1. Executive Summary
Security researchers at InfraHunter identified an exposed open directory containing approximately 48 files and 12 MB of data. The collection included PowerShell scripts, batch files, executable payloads, and credential-harvesting configurations uploaded between October 9 and October 14, 2026.
Analysis of the recovered material revealed a multi-stage intrusion toolkit designed to support remote access, internal network reconnaissance, credential collection, document discovery, and potential lateral movement.
The toolkit demonstrates several notable capabilities:
Remote access: Go-based reverse shells and a custom HTTP C2 implant establish outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Credential harvesting: Inveigh configurations use LLMNR, NBNS, and mDNS poisoning to capture NetNTLM hashes.
Targeted reconnaissance: Scripts search user profiles and documents for keywords associated with Pakistan’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.
Network discovery: Batch scripts enumerate network routes, shares, connected systems, and internal hosts.
Lateral movement attempts: Recovered scripts test credentials against administrative shares across internal network addresses.
Actor impersonation: Some configurations modify domain-related environment variables to impersonate OGDCL.
The infrastructure and tooling have been assessed as potentially connected to DoNot APT. This attribution is supported by infrastructure correlations and similarities to previously documented DoNot techniques, but should be treated as an assessment rather than definitive confirmation.
2. Exposed Infrastructure and Toolkit Development
The exposed directory was hosted at:
IP address:
193.29.104[.]84Port:
8099Hosting network: M247 Europe SRL (AS9009)
Reported location: Saint-Denis, Île-de-France, France
Exposed content: 48 files, approximately 12 MB
The earliest identified files appeared on October 9, 2026. Additional files were uploaded over the following days, including updated reverse shells, modified Inveigh configurations, and a file named ad_pwd.txt.
The October 10 appearance of ad_pwd.txt may indicate credential exposure, although its origin and operational use have not been independently confirmed. By October 14, updated configurations included OGDCL-related environment spoofing, suggesting continued refinement of the toolkit.
3. Targeting Indicators: Pakistan’s Strategic Sectors
The recovered reconnaissance scripts contain hardcoded references to Pakistani nuclear, energy, and industrial control infrastructure.
The contenthunt.bat script searches user documents for terms including:
PAEC
Chashma
KANUPP
SCADA
Modbus
The script searches files under the user’s Documents directory and records matching filenames for further investigation.
Other scripts focus on browser artifacts, user-profile directories, network shortcuts, and potentially sensitive documents. The recovered configurations also reference OGDCL, suggesting an attempt to make credential-harvesting activity appear more credible in an environment where OGDCL-related systems or identities may be expected.
These indicators suggest an interest in Pakistan’s nuclear, energy, oil and gas, and industrial control sectors. They do not, by themselves, prove that a specific organization was compromised or that operational technology systems were accessed.
4. Technical Analysis of the Toolkit
4.1 Go-Based Reverse Shells
Researchers identified three Go-based reverse-shell executables:
rvb80_232.exervb61135.exervb_new.exe
These binaries establish outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure and provide remote command execution through cmd.exe.
The samples show signs of continued development. The later variants include symbol stripping and changes to their communication infrastructure. The rvb_new.exe sample also uses TLS for its connection to the staging infrastructure.
Identified communication endpoints include:
179.43.145[.]232:80179.43.145[.]232:61135193.29.104[.]84:45600
4.2 Custom HTTP Command-and-Control Implant
The executable Beacon-trydnd1.exe was identified as a custom HTTP-based C2 implant.
Its observed capabilities include:
Communicating with
179.43.145[.]232over HTTP.Polling the C2 infrastructure for commands.
Retrieving commands from HTTP response headers.
Supporting process injection.
This provides an additional remote-control mechanism alongside the Go-based reverse shells.
4.3 Credential Harvesting Through Inveigh
A significant portion of the toolkit focuses on credential collection using Inveigh, a PowerShell-based network spoofing and credential-capture tool.
The recovered configurations enable poisoning of:
LLMNR
NBNS
mDNS
These protocols can be abused to intercept name-resolution requests and capture NetNTLM challenge-response material from systems on the same network segment.
The investigation identified multiple iterations of Inveigh configurations. The later inv12.ps1 configuration launches Inveigh in a hidden child PowerShell process, redirects standard input/output streams, and records the child process ID in:
C:\inv12pid.txt
Other configurations modify environment variables to make the system appear to belong to a workgroup or an OGDCL-related domain environment.
This activity can facilitate credential theft and potentially enable further access if captured credentials are successfully cracked or otherwise reused.
4.4 Internal Network and Host Reconnaissance
The toolkit includes scripts designed to gather information about the compromised host and its surrounding network.
The recon88.bat script executes commands such as:
arp -aroute printnet sharenbtstat -S
The output is saved to:
C:\Windows\Temp\recon88.txt
Other scripts enumerate user-profile locations, including Desktop, Documents, Recent files, Chrome user data, browser history, and network shortcuts.
The contenthunt.bat script searches documents for keywords related to nuclear and industrial control infrastructure. This suggests that the toolkit is designed to identify potentially valuable information for subsequent collection.
4.5 Lateral Movement Attempts
The lantest.bat script targets 30 hosts within the internal subnet:
192.168.6.0/24
It attempts to access administrative C$ shares using three credential sets and records the results in:
C:\Windows\Temp\lantest.txt
This indicates an attempt to identify systems accessible through administrative shares and potentially expand access across the internal network.
4.6 Metasploit-Based Payload Loader
The executable rv88b.exe functions as a minimal loader containing a Metasploit x64 shellcode payload.
Its execution involves preparing memory permissions, resolving required Windows APIs, and activating the embedded reverse-shell functionality.
The associated batch file rv88b.bat repeatedly downloads or relaunches the executable, supporting continued payload execution attempts.
5. Potential Impact
If successfully deployed in a targeted environment, the toolkit could create significant risks for government, energy, and industrial organizations.
Potential impacts include:
Credential compromise: NetNTLM hash capture through LLMNR, NBNS, and mDNS poisoning.
Unauthorized remote access: Reverse shells could provide attackers with command execution on compromised Windows systems.
Sensitive information discovery: Keyword-based searches could identify documents related to nuclear facilities, energy infrastructure, and industrial operations.
Internal network compromise: Credential testing against administrative shares could facilitate lateral movement.
Operational intelligence collection: Reconnaissance of user profiles, network shares, and system configurations could provide valuable information about the targeted environment.
The presence of SCADA and Modbus references indicates interest in industrial control environments. However, the available evidence does not establish that the recovered toolkit directly interacted with or disrupted operational technology systems.
6. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
6.1 Network Indicators
| Indicator | Port | Description |
|---|---|---|
193.29.104[.]84 | 8099 | Exposed directory / staging infrastructure |
193.29.104[.]84 | 45600 | Reverse-shell listener |
179.43.145[.]232 | 61135 | Reverse-shell C2 |
179.43.145[.]232 | 80 | Go reverse-shell C2 |
31.7.61[.]8 | 443 | Additional connectivity / C2 indicator |
pakdw.orchidheaven[.]online | — | Infrastructure correlation indicator |
Note: pakdw.orchidheaven[.]online is included as an attribution-related infrastructure pivot. Validate its current resolution and context before applying network blocks.
6.2 File Hashes (SHA-256)
| Filename | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
Beacon-trydnd1.exe | 393bc7084ac943861135a222c32f720df4e4fbb73ac0cfb2a6cf4ab67282f7d2 |
rvb80_232.exe | 7b3570b9c01b40a840d16ce5639988607b86bb4550b781a384a9ed9907d83df2 |
rvb61135.exe | 40b3fd6b7f355d9186840337d3fbea7a130cb60d556c71bfac242fbadad76bcf |
rvb_new.exe | 00ea396ca1d9ac288701449748a28d30a2d180dfd3c2a8e3ea2d76b6232b949e |
rv88b.exe | a9c3d5b4a8e9458b12305b1eb7df4c2087d0a0697b904cddcd22282ae613b228 |
Inveigh.ps1 | cc7dd1d68dc3cc41f385afd000a516145cee2284b2526ee79dfd5e72278e2a23 |
inv12.ps1 | 40b9dfd4beaf3b9f3922584e80ef77dc2274e707f27031104ac22a7d74d12778 |
contenthunt.bat | 2bec79043f55175f632fc8760c53a722357eec52fc3b37181237287f2b55d184 |
hunt88.bat | 0c2e135c9d782af2c15031628d408e5585d1d63c4a059c5b92c7a340e2c7dc4b |
hunt88b.bat | 8fdafa606326b1d53c4ffff9414050064b0318087e6154af059ad9720c5233fb |
lantest.bat | 0f3b433672ca747525037c52? |
Verify every hash against the original research before importing into production detection systems. The original research contains additional hashes for scripts and supporting files.
6.3 Host-Based Indicators
| Artifact | Description |
|---|---|
%USERPROFILE%\Wallet\Hunrd\ | Toolkit staging directory |
C:\loot | Data collection directory |
C:\Windows\Temp\Inveigh.ps1 | Cached Inveigh script |
C:\Windows\Temp\rv88b.exe | Reverse-shell loader |
C:\Users\Public\Videos\rvb61135.exe | Reverse-shell executable |
C:\Windows\Temp\recon88.txt | Network reconnaissance output |
C:\Windows\Temp\hunt88.txt | Keyword search output |
C:\Windows\Temp\hunt88b.txt | User-profile enumeration output |
C:\Windows\Temp\contenthunt.txt | Document keyword search results |
C:\Windows\Temp\lantest.txt | Lateral movement test output |
C:\inv\console.txt | Inveigh output |
C:\inv2\console.txt | Alternate Inveigh output |
C:\inveigh_console.txt | Inveigh output |
C:\inv12pid.txt | Hidden Inveigh process ID |
USERDOMAIN=OGDCL | Domain impersonation indicator |
7. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | ID |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | PowerShell | T1059.001 |
| Command and Control | Web Protocols | T1071.001 |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery | T1082 |
| Discovery | File and Directory Discovery | T1083 |
| Discovery | Query Registry | T1012 |
| Discovery | Peripheral Device Discovery | T1120 |
| Credential Access | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay | T1557.001 |
| Lateral Movement | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | T1021.002 |
| Credential Access | Credentials in Files | T1552.001 |
| Command and Control | Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 |
| Defense Evasion | Process Injection | T1055 |
| Defense Evasion | Masquerading | T1036 |
| Collection | Local Data Staging | T1074.001 |
Technique mappings are based on the behaviors described in the research and should be validated against the specific telemetry available in an environment.
8. Recommendations
Organizations operating in government, energy, nuclear, oil and gas, and industrial environments should consider the following defensive measures:
Hunt for network indicators: Search DNS, proxy, firewall, EDR, and SIEM telemetry for the identified IP addresses, domains, and associated ports.
Investigate suspicious PowerShell activity: Review hidden or non-interactive PowerShell processes, execution-policy bypasses, redirected output, and unusual child-process relationships.
Restrict LLMNR and NBNS: Disable LLMNR where not required and disable NetBIOS name resolution where operationally feasible. Review mDNS usage and apply appropriate segmentation controls.
Strengthen SMB security: Restrict administrative shares to authorized systems, enforce least privilege, and monitor unexpected access to
C$and other administrative shares.Review credential exposure: Investigate possible NetNTLM hash capture, rotate potentially exposed credentials, and enforce strong authentication controls.
Monitor suspicious staging paths: Search endpoints for the identified directories, filenames, and reconnaissance output files.
Detect unauthorized remote shells: Monitor unexpected outbound connections to unusual ports, especially 45600 and 61135, and investigate suspicious Go-based executables.
Review sensitive document access: Monitor unusual bulk file enumeration and searches for terms associated with nuclear, energy, SCADA, and industrial control infrastructure.
Segment IT and OT environments: Restrict unnecessary communication between enterprise IT networks and operational technology networks.
Validate and contain: Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints, preserve forensic evidence, investigate lateral movement, and rebuild affected systems where necessary.
9. Conclusion
The exposed directory provides insight into a developing cyber-espionage toolkit containing multiple remote-access mechanisms, credential-harvesting configurations, and internal reconnaissance scripts. References to Pakistan’s nuclear, energy, oil and gas, and industrial control sectors suggest a focused interest in strategically important environments.
Infrastructure correlations and similarities to previously documented tradecraft support a potential connection to DoNot APT (APT-C-35). Nevertheless, attribution should remain qualified, and the recovered files do not independently confirm a successful compromise of a specific organization.
Organizations in the affected sectors should prioritize hunting for the identified network and host indicators, reviewing suspicious PowerShell and Inveigh activity, and strengthening controls around credential security, SMB access, and IT/OT segmentation.
