Overview
A phishing campaign has been observed distributing the commercially available Zecurit Agent RMM tool through emails impersonating legitimate document-sharing services and invitation platforms.
According to the reported research, attackers send emails disguised as document notifications, event invitations, and file-sharing messages. These messages encourage recipients to click embedded links and download files presented as legitimate documents or installers.
Instead of delivering an actual document, the links lead to attacker-controlled infrastructure that serves Zecurit Agent installers. Although Zecurit Agent is legitimate software, attackers are abusing its remote management capabilities to gain control over compromised systems.
Unit 42 also highlighted this activity, warning that phishing emails use fake notices and invitation-themed lures to convince recipients to install attacker-configured Zecurit Agent software.
Attack Delivery and Infection Chain
The campaign begins with phishing emails designed to appear as routine business communications. Recipients are encouraged to open a shared document, view an invitation, or access a notification.
When a recipient clicks the embedded link, one of two outcomes may occur:
The link directly downloads a Zecurit Agent installer.
The link redirects the recipient to an attacker-controlled lure page that provides the installer.
Observed URL patterns include:
/DocS/files//Ddcu//access/download_invitee.php
At least one installer was distributed through an R2 storage bucket hosted on r2.dev.
The downloaded payloads are Inno Setup installers that silently install a Zecurit MSI package. Following installation, the process ZecuritAgentRegister.exe is executed to enroll the agent.
Once installed and registered, the software can provide remote management capabilities to the attacker, including remote control, screen capture, and remote command execution.
Deceptive Installer Names and Code Signing
The attackers use filenames associated with familiar document-sharing and invitation services to make the installers appear trustworthy.
Examples include:
Docusign.exedocumentpdf.exeEvite.exeViewDoc.exe
An important detail is that the observed installers use the same code-signing certificate as legitimate Zecurit Agent installers.
Certificate details:
Certificate Name:
ZECURIT TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITEDSHA-1 Thumbprint:
6D9ED879ADC48C1B0EBA4058A5C6511A5DD07C63
This demonstrates why a valid digital signature should not be treated as proof that software is safe. Legitimate, signed remote management software can still be abused by threat actors.
Detection and Hunting Opportunities
Security teams should investigate endpoints for artifacts associated with Zecurit Agent installation and execution.
File system indicators:
C:\Program Files\Zecurit\ZecuritAgentInstaller.msiZecuritAgentRegister.exeInstallUninstallApp.exe
Registry indicator:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Zecurit\Agent
Process and service monitoring:
Investigate running processes and Windows services beginning with Zecurit, including:
ZecuritAgentService.exe
Network monitoring:
Monitor outbound connections to Zecurit-related domains, including:
app.zecurit[.]comdms.zecurit[.]com
Because these are legitimate vendor domains, their presence alone does not confirm compromise. Organizations should compare observed connections with their approved RMM software inventory and investigate unexpected installations, registrations, and network activity.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
SHA-256 File Hashes
| File Name | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
| Docusign.exe | d7bae1209fea304403d8eb6f042ea0b9b84be14ef7e29ab9f9c9c079e8d1f1c7 |
| documentpdf.exe | 24387787c0789f0b8ff02102273a8edef5888c420be15bfae103250ce7aa8b49 |
| Evite.exe | 8585921fd9bb23f8dcd12e0d637d43aee6597793038e1ac53dcbe18516024649 |
| ViewDoc.exe | 65f1731d5cdcc169c36d3690196f3a7c60922d85c620d172cc607c8d7eb96566 |
Associated URLs
hxxps[:]//insightzen[.]vu/access/hxxps[:]//insightzen[.]vu/download_invitee.phphxxps[:]//pink.importpersonal[.]net/Ddcu/hxxps[:]//pink.importpersonal[.]net/DocS/files/Docusign.exehxxps[:]//yorix[.]click/activate/download.htmlhxxps[:]//yorix[.]click/activate/installer/documentpdf.exe
Associated Domains
insightzen[.]vupink.importpersonal[.]netyorix[.]click
Additional Hunting Indicators
Certificate:
ZECURIT TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITEDSHA-1:
6D9ED879ADC48C1B0EBA4058A5C6511A5DD07C63Registry:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Zecurit\AgentDirectory:
C:\Program Files\Zecurit\
Mitigation and Recommendations
Organizations should take the following precautions:
Educate employees to verify unexpected document-sharing notifications and event invitations before opening links or downloading files.
Block or investigate suspicious downloads using email security gateways, web filtering, and endpoint detection solutions.
Monitor for unexpected installations of Zecurit Agent and other unauthorized RMM applications.
Maintain an approved inventory of remote monitoring and management tools.
Investigate unusual Zecurit-related processes, Windows services, registry entries, and outbound connections.
Use application allowlisting and endpoint protection to restrict unauthorized software installations.
If an unauthorized agent is discovered, isolate the affected endpoint and investigate its registration, remote sessions, and potential attacker activity.
Conclusion
This campaign demonstrates how threat actors can abuse legitimate remote monitoring and management software to gain unauthorized access to systems. By disguising Zecurit Agent installers as documents, invitations, and notifications, attackers exploit user trust and the appearance of legitimate software.
The use of a valid vendor code-signing certificate further highlights the limitations of relying solely on digital signatures for security decisions. Organizations should combine certificate verification with application inventory checks, endpoint monitoring, and behavioral analysis to identify unauthorized RMM deployments.
