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HighThreat Intelligence · 14 min read

BRONZE SANDCASTLE: Modified Meterpreter Backdoors Exploit DLL Sideloading for Cyber-Espionage

BRONZE SANDCASTLE is a threat activity cluster documented by Sophos researchers involving modified Meterpreter-based backdoors, malicious DLL sideloading, encrypted payloads, and in-memory execution. The research describes operations targeting organizations in Asia and Africa, with incidents observed between August 2025 and August 2026. The activity is distinguished by the use of legitimate executables to load malicious DLLs. One recurring combination involves Sandboxie executables loading sbiedll.dll. Other observed combinations involve Java, Krita, NVDA, Chromium Embedded Framework-related software, and Sysinternals utilities. After the malicious DLL executes, it reads encrypted payload data from files such as config.ini, decrypts the contents, and facilitates execution in memory. Sophos identified similarities to Metasploit-generated shellcode but also found implementation differences, including customized API-resolution logic. The analyzed payloads also contained elements associated with COFFLoader, suggesting additional post-exploitation functionality. The backdoor collects information about compromised systems and communicates with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Observed activities include system and account enumeration, retrieving encrypted configuration data through GitHub, and accessing the Active Directory database file ntds.dit. Sophos reported victims in the Philippines, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Namibia, and likely South Korea. The researchers assessed that the targeting patterns were consistent with Chinese intelligence-gathering interests, but they did not reliably attribute the activity to other similarly tracked threat groups. The findings highlight the importance of monitoring DLL loading, encrypted configuration files, in-memory execution, suspicious outbound communications, and unauthorized access to identity infrastructure.

Written by Sai Swetha·Published Oct 22, 2026

1. Description

BRONZE SANDCASTLE is a threat activity designation used by Sophos researchers to track a cluster of intrusions involving modified Meterpreter-based backdoors and distinctive DLL sideloading behavior.

DLL sideloading occurs when an application loads a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) in place of, or alongside, an expected library. Attackers can abuse this behavior by placing a malicious DLL where a legitimate executable will load it. This allows malicious code to run within the execution context of a trusted application.

In the activity documented by Sophos, the attackers paired legitimate executable files with malicious DLLs. The malware then accessed encrypted configuration or payload files and executed decoded code in memory.

The resulting backdoor could collect information about the compromised host, communicate with external infrastructure, and support additional post-exploitation activity. Sophos also observed activity involving network enumeration and access to sensitive Active Directory data.

The use of legitimate software, encrypted payloads, and memory-based execution can complicate detection when organizations rely primarily on static file signatures.

2. Technical Description

The reported activity combines the following techniques:

  • DLL sideloading: Legitimate executable files load attacker-controlled DLLs.

  • Encrypted payload storage: Payloads or configuration data are stored in files such as config.ini.

  • Runtime decryption: Malicious components decode the stored content during execution.

  • Reflective loading: Executable content is loaded into memory.

  • Control-flow obfuscation: A flattened dispatcher makes the program's execution flow more difficult to analyze.

  • Modified Meterpreter functionality: The payload resembles Metasploit-associated shellcode but has implementation differences.

  • COFFLoader-related functionality: Components suggest additional custom post-exploitation capabilities.

  • System reconnaissance: The backdoor collects host, process, account, and network information.

  • Command-and-control communication: The payload communicates with external infrastructure and may retrieve encrypted configuration data.

  • Active Directory access: Researchers observed activity involving Volume Shadow Copies and the ntds.dit database file.

These behaviors form a multi-stage intrusion pattern. However, not every technique necessarily appears in every incident.

3. Attack Overview

Stage 1: Executable and DLL Preparation

The operators use legitimate executables alongside malicious DLLs. The executable provides a plausible application context, while the DLL introduces the attacker's code.

Sophos repeatedly observed Sandboxie-related executables paired with sbiedll.dll.

Stage 2: DLL Sideloading

When the executable runs, it loads the malicious DLL. The DLL then executes unauthorized code.

Because the executable may be legitimate, defenders must examine the DLL's location, signature, loading relationship, and behavior rather than relying on the executable's name alone.

Stage 3: Encrypted Payload Retrieval

The malicious component reads encrypted data from a file such as config.ini. The payload is decrypted during execution, making the content less obvious to conventional file scanning.

Stage 4: In-Memory Execution

The decoded payload contains a loader capable of loading executable content into memory. This can reduce the need to write the complete executable payload to disk.

Stage 5: Host Profiling

The backdoor collects information about the compromised system, including host identifiers, operating-system details, network addresses, and process metadata.

Stage 6: Command-and-Control Communication

The payload communicates with external infrastructure. Sophos also observed a version of the payload retrieving encrypted configuration files from GitHub.

Stage 7: Reconnaissance and Post-Exploitation

The operators use commands and other functionality to enumerate accounts and network resources. Sophos additionally observed Volume Shadow Copy creation followed by copying of ntds.dit.

This activity can expose sensitive identity information and create opportunities for further compromise.

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 DLL Sideloading Through Legitimate Applications

Sophos identified multiple executable-and-DLL combinations associated with the activity.

ExecutableAssociated DLL
SandboxieWUAU.exesbiedll.dll
Start.exe — renamed Sandboxie executablesbiedll.dll
javaw.exejli.dll
Krita.exeKrita.dll
NvdaHelper.exeNvdaHelperRemote.dll
Jcef_helper.exeLibcef.dll
Vmmap.exeVersion.dll
LineAppMgr.exemsvcp140.dll
bginfo64.exesnmpapi.dll

The names above are reported in the Sophos research. Some correspond to legitimate software components and should not be treated as malicious solely because their names appear in this table.

Security significance: An otherwise legitimate executable may become part of an attack when it loads an unexpected DLL from an untrusted location. Monitoring DLL-load events and their associated file paths can help identify this behavior.

4.2 Encrypted Configuration Files

Sophos reported that malicious DLLs typically read encrypted payloads from local files, including config.ini.

One analyzed archive, aez.zip, contained:

  • javaw.exe

  • jli.dll

  • config.ini

The DLL reads the encrypted content and supports the execution of the decoded payload.

Separating the loader from the encrypted payload may allow operators to change payload data without replacing the loader itself. This can complicate detection based on a single file hash.

Defensive focus: Investigate unexpected DLLs that read local configuration files shortly before suspicious memory execution or external network communications.

4.3 Control-Flow Obfuscation

Researchers identified a flattened control-flow dispatcher in the malicious DLL code.

Instead of following a straightforward sequence of conditional branches, the code uses a state-machine-like structure. A state value is transformed through custom operations, including byte swapping, rotations, inversion, and negation. The result selects a location through a jump table.

This makes the code's execution flow harder to reconstruct using conventional static analysis.

Defensive focus: Use dynamic analysis, execution tracing, and memory inspection when a suspicious binary's logic is obscured by indirect control transfers.

4.4 Modified Meterpreter Payload

The decrypted payload is a backdoor with structural similarities to stageless shellcode associated with the Metasploit Framework.

Sophos identified similarities involving position-independent execution, PE-structure validation, and in-memory loading of executable content.

However, the payload differed from standard Metasploit shellcode in its implementation. Researchers identified non-standard API hashing and transformation routines rather than the familiar ROR13 method associated with Metasploit API resolution.

The analyzed payload was also larger and more complex than typical Metasploit shellcode. Sophos identified versions 1.1.5 and 1.1.7.

These findings indicate that the payload should not simply be classified as an unmodified, standard Meterpreter sample.

4.5 COFFLoader-Related Functionality

The analyzed samples contained elements associated with COFFLoader.

Sophos researchers interpreted the presence of standard APIs associated with the project as suggesting that the malware author may have used a custom Beacon Object File (BOF) to implement additional post-exploitation functionality.

The research also identified in-memory strings associated with C++ function decorators that demonstrated data-stealing capabilities built into the payload.

This suggests that the backdoor's purpose may extend beyond establishing access to the compromised system.

4.6 Host Profiling and Data Collection

The backdoor sends a structured JSON object containing a nested info block to its C2 server.

According to Sophos, the collected information can include:

  • Hostname and username.

  • GUID and domain information.

  • Operating-system version.

  • Internal and public IP addresses.

  • Process listings and metadata.

  • Process IDs and process names.

  • Working directory.

  • Code page.

  • CPU architecture.

  • Implant start time.

  • Implant type, such as server or client.

This information can help an operator understand the compromised host and identify additional targets.

Defensive focus: Investigate unexpected processes that collect extensive host information and send structured data to external destinations. Correlate the network activity with the process that generated it.

4.7 Command-and-Control Communications

Sophos observed payloads contacting the following legitimate services:

  • file[.]io

  • gofile[.]io

  • ably[.]net

  • ably[.]io

Researchers assessed that these connections may have been used to receive C2 tasking.

The research also identified two domains contacted by payload version 1.1.5:

  • dc[.]cathaypacifice[.]com

  • net[.]dpworldto[.]com

Payload version 1.1.7 was observed communicating with GitHub repositories to retrieve encrypted configuration files.

Connections to legitimate platforms do not automatically indicate malicious activity. Investigators should correlate destinations with the initiating process, request path, timing, and surrounding endpoint behavior.

4.8 GitHub-Based Configuration Retrieval

Sophos identified the following GitHub API repository path:

hxxps://api[.]github[.]com/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW

The repository contained files assessed by researchers as likely encrypted configuration files:

  • main.3ku8inqb.js.map

  • main.lhxjkkai.js.map

  • main.y8hnze7q.js.map

  • README.md

The repository also contained encrypted files with a .ts extension that may have represented implants used by the backdoor.

The use of a legitimate code-hosting platform to retrieve encrypted content can complicate network-based detection.

4.9 Network and Account Enumeration

Sophos observed the use of Windows net commands to enumerate users and network resources.

Such commands can help attackers identify accounts, shared resources, and systems of interest.

Defensive focus: Monitor unexpected enumeration commands, especially when executed by unfamiliar processes or users, or shortly after suspicious DLL loading.

4.10 Active Directory Database Access

Sophos observed the operators creating Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe before copying the ntds.dit file.

ntds.dit is the Active Directory database file. It contains directory information, including credential-related material and details about users, groups, and domain configuration.

Unauthorized access to this file can create serious identity-security risks. Depending on the access obtained and surrounding controls, attackers may be able to use extracted information to support further compromise.

Defensive focus: Investigate unexpected vssadmin.exe activity, suspicious shadow-copy creation, and access to ntds.dit. Review the initiating account, process tree, command-line arguments, and subsequent file operations.

5. Victimology and Attribution

5.1 Geographic Targeting

Sophos analyzed incidents occurring between August 2025 and August 2026 and identified victims in:

  • The Philippines.

  • Taiwan.

  • Afghanistan.

  • Namibia.

  • Likely South Korea.

The activity spanned organizations in Asia and Africa.

5.2 Attribution Assessment

Sophos assessed that the targeting patterns were consistent with Chinese intelligence-gathering interests. Researchers also observed activity concentrated during UTC+8 hours.

The geographic targeting overlapped with activity associated with other China-linked groups, including BRONZE PRESIDENT and BRONZE ATLAS. However, Sophos could not reliably link the investigated activity to either group.

BRONZE SANDCASTLE was therefore maintained as a separate designation.

These findings should be described as Sophos's assessment. Geographic targeting and operating-hour patterns alone do not conclusively establish the identity or nationality of an attacker.

6. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators are drawn from the SophosLabs IOC CSV supplied for this article. The hashes and descriptions below are retained from that file. <FileCite ref_id="turn1file0" />

Important: Validate indicators against current telemetry and the original source before blocking or taking action. Filenames alone are not proof of compromise, and a hash identifies a particular file sample rather than every possible variant.

6.1 Command-and-Control Domains

DomainSource description
dc[.]cathaypacifice[.]comBRONZE SANDCASTLE C2 server
net[.]dpworldto[.]comBRONZE SANDCASTLE C2 server

6.2 SHA-256 File Hashes

SHA-256Associated artifact
7afd292994ff214ca4dd880c834532274c957963e9838c7fa2e4d1318af75756sbiedll.dll loader
b39e41be217fe2c690f75e9861cf64df52b302c66619fad608ca60a959288842jli.dll loader
7515417e523a776e371877e868536fa1d1961826d4bc478734be993985d9df03Meterpreter payload in config.ini
ab200eda30dd1868f597ac42e7876894c5838df84605bbd4fca8dbc91c90ea28libcef.dll loader
dd9223c381893f493ca581e5bd35f16f778689e58fc459c1b0c39b0d33b41290CoreFoundation.dll loader
95c6e9447585670b1a50551c36abe22154f6e010bfb23275fc467d2b20a423d9sbiedll.dll loader
548d5add2b27ab8c2d506b81623a37f3d27a0f4e22e6fa938c6a008b70775989jli.dll loader
592a6e74366bcd0c8a47657a88a6e81f99d2876baa6f923bb928bba4477054fcNvdaHelperRemote.dll loader
2332d924b1404961bc65280e782c787a4b048da7519fe73ccf4dc687b843d060jli.dll loader
425177b18cb386f359796576e51666b7350489579550e564f51f8973b2f0979bjli.dll loader
72259376f63116d1aca64bf2ef42a5d211c1ebdb01516ef3b53778ed1347c238jli.dll loader
2411a678e4de91451e69c27369bab4329c3cd969d4ebd851ba91dcfdba7e7db2MSIMG32.dll loader
fdef7b1f4c013d686bf5dbfc92f37191c04beb0dc8b53c608bb8019a8c678052jli.dll loader
e50dc9db568c272d7b019ec8e5fb1f111dd071baa4b3a00bc3c8c885ade46fbcsnmpapi.dll loader
6c5c332428d914fd8eac0164947a70ec3d71bcd3f6cdcccb5e875dcb68ea076dsbiedll.dll loader
91ef27b1e83f324348ca51466ab17e2464f927b9c84758898fd7ce7ae6a6008bsbiedll.dll loader
437ba4b0db084c261f7843f85329b5204a2dedecdacf29b25a53a90bcf8d7d2ejli.dll loader
c7f1c6cfd87e4c4f492a6da634ae6a264467aaee5a3eed14e89c2297a58e5d30jli.dll loader
c39ac4e1fe11639a9d46e026850cc3146eb809b542daf38e1a00eab11eaa1834sbiedll.dll loader
e404b2b9f9f203dad81bdc1ef8bfcbe4f42eb616f113a89ed504202212af1c1ejli.dll loader
5e2b035ae40f8eaab40792a92573171df0011c2fbed55582268a824effa7cb91msvcp140.dll loader

6.3 SHA-1 File Hashes

SHA-1Associated artifact
1f74838581e8bef12cb7df2d70099cd6865ef238sbiedll.dll loader
e98c54ce736a607803e89144daa679fccd4f7521jli.dll loader
f7db825aeee21d6326fa9c31512d090720546341Meterpreter payload in config.ini
dae5a4489671e2d9d2189a830b17ff144f8ab904libcef.dll loader
ffe58ea274af642a3fc1d50e823cb01f61dc8daeCoreFoundation.dll loader
cd1a262f8c2624700440b0aa464b7a2b42e23511sbiedll.dll loader
536d6a8fa98a566079a459b16df1e29622dd8af5jli.dll loader
4e6d600ce7a9cf6414e738d8f39260ae961602f0NvdaHelperRemote.dll loader
624da53bd827ca27b66d8a42a9524b0b48e882b4jli.dll loader
56b1258c4553fb549fca9215727be1e5cd1efe4ejli.dll loader
1abe25d3255679bdc1c35c070da40e3c4572bb4ajli.dll loader
2f399541445cc1aade0e7a2148853fe41be57827MSIMG32.dll loader
120d204d253293d594d6fcbe681797942fb74f7ajli.dll loader
0ed62f00b9e7c5780c9bd05b096eee13a160480fsnmpapi.dll loader
c2811a0fa539e4cd6633f32349fb34b0455bcba6sbiedll.dll loader
1fc7350e215759b4d66ab6458244271b5e2cfa90sbiedll.dll loader
24ede364f5eabe991c866e92ffa396bcb894eb14jli.dll loader
6204c6342c5dfb67bdc29d45a524c3ac3a99aa01jli.dll loader
ffd5cfbd5274a351315ba1e922d795f872f7ff9bsbiedll.dll loader
8964de054bfb70c5560ebabe224bb45723f60b37jli.dll loader
ab86a6b71582e16a7da14533fe9407d7a2bc525cmsvcp140.dll loader

6.4 MD5 File Hashes

MD5Associated artifact
07ed4b9470b2395ad5f969a501761ab8sbiedll.dll loader
25ee87bb42d88bf00f60c4064c376846jli.dll loader
dd89cfd1f0b13addfc43cae758130b6aMeterpreter payload in config.ini
615a6089ab073115ed0b8bcfcfbdc966libcef.dll loader
4e916e024ea0c0eb16bd91f054d22444CoreFoundation.dll loader
e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3sbiedll.dll loader
2a39552543f84aa3a7a562d9bb54fc00jli.dll loader
8c32bf3711b237e3c781a00b5c526695NvdaHelperRemote.dll loader
f771159881bc82217d30a64a7716e613jli.dll loader
3addd7c803b9570fc0b1ee6899444c66jli.dll loader
a0fa0893e1adde6b93063ab2c7369536jli.dll loader
0a7464945e1994a7fc5ee2b86ce48c94MSIMG32.dll loader
e43a7c1169cf1d4ce8b22c1301ca100cjli.dll loader
5ac863a8bffbcca5647284e088d401dcsnmpapi.dll loader
b695542718a7cc373112852d97d1811esbiedll.dll loader
4cf187200a4e639e314b7f96a33f161esbiedll.dll loader
32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3jli.dll loader
c15c10589e671094185311e358b8903bjli.dll loader
5910e874fccc9b37239b00b993393994sbiedll.dll loader
0ff9ecbaf18e45cd7b4943b21d5c6cf1jli.dll loader
ebf221383c234ea2361ed54e6df6ddfcmsvcp140.dll loader

6.5 Sophos Countermeasures

Sophos lists the following detection names in its article:

  • ATK/Swrort-Y

  • ATK/ScLoad-W

  • ATK/ScLoad-X

  • ATK/ScLoad-Y

  • ATK/ScLoad-Z

  • Troj/Loader-JL

  • Troj/Loader-JP

These are Sophos-specific detection names. Other security products may use different labels or detection logic.

6.6 IOC Investigation Guidance

Security teams should use these indicators as starting points for threat hunting:

  1. Search endpoint telemetry for the listed file hashes.

  2. Investigate the associated DLLs and the executable processes that loaded them.

  3. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, and endpoint logs for connections to the listed C2 domains.

  4. Examine unexpected access to encrypted configuration files and suspicious in-memory execution.

  5. Correlate IOC matches with account enumeration, process discovery, and Active Directory access.

  6. Preserve suspicious files, logs, memory artifacts, and timestamps for forensic analysis.

  7. Validate any match against the complete environment and relevant source data before blocking or isolating systems.

Full IOC source: SophosLabs — BRONZE SANDCASTLE Meterpreter IOCs

7. Potential Impact

7.1 Unauthorized System Access

The backdoor can provide operators with a way to interact with compromised systems and perform additional actions. The resulting impact depends on the privileges obtained and the systems accessible from the initial host.

7.2 Exposure of Host and Network Information

The payload collects operating-system details, network addresses, process metadata, and other information that can help attackers understand the victim's environment.

7.3 Active Directory Compromise

Access to ntds.dit presents a serious identity-security risk. Unauthorized access to the Active Directory database can expose sensitive directory information and potentially support additional credential-related attacks.

7.4 Data Theft

Sophos identified data-stealing capabilities within the analyzed payload. Organizations should determine whether sensitive files, identity data, or other information were accessed and transferred outside their environment.

7.5 Reduced Detection Opportunities

Encrypted payloads, control-flow obfuscation, and in-memory execution can reduce the effectiveness of security tools that rely primarily on static file signatures.

7.6 Operational and Reputational Consequences

A successful intrusion may lead to incident-response costs, business disruption, sensitive-data exposure, regulatory scrutiny, and reputational harm. The exact consequences depend on the scope of the compromise.

8. Recommendations

8.1 Immediate Actions

1. Investigate suspicious DLL loading

Review endpoint telemetry for trusted applications loading DLLs from unexpected directories. Check file paths, signatures, hashes, parent processes, and execution context.

2. Hunt for encrypted configuration files

Search for suspicious config.ini files and archives containing unexpected executable/DLL/configuration combinations. Correlate file access with subsequent process and network activity.

3. Monitor in-memory execution

Use EDR and memory-analysis capabilities to identify suspicious reflective loading, anomalous PE structures in memory, and processes that decode files before executing code.

4. Review outbound communications

Investigate connections to the C2 domains and other services described by Sophos. Attribute connections to their originating processes and investigate unusual repository paths or download activity.

5. Examine reconnaissance commands

Review command-line logs for unexpected Windows net commands, account enumeration, network discovery, and suspicious process listings.

6. Protect Active Directory

Investigate unexpected use of vssadmin.exe, Volume Shadow Copy creation, and access to ntds.dit. Verify that domain controllers and their backups are protected by strict access controls.

7. Preserve evidence

Retain suspicious DLLs, encrypted configuration files, endpoint logs, process trees, relevant memory artifacts, and network records.

8. Contain confirmed compromises

Isolate affected systems as appropriate, restrict compromised accounts and access paths, and determine whether the activity has spread to other endpoints or identity infrastructure.

8.2 Preventive Actions

A. Endpoint and Behavioral Monitoring

  • Enable telemetry for process creation, command-line execution, and DLL loading.

  • Monitor unexpected DLLs loaded from writable or untrusted locations.

  • Investigate suspicious in-memory execution and reflective loading.

  • Use behavioral analytics alongside file-based detection.

  • Correlate process, identity, file-system, and network events.

B. Application and DLL Security

  • Restrict execution of unapproved software and libraries where feasible.

  • Apply application-control policies and allowlisting where operationally appropriate.

  • Monitor trusted applications loading unexpected DLLs.

  • Maintain an inventory of approved software and expected library dependencies.

  • Review software deployment practices to reduce unauthorized executable/DLL combinations.

C. Identity and Active Directory Security

  • Apply least privilege to domain and server administration.

  • Restrict access to domain controllers and sensitive directory files.

  • Monitor unexpected access to ntds.dit and other credential stores.

  • Audit privileged accounts and suspicious domain-configuration changes.

  • Enforce MFA for remote and privileged access wherever supported.

  • Maintain secure, tested backups of critical identity infrastructure.

D. Network Security

  • Monitor unusual outbound communications and unexpected use of file-sharing, messaging, and code-hosting platforms.

  • Correlate DNS, proxy, firewall, and endpoint logs.

  • Restrict outbound traffic according to business requirements where feasible.

  • Investigate connections made by unfamiliar processes after suspicious DLL loading.

  • Maintain an incident-response process for suspicious C2 activity.

E. Incident Response Readiness

  • Maintain procedures for backdoor deployment, identity compromise, and data theft.

  • Establish evidence-preservation and memory-acquisition procedures.

  • Define containment and recovery priorities for domain controllers and other critical systems.

  • Conduct threat-hunting exercises focused on DLL sideloading and in-memory execution.

  • Update detections as new indicators and behavioral findings become available.

9. Conclusion

BRONZE SANDCASTLE demonstrates how DLL sideloading, encrypted configuration files, runtime decoding, reflective loading, and modified Meterpreter-based backdoors can be combined to support cyber-espionage operations.

The use of trusted executables paired with malicious DLLs is a distinctive aspect of the activity. Encrypted payloads and in-memory execution complicate static detection, while host profiling, network reconnaissance, and access to Active Directory data can expose sensitive information and increase the risk of wider compromise.

Sophos observed victims across Asia and Africa and assessed that the targeting was consistent with Chinese intelligence-gathering interests. However, the researchers did not reliably link the investigated activity to other similarly tracked groups. Technical evidence and attribution assessments should therefore remain clearly distinguished.

Organizations should monitor DLL loading and memory execution, investigate suspicious external communications, protect Active Directory, and correlate endpoint and network telemetry. Combining behavioral detection with least-privilege access and strong incident-response procedures provides a more resilient defense than relying on file signatures alone.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1574.002 — Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingT1027 — Obfuscated Files or InformationT1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationT1620 — Reflective Code LoadingT1057 — Process DiscoveryT1016 — System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1018 — Remote System DiscoveryT1087 — Account DiscoveryT1082 — System Information DiscoveryT1003.003 — OS Credential Dumping: NTDS