distinct observed activity and should not be confused with the RedFlick/CosmicPulse Windows malware delivery chain.

4. Initial Access – Phishing and Social Engineering

Star Blizzard has expanded its phishing operations from highly targeted spear-phishing to larger campaigns involving tens to hundreds of emails per campaign.

The actor commonly uses a two-stage email approach.

4.1 Initial Contact

The first email typically attempts to establish communication with the target without including a malicious attachment.

Common themes include:

  • Invitations to confidential conferences or roundtable discussions.

  • Strategic discussions involving international security.

  • Financial notifications and payment advice.

  • Tax audit notifications.

  • Outstanding fine notifications.

  • Water supply disruption notices.

The messages may impersonate trusted contacts, government representatives, researchers, or well-known organizations.

4.2 Follow-up Email

Once the recipient responds, Star Blizzard sends a follow-up message containing a password-protected RAR or ZIP archive.

The password is frequently included as an image within the email, making it less likely to be detected by basic text-based email security controls.

The archives contain files that initiate the RedFlick infection process.

4.3 Compromised Websites Used for Email Distribution

Since March 2026, Microsoft has observed Star Blizzard creating accounts on compromised websites to support its large-scale phishing campaigns.

The actor reportedly used accounts hosted on compromised cPanel and WordPress websites, reusing account names across multiple domains.

Microsoft assesses with high confidence that these websites were compromised and abused for phishing distribution.

This approach provides access to legitimate-looking web infrastructure and reduces reliance on newly registered or easily identifiable attacker-controlled email services.

5. Technical Analysis – RedFlick Malware Delivery Technique

RedFlick is Microsoft's tracking name for a malware delivery technique that uses scheduled tasks to deploy the CosmicPulse backdoor.

The technique reduces the number of user actions required for infection and uses multiple stages to deliver and execute malicious payloads.

Microsoft observed several variations of the delivery mechanism during 2026.

5.1 VHDX-Based Delivery – January 2026

In January 2026, Star Blizzard used a malicious Virtual Hard Disk v2 (VHDX) file delivered through a password-protected ZIP archive.

The archive contained:

  • A malicious LNK shortcut disguised as a PDF document.

  • A hidden directory containing a BAT script.

  • A legitimate decoy PDF.

When the victim opens the LNK file, the execution chain proceeds as follows:

  1. The LNK file launches conhost.exe in a hidden window.

  2. cmd.exe is spawned to execute the embedded BAT script.

  3. The BAT script opens the legitimate decoy PDF to make the activity appear normal.

  4. The script invokes ssh.exe with PermitLocalCommand enabled.

  5. The SSH command initiates a local command execution mechanism.

  6. The execution chain downloads and installs a remotely hosted MSI package.

  7. The MSI installer creates a scheduled task that downloads and executes the CosmicPulse downloader.

The downloader is compiled as a Control Panel applet DLL (CPL), which can be executed through Windows Control Panel functionality.

This technique allows the attacker to disguise malicious activity as a legitimate system component.

5.2 CosmicPulse Downloader

The Control Panel applet DLL acts as a downloader responsible for obtaining and installing CosmicPulse.

The downloader is also publicly associated with the names:

  • NOROBOT

  • BAITSWITCH

The observed installation process includes:

  1. Downloading two ZIP archives and storing them on the compromised system.

  2. Writing an encrypted AES key to the registry location:

    HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.mollis

  3. Extracting a Python 3.8 64-bit package and a Python bootstrapper from one ZIP archive.

  4. Using the bootstrapper to retrieve and decrypt the AES key.

  5. Using AES-ECB decryption with an embedded key to decode the CosmicPulse payload.

  6. Executing the resulting Python-based backdoor, also known as YESROBOT.

Microsoft observed changes to CosmicPulse during 2026 intended to circumvent existing signatures. However, the backdoor's overall capabilities and purpose remained consistent with earlier reporting.

5.3 RedFlick Scheduled Task Persistence – April 2026

In April 2026, Microsoft observed an evolution in the actor's persistence mechanisms.

Instead of creating only one scheduled task, the malicious MSI installer created three scheduled tasks masquerading as legitimate Windows network components.

Each task performs a different function.

Task 1 – Internet Quality Test Connection

This task performs registration beaconing and supports dynamic DLL execution.

Its functions include:

  • Collecting the network or computer name.

  • Collecting the username of the infected device.

  • Encoding the collected information using UTF-16 and Base64.

  • Transmitting the information to the C2 infrastructure.

  • Supporting remote execution of an attacker-controlled DLL.

The DLL can reportedly be executed through Control_RunDLL from Shell32.dll.

Microsoft was unable to obtain a variant of this specific DLL payload.

The task uses a WebDAV UNC path to access the remote payload over HTTP rather than relying on a conventional SMB network share.

Task 2 – Network Configuration Manager

This task supports the WebDAV-based execution mechanism used by the other scheduled tasks.

It enables Windows to process a UNC-style path as a WebDAV resource through the WebClient functionality and associated WebDAV redirector.

This allows remote web resources to be accessed as though they were local file or folder paths.

Task 3 – System Health Monitor

This task is responsible for executing the CosmicPulse downloader.

It uses control.exe to access a remote path hosted on the hardcoded C2 infrastructure and execute the next-stage payload.

Microsoft observed the use of the infrastructure at:

103.245.213[.]217

In at least one incident, Microsoft observed either the first or third scheduled task deploying CosmicPulse.

5.4 PDF-Based Payload Concealment – July 2026

In July 2026, Microsoft observed another modification to Star Blizzard's malware delivery process.

The actor used a multistage infection chain involving password-protected archives, malicious LNK files, PDF files, PowerShell, and MSI installers.

The observed sequence was:

  1. The phishing email contains a password-protected RAR archive nested inside a ZIP archive.

  2. The archive contains a malicious LNK file.

  3. When executed, the LNK file launches conhost.exe.

  4. The execution chain uses curl to download a PDF from attacker-controlled infrastructure.

  5. A PowerShell payload searches the PDF for the magic header cAB.

  6. The script extracts the following 208 bytes of Base64-encoded data.

  7. The extracted content is decoded and executed through PowerShell.

  8. The resulting command attempts to download and install an MSI package.

  9. The MSI installer attempts to create additional scheduled tasks.

  10. The scheduled tasks support further payload retrieval and execution, including a CPL applet.

The use of a PDF as a container for concealed PowerShell content demonstrates an additional attempt to bypass traditional file-based security inspection.

5.5 CosmicPulse Backdoor

CosmicPulse is a Python-based backdoor deployed through the RedFlick infection chain.

It is also referenced in related reporting as YESROBOT.

The malware is delivered through a downloader that retrieves encrypted payload files, extracts a Python runtime and bootstrapper, and decrypts the final backdoor.

Microsoft observed the actor modifying CosmicPulse throughout 2026 to avoid detection by existing signatures.

The backdoor remains the primary malware payload associated with the RedFlick delivery technique described in the report.

6. Attack Chain Summary

The following sequence summarizes the major RedFlick infection stages:

  1. Initial contact: The attacker sends a phishing email impersonating a trusted individual or organization.

  2. Victim engagement: The recipient responds to the initial email.

  3. Malicious attachment delivery: A follow-up email contains a password-protected ZIP or RAR archive.

  4. Archive execution: The victim extracts and opens a malicious LNK file disguised as a legitimate document.

  5. Initial payload execution: Hidden command-line processes, BAT scripts, or PowerShell execute.

  6. Payload retrieval: The infection chain downloads a malicious MSI package or related payload.

  7. Scheduled task creation: RedFlick establishes multiple scheduled tasks using legitimate-looking names.

  8. Downloader execution: The scheduled tasks retrieve and execute the CosmicPulse downloader.

  9. Backdoor installation: The downloader extracts and decrypts the Python-based CosmicPulse payload.

  10. Command and control: The infected system communicates with attacker-controlled infrastructure and provides the actor with a persistent foothold.

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were published by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. IP addresses and domains are defanged for safe handling.

7.1 File Hashes – SHA-256

SHA-256File name / Description
9707a8694e954e9ee13e839d6e5905ce626c0837c7c90da6d1025bfbe152866bDocuments.zip – Password-protected ZIP attachment observed in January campaign targeting Ukraine
1f2096ff906915fbf80778f0636446206197351f7e271af97936eeb6f32c179dDocuments.vhdx – Malicious VHDX contained within the January ZIP archive
699e92a9e0edf7835879d5697bc67138c0b137117f459caf1a44df357407cad9Chatham_London_Conference_2026_Invitation.rar – Password-protected June campaign attachment
24b6e36a09eb2acfc2a95478ca685acb7593b1689be6a4a639fe0d222393cfa7USUBC_Private_Executive_Roundtable_Webex.rar – Password-protected July campaign attachment
dd98dbc1a55afe6fd0ed2ed53a79c76f6bde15081a0060422185b74eb1799ee4Payment Advice Note.zip – Password-protected August campaign attachment

Associated archive passwords published by Microsoft:

File namePassword
Chatham_London_Conference_2026_Invitation.rarLiveCrown8142
USUBC_Private_Executive_Roundtable_Webex.rarLiteRaspberry9415
Payment Advice Note.zipBirdMouseCrab

These passwords are included as forensic context for identifying or analyzing the corresponding archives. They should not be used to open untrusted attachments on production systems.

7.2 IPv4 Indicators

IP AddressDescription
103.245.231[.]248Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – January 2026
2.57.241[.]246Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – February 2026
89.125.209[.]168Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – February 2026
103.245.231[.]79Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – March 2026
45.84.59[.]66Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – April 2026
103.160.59[.]97Host for CosmicPulse downloader DLL – July 2026
103.245.213[.]217Hardcoded C2 infrastructure observed in the April scheduled-task activity

7.3 Domain Indicators

DomainDescription
etia[.]caRedFlick MSI installer – January 2026
groy[.]ccRedFlick MSI installer – February 2026
gliderrompercycl[.]comCosmicPulse backdoor download
muvb[.]netRedFlick MSI installer – February 2026
divekickspolic[.]orgCosmicPulse backdoor download
matjk[.]clickRedFlick MSI installer – March 2026
bpdaersa[.]clickRedFlick MSI installer – March 2026
stuseamandesilt[.]orgCosmicPulse backdoor download
Itechx[.]telRedFlick MSI installer – April 2026
guach[.]netRedFlick PowerShell code installer – June 2026
ruten[.]observerCosmicPulse downloader DLL – June-July 2026
byveo[.]orgRedFlick PowerShell code installer – July 2026
secure-dns-hub[.]comCosmicPulse downloader DLL – July 2026 and ongoing at the time of reporting
qumel[.]linkCosmicPulse downloader DLL – July 2026
cyrna[.]topRedFlick MSI installer – August 2026
drasw[.]clubCosmicPulse downloader DLL – August 2026

IOC handling note: The indicators are associated with different campaign stages and periods. Their appearance in telemetry should be correlated with timestamps, process execution, file activity, and other contextual evidence before confirming compromise. Microsoft also provides a broader technical analysis and hunting guidance in the original report.

8. Detection and Threat Hunting

Security teams should prioritize identifying malicious archive execution, suspicious LNK activity, unusual conhost.exe and curl relationships, unauthorized scheduled task creation, and execution of CosmicPulse-related payloads.

8.1 Endpoint Threat Hunting

Review EDR telemetry for the following activities:

  • conhost.exe launching curl.

  • ssh.exe executed with PermitLocalCommand=yes.

  • Suspicious cmd.exe and PowerShell execution originating from archive-extracted LNK files.

  • MSI installers creating multiple scheduled tasks.

  • Scheduled tasks named:

    • Internet Quality Test Connection

    • Network Configuration Manager

    • System Health Monitor

  • control.exe accessing remote WebDAV or UNC paths.

  • Unexpected DLL execution through Control_RunDLL.

  • Python execution from unusual directories or recently created archives.

  • Suspicious registry activity involving:

    HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.mollis

8.2 Network Threat Hunting

Search network, DNS, firewall, and proxy telemetry for:

  • Connections to the published IP and domain indicators.

  • Outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests associated with the listed domains.

  • Suspicious WebDAV access over HTTP or HTTPS.

  • Unexpected outbound SSH connections.

  • MSI, CPL, ZIP, VHDX, PDF, and other payload downloads from suspicious infrastructure.

  • Repeated connections to known CosmicPulse delivery infrastructure.

  • Beaconing activity involving encoded hostname and username information.

8.3 Microsoft Defender XDR Hunting Queries

The following Microsoft Defender XDR queries are based on the hunting logic published by Microsoft.

A. Detect conhost.exe invoking curl

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName == "conhost.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "curl"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
    ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, DeviceId, ProcessId,
    ProcessUniqueId, InitiatingProcessUniqueId

B. Detect SSH invoking a local command line

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ssh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "PermitLocalCommand=yes"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "LocalCommand=cmd.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
    ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId,
    ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, ReportId

C. Detect suspicious RedFlick scheduled tasks

union isfuzzy=true
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or AdditionalFields has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType,
        ProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields,
        RegistryKey = tostring(dynamic(null)),
        RegistryValueName = tostring(dynamic(null)),
        SourceTable = "DeviceProcessEvents",
        ProcessId, AccountName, AccountDomain, AccountSid
),
(
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or AdditionalFields has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or RegistryKey has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or RegistryValueName has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType,
        ProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields,
        RegistryKey, RegistryValueName,
        SourceTable = "DeviceEvents",
        ProcessId = long(null), AccountName = "",
        AccountDomain = "", AccountSid = ""
),
(
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where RegistryKey has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or RegistryValueName has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or RegistryValueData has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (
        "Internet Quality Test Connection",
        "Network Configuration Manager",
        "System Health Monitor"
    )
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType,
        ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
        AdditionalFields = "",
        RegistryKey, RegistryValueName,
        SourceTable = "DeviceRegistryEvents",
        ProcessId = long(null), AccountName = "",
        AccountDomain = "", AccountSid = ""
)

Note: The above queries are based on Microsoft's published examples. Results require investigation because similar process activity or task names may occur in legitimate environments.

8.4 Microsoft Sentinel – Network IOC Hunting

The following query checks IP and domain indicators across network-session data sources supported by the ASIM network session parser.

let lookback = 30d;
let ioc_ip_addr = dynamic([
    "103.245.231.248",
    "2.57.241.246",
    "89.125.209.168",
    "103.245.231.79",
    "45.84.59.66",
    "103.160.59.97"
]);
let ioc_domains = dynamic([
    "etia.ca",
    "groy.cc",
    "gliderrompercycl.com",
    "muvb.net",
    "divekickspolic.org",
    "matjk.click",
    "bpdaersa.click",
    "stuseamandesilt.org",
    "Itechx.tel",
    "guach.net",
    "ruten.observer",
    "byveo.org",
    "secure-dns-hub.com",
    "qumel.link",
    "cyrna.top",
    "drasw.club"
]);
_Im_NetworkSession(
    starttime=todatetime(ago(lookback)),
    endtime=now()
)
| where DstIpAddr in (ioc_ip_addr)
    or DstDomain has_any (ioc_domains)
| summarize
    FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
    LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
    EventCount=count()
    by SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, DstDomain,
       Dvc, EventProduct, EventVendor

8.5 Microsoft Sentinel – Web Session IOC Hunting

let lookback = 30d;
let ioc_ip_addr = dynamic([
    "103.245.231.248",
    "2.57.241.246",
    "89.125.209.168",
    "103.245.231.79",
    "45.84.59.66",
    "103.160.59.97"
]);
let ioc_domains = dynamic([
    "etia.ca",
    "groy.cc",
    "gliderrompercycl.com",
    "muvb.net",
    "divekickspolic.org",
    "matjk.click",
    "bpdaersa.click",
    "stuseamandesilt.org",
    "Itechx.tel",
    "guach.net",
    "ruten.observer",
    "byveo.org",
    "secure-dns-hub.com",
    "qumel.link",
    "cyrna.top",
    "drasw.club"
]);
_Im_WebSession(
    starttime=todatetime(ago(lookback)),
    endtime=now()
)
| where DstIpAddr in (ioc_ip_addr)
    or DstDomain has_any (ioc_domains)
    or Url has_any (ioc_domains)
| summarize
    FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
    LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
    EventCount=count()
    by SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, DstDomain,
       Url, Dvc, EventProduct, EventVendor

The Sentinel queries are based on Microsoft's published ASIM hunting examples. The published IP list and domain list should be maintained as separate threat intelligence indicators where possible, allowing them to be reused in analytics rules and scheduled hunts.

9. Recommendations

9.1 Email Security

  • Implement phishing-resistant authentication methods for users with access to sensitive information.

  • Configure Conditional Access policies to restrict suspicious or unauthorized sign-ins.

  • Enable advanced anti-phishing protection through Microsoft Defender for Office 365 or equivalent security solutions.

  • Enable Safe Links and Safe Attachments to inspect malicious URLs and email attachments.

  • Monitor suspicious emails containing password-protected ZIP and RAR archives.

  • Investigate emails impersonating trusted contacts, government officials, NGOs, and conference organizers.

  • Train users to verify unexpected invitations and financial notifications through previously established communication channels.

9.2 Endpoint Protection

  • Enable endpoint detection and response in block mode where supported.

  • Maintain real-time antivirus protection and cloud-delivered protection.

  • Enable automatic sample submission where organizational policy permits.

  • Configure attack surface reduction rules to block potentially obfuscated scripts and untrusted executable content.

  • Monitor suspicious execution of conhost.exe, curl.exe, ssh.exe, control.exe, msiexec.exe, and PowerShell.

  • Investigate scheduled task creation involving unusual network-related names.

  • Review suspicious DLL execution and WebDAV access.

9.3 Network Security

  • Restrict outbound SSH connections to external networks where not required for business operations.

  • Monitor unexpected WebDAV traffic and suspicious HTTP/HTTPS access to external infrastructure.

  • Block confirmed malicious IP addresses and domains after validating business impact and reputation.

  • Enable network protection to prevent access to known malicious websites and content.

  • Monitor unusual outbound traffic and repeated connections to suspicious infrastructure.

9.4 Identity and Access Protection

  • Implement phishing-resistant MFA.

  • Apply Conditional Access policies based on user, device, location, and risk.

  • Enable Continuous Access Evaluation where supported.

  • Review suspicious authentication attempts, including unexpected locations, ISPs, user agents, and anonymization services.

  • Investigate potential credential theft and unauthorized account access.

  • Use Zero-hour Auto Purge (ZAP) in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 to remove malicious messages when new threat intelligence becomes available.

9.5 Threat Hunting and Incident Response

  • Conduct retrospective IOC hunting across endpoint, network, DNS, proxy, and email telemetry.

  • Review the complete execution chain rather than relying exclusively on file hashes or network indicators.

  • Investigate suspicious scheduled tasks and their associated commands.

  • Review registry modifications, WebDAV connections, and remote DLL execution.

  • Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints and preserve forensic evidence.

  • Identify potential credential exposure and reset affected credentials where necessary.

  • Monitor for subsequent activity involving the CosmicPulse backdoor.

10. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

The following techniques map to behaviors described in Microsoft's research.

TacticTechniqueIDObserved behavior
Initial AccessSpearphishing AttachmentT1566.001Delivery of password-protected RAR and ZIP archives
Initial AccessSpearphishing LinkT1566.002Phishing emails containing malicious links
ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious FileT1204.002Victim executes malicious LNK files
ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellT1059.003BAT and CMD script execution
ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.001Execution of concealed PowerShell payloads
PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskT1053.005Creation of multiple Windows scheduled tasks
Defense EvasionObfuscated Files or InformationT1027Concealment and encoding of malicious payloads
Defense EvasionDeobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationT1140Decoding of Base64 and encrypted payload content
Defense EvasionSystem Binary Proxy Execution: Control PanelT1218.002Use of Control Panel applet functionality to execute payloads
Command and ControlIngress Tool TransferT1105Downloading MSI, DLL, and backdoor payloads
Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsT1071.001HTTP/HTTPS-based communication and WebDAV access
ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Transmission of host reconnaissance information to C2 infrastructure

11. Conclusion

Star Blizzard's adoption of the RedFlick malware delivery technique highlights the continued evolution of its cyberespionage operations.

By combining large-scale phishing campaigns, compromised websites, password-protected archives, malicious LNK files, VHDX-based delivery, scheduled task persistence, and PDF-based payload concealment, the group has developed more flexible and scalable methods for delivering its CosmicPulse backdoor.

The reduction in required user interaction is particularly significant, as the technique allows malware deployment through a simplified infection chain while maintaining multiple persistence and evasion mechanisms.

Organizations in government, financial services, NGOs, think tanks, and other sectors associated with international policy should prioritize phishing detection, scheduled task monitoring, endpoint threat hunting, and network IOC correlation.

Security teams should use the indicators and hunting queries published by Microsoft to identify potential exposure and investigate suspicious activity across their environments.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1566.001T1566.002T1204.002T1059.003T1059.001T1053.005T1027T1140T1218.002T1105T1071.001T1041