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CriticalAdvanced Persistent Threats (APT) · 7 min read

BlackX UEFI Bootkit Revives BlackLotus Techniques to Target Central Asian Diplomatic Organizations

A sophisticated UEFI bootkit named BlackX has been used in cyberespionage attacks targeting diplomatic organizations in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Discovered by Kaspersky researchers in early 2026, BlackX reuses techniques associated with the BlackLotus bootkit and exploits the Baton Drop vulnerability (CVE-2022-21894) to bypass Secure Boot protections. The malware deploys a malicious kernel driver to interfere with security monitoring and delivers additional espionage payloads that abuse cloud storage services for command-and-control communications. Kaspersky attributes the campaign to APT41 with medium confidence.

Written by Jakka Lakshmi Koumudi·Published Oct 27, 2026



1. Description

BlackX is a UEFI bootkit designed to establish persistent access by compromising the security mechanisms that protect the Windows startup process. Unlike conventional malware that operates primarily after the operating system loads, a UEFI bootkit targets the system's pre-boot environment, potentially allowing malicious components to execute before Windows security controls become fully operational.

According to Kaspersky Securelist, BlackX was identified during an investigation into attacks against diplomatic organizations in Central Asia in early 2026. The campaign involved compromising victim networks and obtaining administrator privileges before deploying the bootkit.

The investigation revealed similarities between BlackX and BlackLotus, a previously documented UEFI bootkit capable of bypassing Secure Boot. Researchers also identified a malicious kernel driver, a remote access trojan (RAT), and an additional payload called OxiDLLRunner.

Kaspersky assessed with medium confidence that the campaign was conducted by APT41, based on similarities in code, development practices, and previously observed threat activity. <Cite refs={["turn870929search0","turn870929search1"]}/>

2. Technical Description

BlackX exploits the Baton Drop vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-21894, to undermine Secure Boot protections. The vulnerability affects the security mechanisms used to validate trusted software during system startup.

The attack abuses weaknesses in the revocation process for vulnerable UEFI components. Although Microsoft released security updates addressing the issue, Kaspersky found that affected systems had been patched but remained susceptible because administrators had not completed the additional manual steps required to activate the relevant certificate revocations.

BlackX uses an installer named inst.exe and an encrypted, extensionless file named PVMDIJGKAX2. The installer decrypts the necessary installation data and places components in system and UEFI partitions.

The bootkit then attempts to establish a path for loading arbitrary EFI files and a malicious Windows kernel driver. That driver interferes with security monitoring mechanisms and facilitates the deployment of further malware.

This technique illustrates an important distinction: installing a security update does not always mean that every associated mitigation has been fully enforced.

3. Attack Overview

The reported attack chain can be summarized as follows:

  1. Initial compromise: Attackers compromise targeted organizational networks and obtain administrator privileges on victim machines.

  2. Bootkit deployment: The attackers introduce inst.exe and the encrypted file PVMDIJGKAX2.

  3. Secure Boot bypass: BlackX exploits Baton Drop-related weaknesses to manipulate the trusted UEFI startup process.

  4. Kernel driver execution: A malicious driver is loaded to interfere with security callbacks, registry monitoring, and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW).

  5. Espionage payload delivery: The bootkit deploys additional malware, including a RAT and OxiDLLRunner.

  6. Cloud-based communication: The RAT abuses Google Drive, OneDrive, and Yandex.Disk in observed variants to exchange commands, files, and execution results.

  7. Persistent access and evasion: The malware attempts to maintain access while disrupting security visibility and protecting its own components from tampering.

These stages reflect the activity described by Kaspersky. They should not be interpreted as proof that every component or capability was used identically in every victim environment.

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 UEFI compromise and Secure Boot bypass

BlackX uses techniques similar to those associated with BlackLotus to exploit Baton Drop and manipulate the trusted boot process. The researchers observed an implementation that attempts to install custom Machine Owner Keys (MOKs), enabling the loading of EFI files that would otherwise be restricted by the expected trust configuration.

The important security issue is not simply the existence of a bootkit, but the gap between applying a security update and completing the associated certificate-revocation measures.

4.2 Kernel-level security interference

The malicious driver attempts to weaken endpoint defenses by:

  • Disabling process, thread, and registry callbacks associated with security solutions.

  • Tampering with ETW providers to interfere with access to security-relevant event data.

  • Protecting bootkit files by intercepting file-open requests and returning a handle to calc.exe instead of the requested malicious file.

Kaspersky also reported that some driver routines were designed to activate when Kaspersky or Avast products were present. During dynamic analysis, however, the researchers found that these routines failed to interfere with Kaspersky products as intended.

4.3 Remote access trojan and cloud-based command-and-control

One of the observed second-stage payloads is a RAT that can load additional .NET payloads. It uses cloud storage services for command-and-control communications.

The analyzed variants used Google Drive, OneDrive, and Yandex.Disk to exchange information and support operations such as executing commands, uploading files, and downloading files to infected systems.

Using legitimate cloud services can make malicious communications harder to distinguish from ordinary activity, particularly when organizations do not monitor unusual application behavior or unexpected access to cloud storage.

4.4 OxiDLLRunner and DLL sideloading

A second payload, named OxiDLLRunner by the researchers, is an obfuscated malicious DLL delivered alongside supporting files.

It is loaded through a legitimate executable named googleupdate.exe, originally identified as jcef_helper.exe. The DLL decrypts data stored in v8_context_snapshot.bin, which contains shellcode followed by a Rust-based payload.

The Rust payload communicates with the reported command-and-control domain www[.]archivetj[.]com and is designed to receive DLL plugins exporting a function named create_plugin.

This chain combines DLL sideloading, obfuscation, encrypted payloads, and modular execution to complicate detection and analysis.

4.5 Attribution assessment

Kaspersky attributed the campaign to APT41 with medium confidence. The assessment draws on similarities to earlier reporting about a potentially related threat actor, the use of DLL sideloading and encrypted payloads, and OLLVM obfuscation practices.

This attribution remains an assessment rather than definitive proof of the operators' identity.

5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators are explicitly reported in the source material. Validate them against the original report and trusted threat-intelligence feeds before using them in detection systems.

Files and artifacts

  • inst.exe — BlackX installer.

  • PVMDIJGKAX2 — encrypted, extensionless installation-data file.

  • googleupdate.exe — legitimate executable name abused for DLL sideloading.

  • jcef_helper.exe — original filename associated with the executable.

  • v8_context_snapshot.bin — encrypted payload data file.

Network indicator

  • www[.]archivetj[.]com — reported command-and-control domain associated with the Rust payload.

Certificate indicator

  • Serial number: 0bcdf5e0da32d68900b8b7638459d072 — certificate associated with the malicious kernel driver. Kaspersky reported that the certificate had been revoked by its issuer at the time of publication.

File hash

  • MD5 for the executable identified by its original filename, jcef_helper.exe: AF8A983B9ADA07EAE1259BF2953ABD40.

Note: The source report contains additional technical details and artifacts. The indicators above should be treated as a focused selection, not an exhaustive IOC set.

6. Potential Impact

Successful deployment of a UEFI bootkit such as BlackX can create significant security risks:

  • Secure Boot circumvention: Weaknesses in the revocation process may allow malicious EFI components to load.

  • Long-term persistence: Pre-boot compromise can make remediation more complex than removing conventional user-mode malware.

  • Reduced endpoint visibility: Kernel-driver interference can disrupt security callbacks and event collection.

  • Cyberespionage: RAT capabilities can enable command execution and file transfers, potentially exposing confidential organizational information.

  • Credential and data exposure: Persistent access may support further reconnaissance and information theft, depending on the operator's objectives.

  • Difficult incident recovery: Rebuilding trust in the boot environment may require firmware, boot configuration, certificate-revocation, and operating-system checks.

These impacts describe the capabilities and risks associated with the reported malware. They do not establish that every potential consequence occurred in every targeted organization.

7. Recommendations

Immediate Actions

  • Verify complete Baton Drop mitigation: Do not rely solely on confirmation that Windows updates are installed. Follow Microsoft's current guidance to check and complete the required Secure Boot certificate-revocation steps.

  • Review Secure Boot configuration: Confirm that Secure Boot is enabled and that the relevant certificate and revocation protections are properly enforced.

  • Hunt for reported indicators: Search endpoint telemetry, file inventories, DNS logs, proxy records, and cloud-service audit logs for the reported filenames, domain, and certificate details.

  • Investigate suspicious drivers: Review unexpected kernel-driver activity, security callback disruptions, ETW tampering, and abnormal attempts to interfere with endpoint protection.

  • Examine cloud-service activity: Investigate unusual Google Drive, OneDrive, or Yandex.Disk access from sensitive endpoints, especially when associated with unexpected command execution or file transfers.

  • Escalate suspected bootkit infections: Preserve forensic evidence and involve qualified incident responders. A normal operating-system cleanup may not be sufficient to restore trust in a compromised boot environment.

Preventive Measures

  • Complete security update procedures: Track post-update actions, including manual mitigation steps, through formal change-management and compliance processes.

  • Monitor Secure Boot revocation status: Establish periodic verification that required protections remain effective across managed Windows endpoints.

  • Strengthen privileged access: Restrict administrator privileges and tightly control software and driver installation.

  • Deploy layered endpoint defenses: Use endpoint protection with tamper protection, behavioral detection, and monitoring for suspicious kernel-level activity.

  • Monitor cloud-based command-and-control patterns: Apply cloud audit logging, DNS monitoring, and egress controls to detect unusual use of legitimate cloud services.

  • Maintain incident-response readiness: Prepare recovery procedures that account for firmware and boot-chain compromise, not just operating-system reinstalls.

  • Validate security controls: Periodically test endpoint configurations and compliance reporting to ensure that documented mitigations are actually enforced.

8. Conclusion

BlackX demonstrates how sophisticated threat actors can combine UEFI bootkit techniques, kernel-level security interference, and cloud-based communications to support persistent cyberespionage.

The investigation also highlights a critical lesson for security teams: installing a patch may not be enough when additional configuration or revocation steps are required to fully enforce the mitigation. Organizations should validate the effective state of their Secure Boot protections, monitor suspicious driver and cloud-service activity, and maintain recovery procedures for boot-level compromise.

Kaspersky's assessment links the campaign to APT41 with medium confidence, underscoring the importance of distinguishing evidence-backed findings from attribution assessments.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1562.001 – Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools