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HighAdvanced Persistent Threats (APT) · 7 min read

Exposed Open Directory Reveals Suspected DoNot APT Toolkit Targeting Pakistan’s Nuclear and Energy Sectors

An exposed directory hosted at 193.29.104[.]84:8099 has revealed a collection of scripts, executables, and reconnaissance tools potentially associated with DoNot APT (APT-C-35 / SectorE02). The toolkit contains Go-based reverse shells, a custom HTTP command-and-control implant, Metasploit-based payload loading, and Inveigh configurations designed to capture NetNTLM hashes through LLMNR, NBNS, and mDNS poisoning. Several recovered scripts contain references to Pakistan’s nuclear, energy, oil and gas, and industrial control sectors, including PAEC, Chashma, KANUPP, OGDCL, SCADA, and Modbus. The investigation indicates possible targeted reconnaissance and credential-harvesting activity. However, the exposed files alone do not confirm a successful compromise of a specific Pakistani organization or establish the operator’s ultimate objectives.

Written by ThreatBeaconX Research Team·Published Nov 2, 2026

1. Executive Summary

Security researchers at InfraHunter identified an exposed open directory containing approximately 48 files and 12 MB of data. The collection included PowerShell scripts, batch files, executable payloads, and credential-harvesting configurations uploaded between October 9 and October 14, 2026.

Analysis of the recovered material revealed a multi-stage intrusion toolkit designed to support remote access, internal network reconnaissance, credential collection, document discovery, and potential lateral movement.

The toolkit demonstrates several notable capabilities:

  • Remote access: Go-based reverse shells and a custom HTTP C2 implant establish outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

  • Credential harvesting: Inveigh configurations use LLMNR, NBNS, and mDNS poisoning to capture NetNTLM hashes.

  • Targeted reconnaissance: Scripts search user profiles and documents for keywords associated with Pakistan’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.

  • Network discovery: Batch scripts enumerate network routes, shares, connected systems, and internal hosts.

  • Lateral movement attempts: Recovered scripts test credentials against administrative shares across internal network addresses.

  • Actor impersonation: Some configurations modify domain-related environment variables to impersonate OGDCL.

The infrastructure and tooling have been assessed as potentially connected to DoNot APT. This attribution is supported by infrastructure correlations and similarities to previously documented DoNot techniques, but should be treated as an assessment rather than definitive confirmation.

2. Exposed Infrastructure and Toolkit Development

The exposed directory was hosted at:

  • IP address: 193.29.104[.]84

  • Port: 8099

  • Hosting network: M247 Europe SRL (AS9009)

  • Reported location: Saint-Denis, Île-de-France, France

  • Exposed content: 48 files, approximately 12 MB

The earliest identified files appeared on October 9, 2026. Additional files were uploaded over the following days, including updated reverse shells, modified Inveigh configurations, and a file named ad_pwd.txt.

The October 10 appearance of ad_pwd.txt may indicate credential exposure, although its origin and operational use have not been independently confirmed. By October 14, updated configurations included OGDCL-related environment spoofing, suggesting continued refinement of the toolkit.

3. Targeting Indicators: Pakistan’s Strategic Sectors

The recovered reconnaissance scripts contain hardcoded references to Pakistani nuclear, energy, and industrial control infrastructure.

The contenthunt.bat script searches user documents for terms including:

  • PAEC

  • Chashma

  • KANUPP

  • SCADA

  • Modbus

The script searches files under the user’s Documents directory and records matching filenames for further investigation.

Other scripts focus on browser artifacts, user-profile directories, network shortcuts, and potentially sensitive documents. The recovered configurations also reference OGDCL, suggesting an attempt to make credential-harvesting activity appear more credible in an environment where OGDCL-related systems or identities may be expected.

These indicators suggest an interest in Pakistan’s nuclear, energy, oil and gas, and industrial control sectors. They do not, by themselves, prove that a specific organization was compromised or that operational technology systems were accessed.

4. Technical Analysis of the Toolkit

4.1 Go-Based Reverse Shells

Researchers identified three Go-based reverse-shell executables:

  • rvb80_232.exe

  • rvb61135.exe

  • rvb_new.exe

These binaries establish outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure and provide remote command execution through cmd.exe.

The samples show signs of continued development. The later variants include symbol stripping and changes to their communication infrastructure. The rvb_new.exe sample also uses TLS for its connection to the staging infrastructure.

Identified communication endpoints include:

  • 179.43.145[.]232:80

  • 179.43.145[.]232:61135

  • 193.29.104[.]84:45600

4.2 Custom HTTP Command-and-Control Implant

The executable Beacon-trydnd1.exe was identified as a custom HTTP-based C2 implant.

Its observed capabilities include:

  • Communicating with 179.43.145[.]232 over HTTP.

  • Polling the C2 infrastructure for commands.

  • Retrieving commands from HTTP response headers.

  • Supporting process injection.

This provides an additional remote-control mechanism alongside the Go-based reverse shells.

4.3 Credential Harvesting Through Inveigh

A significant portion of the toolkit focuses on credential collection using Inveigh, a PowerShell-based network spoofing and credential-capture tool.

The recovered configurations enable poisoning of:

  • LLMNR

  • NBNS

  • mDNS

These protocols can be abused to intercept name-resolution requests and capture NetNTLM challenge-response material from systems on the same network segment.

The investigation identified multiple iterations of Inveigh configurations. The later inv12.ps1 configuration launches Inveigh in a hidden child PowerShell process, redirects standard input/output streams, and records the child process ID in:

C:\inv12pid.txt

Other configurations modify environment variables to make the system appear to belong to a workgroup or an OGDCL-related domain environment.

This activity can facilitate credential theft and potentially enable further access if captured credentials are successfully cracked or otherwise reused.

4.4 Internal Network and Host Reconnaissance

The toolkit includes scripts designed to gather information about the compromised host and its surrounding network.

The recon88.bat script executes commands such as:

  • arp -a

  • route print

  • net share

  • nbtstat -S

The output is saved to:

C:\Windows\Temp\recon88.txt

Other scripts enumerate user-profile locations, including Desktop, Documents, Recent files, Chrome user data, browser history, and network shortcuts.

The contenthunt.bat script searches documents for keywords related to nuclear and industrial control infrastructure. This suggests that the toolkit is designed to identify potentially valuable information for subsequent collection.

4.5 Lateral Movement Attempts

The lantest.bat script targets 30 hosts within the internal subnet:

192.168.6.0/24

It attempts to access administrative C$ shares using three credential sets and records the results in:

C:\Windows\Temp\lantest.txt

This indicates an attempt to identify systems accessible through administrative shares and potentially expand access across the internal network.

4.6 Metasploit-Based Payload Loader

The executable rv88b.exe functions as a minimal loader containing a Metasploit x64 shellcode payload.

Its execution involves preparing memory permissions, resolving required Windows APIs, and activating the embedded reverse-shell functionality.

The associated batch file rv88b.bat repeatedly downloads or relaunches the executable, supporting continued payload execution attempts.

5. Potential Impact

If successfully deployed in a targeted environment, the toolkit could create significant risks for government, energy, and industrial organizations.

Potential impacts include:

  • Credential compromise: NetNTLM hash capture through LLMNR, NBNS, and mDNS poisoning.

  • Unauthorized remote access: Reverse shells could provide attackers with command execution on compromised Windows systems.

  • Sensitive information discovery: Keyword-based searches could identify documents related to nuclear facilities, energy infrastructure, and industrial operations.

  • Internal network compromise: Credential testing against administrative shares could facilitate lateral movement.

  • Operational intelligence collection: Reconnaissance of user profiles, network shares, and system configurations could provide valuable information about the targeted environment.

The presence of SCADA and Modbus references indicates interest in industrial control environments. However, the available evidence does not establish that the recovered toolkit directly interacted with or disrupted operational technology systems.

6. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

6.1 Network Indicators

IndicatorPortDescription
193.29.104[.]848099Exposed directory / staging infrastructure
193.29.104[.]8445600Reverse-shell listener
179.43.145[.]23261135Reverse-shell C2
179.43.145[.]23280Go reverse-shell C2
31.7.61[.]8443Additional connectivity / C2 indicator
pakdw.orchidheaven[.]online—Infrastructure correlation indicator

Note: pakdw.orchidheaven[.]online is included as an attribution-related infrastructure pivot. Validate its current resolution and context before applying network blocks.

6.2 File Hashes (SHA-256)

FilenameSHA-256
Beacon-trydnd1.exe393bc7084ac943861135a222c32f720df4e4fbb73ac0cfb2a6cf4ab67282f7d2
rvb80_232.exe7b3570b9c01b40a840d16ce5639988607b86bb4550b781a384a9ed9907d83df2
rvb61135.exe40b3fd6b7f355d9186840337d3fbea7a130cb60d556c71bfac242fbadad76bcf
rvb_new.exe00ea396ca1d9ac288701449748a28d30a2d180dfd3c2a8e3ea2d76b6232b949e
rv88b.exea9c3d5b4a8e9458b12305b1eb7df4c2087d0a0697b904cddcd22282ae613b228
Inveigh.ps1cc7dd1d68dc3cc41f385afd000a516145cee2284b2526ee79dfd5e72278e2a23
inv12.ps140b9dfd4beaf3b9f3922584e80ef77dc2274e707f27031104ac22a7d74d12778
contenthunt.bat2bec79043f55175f632fc8760c53a722357eec52fc3b37181237287f2b55d184
hunt88.bat0c2e135c9d782af2c15031628d408e5585d1d63c4a059c5b92c7a340e2c7dc4b
hunt88b.bat8fdafa606326b1d53c4ffff9414050064b0318087e6154af059ad9720c5233fb
lantest.bat0f3b433672ca747525037c52?

Verify every hash against the original research before importing into production detection systems. The original research contains additional hashes for scripts and supporting files.

6.3 Host-Based Indicators

ArtifactDescription
%USERPROFILE%\Wallet\Hunrd\Toolkit staging directory
C:\lootData collection directory
C:\Windows\Temp\Inveigh.ps1Cached Inveigh script
C:\Windows\Temp\rv88b.exeReverse-shell loader
C:\Users\Public\Videos\rvb61135.exeReverse-shell executable
C:\Windows\Temp\recon88.txtNetwork reconnaissance output
C:\Windows\Temp\hunt88.txtKeyword search output
C:\Windows\Temp\hunt88b.txtUser-profile enumeration output
C:\Windows\Temp\contenthunt.txtDocument keyword search results
C:\Windows\Temp\lantest.txtLateral movement test output
C:\inv\console.txtInveigh output
C:\inv2\console.txtAlternate Inveigh output
C:\inveigh_console.txtInveigh output
C:\inv12pid.txtHidden Inveigh process ID
USERDOMAIN=OGDCLDomain impersonation indicator

7. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueID
ExecutionPowerShellT1059.001
Command and ControlWeb ProtocolsT1071.001
DiscoverySystem Information DiscoveryT1082
DiscoveryFile and Directory DiscoveryT1083
DiscoveryQuery RegistryT1012
DiscoveryPeripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
Credential AccessLLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayT1557.001
Lateral MovementSMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002
Credential AccessCredentials in FilesT1552.001
Command and ControlIngress Tool TransferT1105
Defense EvasionProcess InjectionT1055
Defense EvasionMasqueradingT1036
CollectionLocal Data StagingT1074.001

Technique mappings are based on the behaviors described in the research and should be validated against the specific telemetry available in an environment.

8. Recommendations

Organizations operating in government, energy, nuclear, oil and gas, and industrial environments should consider the following defensive measures:

  1. Hunt for network indicators: Search DNS, proxy, firewall, EDR, and SIEM telemetry for the identified IP addresses, domains, and associated ports.

  2. Investigate suspicious PowerShell activity: Review hidden or non-interactive PowerShell processes, execution-policy bypasses, redirected output, and unusual child-process relationships.

  3. Restrict LLMNR and NBNS: Disable LLMNR where not required and disable NetBIOS name resolution where operationally feasible. Review mDNS usage and apply appropriate segmentation controls.

  4. Strengthen SMB security: Restrict administrative shares to authorized systems, enforce least privilege, and monitor unexpected access to C$ and other administrative shares.

  5. Review credential exposure: Investigate possible NetNTLM hash capture, rotate potentially exposed credentials, and enforce strong authentication controls.

  6. Monitor suspicious staging paths: Search endpoints for the identified directories, filenames, and reconnaissance output files.

  7. Detect unauthorized remote shells: Monitor unexpected outbound connections to unusual ports, especially 45600 and 61135, and investigate suspicious Go-based executables.

  8. Review sensitive document access: Monitor unusual bulk file enumeration and searches for terms associated with nuclear, energy, SCADA, and industrial control infrastructure.

  9. Segment IT and OT environments: Restrict unnecessary communication between enterprise IT networks and operational technology networks.

  10. Validate and contain: Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints, preserve forensic evidence, investigate lateral movement, and rebuild affected systems where necessary.

9. Conclusion

The exposed directory provides insight into a developing cyber-espionage toolkit containing multiple remote-access mechanisms, credential-harvesting configurations, and internal reconnaissance scripts. References to Pakistan’s nuclear, energy, oil and gas, and industrial control sectors suggest a focused interest in strategically important environments.

Infrastructure correlations and similarities to previously documented tradecraft support a potential connection to DoNot APT (APT-C-35). Nevertheless, attribution should remain qualified, and the recovered files do not independently confirm a successful compromise of a specific organization.

Organizations in the affected sectors should prioritize hunting for the identified network and host indicators, reviewing suspicious PowerShell and Inveigh activity, and strengthening controls around credential security, SMB access, and IT/OT segmentation.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1059.001T1071.001T1082T1083T1557.001T1021.002T1105T1055