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HighThreat Intelligence · 8 min read

Check Point Gateway Intrusions Escalate to Root Access and VMware ESXi Destruction Through PHP2Shell Exploitation

Check Point Research has disclosed an active exploitation campaign targeting unpatched Check Point Security Gateways through the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619). The investigation identified two waves of activity beginning October 30, 2026. The first wave targeted Israeli organizations and included destructive operations against some victims. A second wave on November 2 expanded to organizations across multiple countries and sectors, without evidence of destructive activity. Attackers initially exploited vulnerable Mobile Access portals to obtain access to the gateway. They subsequently exploited CVE-2026-123039, a local privilege-escalation vulnerability in the Gaia DynamicCLI interface, to elevate privileges from the portal service account to root. Following privilege escalation, attackers deployed PHP webshells and established persistence using a Linux backdoor identified as TSGA, alongside its embedded networking component TSProxy. The compromised gateways were then used to conduct internal reconnaissance and move laterally to VMware ESXi infrastructure over SSH. In destructive incidents, attackers deployed the destroy_v6 Linux wiper, which recursively overwrites and deletes files and leaves politically themed notes named DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt. Check Point identified similarities between TSGA, TSProxy, and the previously documented PhiliKit malware framework. However, researchers have not established the responsible threat actor with high confidence. The possibility of a false-flag operation or involvement of an initial-access broker remains open.

Written by ThreatBeaconX Threat Intelligence Team·Published Nov 13, 2026

Technical Description

The campaign combines remote code execution against vulnerable Check Point Mobile Access portals with local privilege escalation on the underlying Gaia operating system.

Vulnerability Overview

CVE

Description

CVSS

Role in the attack

CVE-2026-109618

PHP2Shell remote code execution vulnerability

9.2

Initial access

CVE-2026-109619

PHP2Shell remote code execution vulnerability

9.2

Initial access

CVE-2026-123039

Gaia OS DynamicCLI local privilege escalation

7.8

Root privilege escalation

The PHP2Shell vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution through vulnerable PHP interfaces exposed by Check Point Mobile Access portals.

CVE-2026-123039 affects the DynamicCLI IPC interface. Attackers who have already obtained local code execution can exploit this issue to execute commands with root privileges.

Important: CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege-escalation vulnerability, not a standalone unauthenticated remote-access vulnerability. The observed campaign chained it after PHP2Shell exploitation.

Affected Products and Versions

According to Check Point's security advisory:

  • Check Point Security Gateways with Mobile Access Portal.

  • Security Gateway releases from R80 through R82.20.

  • Spark Firewalls running R81.10.x, R82.00.x, R77.20.x and R80.20.x are also listed in the PHP2Shell advisory.

  • CVE-2026-123039 affects Gaia releases R81.20, R82, R82.10 and R82.20.

Check Point's advisory provides separate vulnerability and remediation guidance for these products. Organizations should verify their exact release and installed hotfix against the relevant vendor security advisories.

Attack Overview

The observed attack chain consists of initial exploitation, privilege escalation, webshell deployment, persistence, internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, and destructive activity.

1. Initial Access – PHP2Shell Exploitation

Beginning October 30, attackers targeted internet-facing Check Point Mobile Access portals.

The investigation identified PHP session artifacts under:

/opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/

Session files containing the marker upload_progress_pwn were associated with the exploitation activity.

During the same period, Apache/PHP worker processes experienced hundreds of segmentation faults, providing additional evidence of repeated exploitation attempts.

The observed activity was consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.

2. Privilege Escalation – CVE-2026-123039

After obtaining access through the Mobile Access portal, attackers exploited the Gaia DynamicCLI IPC interface.

The vulnerability enabled attackers to escalate privileges from the portal service account to root.

This provided the permissions necessary to deploy additional malware, modify appliance files, and establish persistent access.

3. PHP Webshell Deployment

Attackers deployed PHP webshells inside the Mobile Access portal's template directory.

The initial webshells followed the naming pattern:

zz*.tpl

The attackers subsequently replaced the initial lightweight shells with expanded versions.

The expanded webshell supported:

  • Operating-system command execution.

  • PHP code execution.

  • File uploads.

  • Plain-text command input.

  • Base64-encoded and XOR-obfuscated commands.

The expanded shell required the hardcoded key:

zz2026

Uploaded files were initially stored at:

/tmp/.up.tpl

The attackers subsequently copied the uploaded file into the portal's template directory as:

challenge_render.tpl

4. Persistent Backdoor Deployment – TSGA

Attackers deployed a Linux backdoor identified as TSGA.

The initial executable was launched from:

/tmp/CPconfigdaemon

It was executed in the background with output redirected to:

/tmp/.bd.log

When executed with root privileges, the malware relocated itself and relaunched under the name:

slot_CPconfigdaemon

The implant provides capabilities including:

  • Encrypted remote access.

  • Interactive command execution.

  • Configuration collection and theft.

  • Backup and snapshot-based persistence.

  • Process injection.

  • Binary firewall-log tampering.

  • File transfers.

These capabilities provide attackers with continued access to compromised Check Point appliances.

5. Network Persistence and Concealed Communications – TSProxy

TSGA contains a second component identified as TSProxy.

The malware writes a shared library to:

/lib/libcpfwcommon.so

TSProxy is an embedded Linux networking backdoor that supports encrypted SOCKS-style proxying.

It can inject its shared library into selected appliance processes and intercept networking functions to handle specially marked attacker connections while allowing normal traffic to continue.

This provides a mechanism for concealing attacker communications within existing appliance services.

6. Internal Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

After establishing persistence on the gateway, attackers deployed the gogo scanner to identify internal assets and services.

They subsequently moved laterally to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, authenticating with the vpxuser service account.

This demonstrates how a compromised perimeter security appliance can become a pivot point for accessing internal virtualization infrastructure.

7. Destructive Activity – destroy_v6 Wiper

During the first campaign wave, attackers deployed a Linux ELF wiper identified as:

destroy_v6

The malware was staged on the ESXi host at:

/tmp/des

Its capabilities include:

  • Recursive directory traversal.

  • Deletion of files regardless of extension.

  • Overwriting files with zeros before deletion by default.

  • Selective exclusion of directories through the -w option.

  • Fast deletion using the -f option.

  • Dropping politically themed notes named DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt.

The notes explicitly reject ransom negotiations.

The second wave on November 2 expanded internationally, but Check Point reported no evidence of destructive activity during that wave.

Technical Analysis

Malware Components

Component

Description

Purpose

PHP webshell

Malicious .tpl files

Remote command execution and file uploads

TSGA

slot_CPconfigdaemon

Persistent gateway backdoor

TSProxy

/lib/libcpfwcommon.so

Concealed encrypted network access and proxying

gogo

Internal scanner

Network reconnaissance

destroy_v6

Linux ELF wiper

File overwriting and deletion

DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt

Destructive activity note

Political messaging accompanying the wiper

PhiliKit Relationship

Check Point Research identified code, configuration, and cryptographic similarities between TSGA, TSProxy, and the previously documented PhiliKit malware framework.

The research identifies shared tooling characteristics, including:

  • Common Tiny SHell roots.

  • Encrypted remote-control communications.

  • TCP port 11072.

  • Unix socket /tmp/.p_sock.

  • Similar operator credentials and transport secrets.

  • Matching TLS certificate and private-key material between TSProxy and the PhiliKit-related networking component.

These similarities support a shared tooling lineage.

However, shared malware components do not independently establish who conducted this operation.

Threat Actor Attribution

Check Point Research identified links between the deployed implants and the PhiliKit malware family, which has previously been associated with the China-nexus threat actor UNC5221.

Additional contextual observations include:

  • Infrastructure hosted on LightNode VPS services.

  • Scanning activity concentrated between 00:00 and 09:00 UTC.

  • Similarities with tooling previously observed in attacks against Ivanti appliances.

However, researchers highlighted several inconsistencies with known Chinese-nexus operational patterns:

  • Destructive activity against Israeli organizations.

  • Politically themed notes referencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

  • The use of the name PhiliKit, derived from the malware's internal name philistine.

Check Point could not confidently determine the true nature of the operation.

Possible scenarios include direct operation by the identified actor, participation by an initial-access broker, or a false-flag operation.

Attribution assessment: Unconfirmed. Do not attribute the campaign directly to UNC5221 based solely on the identified tooling similarities.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were published by Check Point Research.

File Hashes – SHA-256

SHA-256

Associated file

edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3

TPL webshell

4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8

slot_CPconfigdaemon

d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63

CPconfigdaemon

3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90

gogo

c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237

destroy_v6

0522937c0c0337be54fe25493539e5f5f8ceb9742c980aaff1cfc9515f3a96f7

DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt

ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7

philistine

fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da

libdssafe.so

Network Indicators

Indicator

Type

130.94.19[.]204

Attacker infrastructure

130.94.19[.]168

Attacker infrastructure

Additional Host-Based Indicators

Indicator

Description

upload_progress_pwn

PHP session artifact associated with exploitation

zz*.tpl

Webshell filename pattern

challenge_render.tpl

Observed webshell-related filename

/tmp/.up.tpl

Webshell upload staging path

/tmp/CPconfigdaemon

Initial TSGA executable path

slot_CPconfigdaemon

Persistent TSGA filename

/tmp/.bd.log

TSGA output log

/lib/libcpfwcommon.so

TSProxy shared library

/tmp/.p_sock

Unix socket used for encrypted communications

/tmp/des

Observed wiper staging path

DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt

Destructive activity note

IOC handling note: Validate file hashes and infrastructure indicators against the original Check Point research before operational deployment. The IP addresses are published indicators associated with the campaign; their presence alone does not prove compromise.

Potential Impact

Successful exploitation of this attack chain can result in:

  1. Unauthorized root-level access to Check Point Security Gateways.

  2. Persistent compromise of perimeter security infrastructure.

  3. Concealed remote access and proxy-based communications.

  4. Exposure of gateway configuration and security-related information.

  5. Internal network reconnaissance and lateral movement.

  6. Unauthorized access to VMware ESXi infrastructure.

  7. Destructive file overwriting and deletion.

  8. Disruption of critical business services and virtualization environments.

  9. Reduced forensic visibility through firewall-log tampering.

Recommendations

Immediate Actions

  1. Apply vendor hotfixes: Install the November Check Point Jumbo Hotfix on all applicable Security Gateways and Management Servers as recommended by Check Point.

  2. Verify PHP2Shell remediation: Confirm that the PHP2Shell fixes for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are installed.

  3. Address privilege escalation: Verify remediation for CVE-2026-123039 on applicable Gaia releases.

  4. Review Mobile Access portals: Prioritize internet-facing gateways and confirm their exact software versions and hotfix status.

  5. Hunt for published IOCs: Search gateway files, logs, session artifacts, and relevant telemetry for the published hashes, IPs, filenames, and paths.

  6. Inspect webshell activity: Investigate unexpected .tpl files, especially those matching zz*.tpl, and review the portal template directory.

  7. Investigate backdoor persistence: Look for slot_CPconfigdaemon, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, and suspicious processes or shared-library injections.

  8. Review DynamicCLI activity: Investigate unexpected commands and suspicious local activity associated with CVE-2026-123039.

  9. Investigate lateral movement: Review SSH activity involving VMware ESXi hosts and the vpxuser account.

  10. Protect virtualization infrastructure: Validate ESXi host integrity, investigate unexpected file deletion, and ensure recoverable offline backups are available.

  11. Escalate suspected compromise: Isolate affected appliances and engage Check Point Incident Response or qualified incident responders. Preserve evidence before rebuilding or cleaning systems.

Preventive Actions

  1. Restrict administrative and Mobile Access interfaces to trusted networks wherever operationally possible.

  2. Maintain a formal patch-management process for perimeter security appliances.

  3. Monitor gateway processes for unexpected shell execution, file creation, and shared-library loading.

  4. Monitor SSH authentication and administrative activity involving virtualization infrastructure.

  5. Restrict outbound network connections from security appliances to required destinations.

  6. Implement segmentation between perimeter security appliances and internal management networks.

  7. Maintain offline or immutable backups of critical virtualization workloads and configurations.

  8. Monitor for unexpected modifications to firewall logs and appliance configuration files.

  9. Establish threat-hunting detections for the published IOCs and associated behavioral patterns.

Threat Hunting Recommendations

TH teams should prioritize the following detection and investigation activities:

Hunting area

Investigation focus

Check Point gateway

PHP session artifacts containing upload_progress_pwn

Webshell deployment

Unexpected zz*.tpl and challenge_render.tpl files

Privilege escalation

Suspicious DynamicCLI activity and root-level command execution

Backdoor persistence

slot_CPconfigdaemon and /tmp/CPconfigdaemon

Shared-library activity

Unexpected loading of /lib/libcpfwcommon.so

Network communications

Connections involving the published IPs and TCP port 11072

Internal reconnaissance

Gateway-originated scanning and unusual internal connections

Lateral movement

SSH activity involving ESXi and vpxuser

Destructive activity

File overwriting, recursive deletion, and DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt creation

Log integrity

Unexpected firewall-log modification or tampering

Recommended priority: P1 – Threat Hunting for organizations operating internet-facing Check Point Security Gateways, particularly where the Mobile Access Portal is enabled.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique

Name

Observed activity

T1190

Exploit Public-Facing Application

PHP2Shell exploitation of Mobile Access portals

T1068

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

CVE-2026-123039 exploitation

T1505.003

Server Software Component: Web Shell

Deployment of malicious PHP .tpl files

T1059

Command and Scripting Interpreter

Operating-system command execution through webshells

T1543.002

Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service

Use only if service-based persistence is confirmed; not assigned to the observed mechanism here

T1574.006

Dynamic Linker Hijacking

Shared-library injection and TSProxy activity

T1046

Network Service Discovery

Internal reconnaissance using gogo

T1021.004

Remote Services: SSH

Lateral movement to VMware ESXi

T1485

Data Destruction

destroy_v6 overwriting and deleting files

T1070

Indicator Removal

Firewall-log tampering capability

Mapping is based on reported behavior. Some capabilities are described by the research, but their use in every investigated incident is not established.

Conclusion

The PHP2Shell exploitation campaign demonstrates how vulnerabilities in internet-facing security appliances can provide attackers with an entry point into enterprise infrastructure.

By chaining PHP2Shell remote code execution with the Gaia DynamicCLI privilege-escalation vulnerability, attackers were able to obtain root privileges, establish persistent access, and move into internal virtualization environments.

The deployment of TSGA, TSProxy, and destroy_v6 highlights the potential progression from perimeter compromise to persistent intrusion and destructive operations.

Organizations operating Check Point Security Gateways should prioritize vendor hotfix deployment, investigate the published indicators, review DynamicCLI activity, and assess the integrity of connected VMware ESXi infrastructure.

The campaign's attribution remains unresolved, and organizations should focus on observed behavior and technical indicators rather than assuming a specific threat actor.