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HighThreat Intelligence · 8 min read

SCKit Malware Abuses ScreenConnect to Establish Rogue Remote Access and Target MSP Technicians

Blackpoint Cyber reported an active campaign on November 11, 2026, involving unauthorized ScreenConnect deployments through legitimate, cloud-hosted management instances. The investigation identified a malicious toolkit named SCKit, designed to abuse ScreenConnect's remote management capabilities to establish persistent access and potentially extend intrusions into managed service provider (MSP) environments. The toolkit deploys unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients, manipulates legitimate Guest sessions through a component called RelayTrap, and contains additional scripts designed to collect technicians' authenticated ScreenConnect browser sessions. If successful, these capabilities could allow attackers to use existing administrative privileges to distribute commands across other managed endpoints. The investigation confirmed unauthorized client deployments. However, Blackpoint did not observe successful Guest-to-Host propagation or establish that the toolkit successfully compromised technician workstations. Controlled testing against a current ScreenConnect Host client also showed that the attempted file transfer was not retrieved or executed.

Written by ThreatBeaconX Research Team·Published Nov 12, 2026

The campaign abuses trusted remote management infrastructure rather than relying exclusively on a conventional malware delivery mechanism. Attackers used existing ScreenConnect management access and its built-in Run Command functionality to execute commands on managed endpoints under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context.

The deployment process installs additional ScreenConnect Access clients configured to communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure. It also deploys SCKit components under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, where they attempt to interfere with legitimate ScreenConnect Guest sessions.

The toolkit's RelayTrap component attempts to reverse the normal file-transfer relationship between a technician's Host client and a managed Guest endpoint. It prepares a malicious file-transfer-and-execution request associated with CVE-2026-84869. The vulnerability affects ScreenConnect Host clients earlier than version 26.6.5.9742; the vendor's 26.6.5 security update introduced the fix.

Additional SCKit components attempt to retrieve .ASPXAUTH session cookies from technician workstations and reuse authenticated management sessions. These capabilities could provide a route to further command execution across systems accessible to the technician.

The broader propagation chain remains unconfirmed. Defenders should prioritize identifying unauthorized ScreenConnect clients, reviewing management activity, checking technician workstations, and validating that Host and Guest clients are patched.

Technical Description

SCKit is a multi-stage malicious toolkit that combines unauthorized remote access deployment, encrypted PowerShell payload delivery, ScreenConnect Guest manipulation, and attempted browser-session theft.

The investigation identified several major components:

  • Stage0Loader.ps1: Initiates communication with the staging infrastructure and retrieves encrypted payloads.

  • SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1: Deploys unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients and prepares the endpoint for additional SCKit functionality.

  • TrapWatch.ps1: Monitors ScreenConnect services and attempts to replace selected Guest processes.

  • RelayTrap.cs: Implements the attempted Guest-to-Host file-transfer-and-execution technique.

  • Panel-Lateral-free.ps1: Attempts to collect local ScreenConnect authentication sessions and reuse technician permissions.

  • ToolboxRelayUploader.exe: Supports the attempted distribution of commands and bootstrap components through ScreenConnect's Shared Toolbox.

The toolkit uses encrypted delivery stages and PowerShell execution to make its deployment less straightforward to inspect.

Attack Overview

1. Abuse of Existing ScreenConnect Management Access

Attackers leveraged legitimate cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances and their built-in Run Command functionality to execute commands on managed endpoints.

The deployment sequence checks for existing ScreenConnect installations, downloads an attacker-controlled installer to:

C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi

The installer is executed silently to establish an additional remote access connection outside the organization's approved management infrastructure.

The same sequence creates a Base64-encoded batch script:

C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat

This script initiates the subsequent SCKit deployment stages.

2. Encrypted Payload Delivery

The batch script contacts the staging domain ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev and retrieves a PowerShell decoder through the EadF.php endpoint.

The loader uses the system's MachineGuid as part of its payload retrieval process. The recovered encryption process includes:

  • PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation.

  • AES-256-CBC decryption.

  • GZip decompression.

  • Base64-encoded payload delivery.

  • Custom HTTP response headers, including X-Lab-Half and X-Lab-Salt.

The decrypted PowerShell content is written to a temporary file and launched through a hidden PowerShell process with execution policy restrictions bypassed.

Temporary PowerShell filenames follow a generated pattern:

k followed by 32 hexadecimal characters and the .ps1 extension.

3. Deployment of Rogue ScreenConnect Clients

The installation script deploys additional ScreenConnect Access clients using the following sources:

  • sc[.]payproofkit[.]com

  • cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com

The recovered installer configuration references the relay:

soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org:81

These unauthorized clients provide an additional remote access channel controlled by the attackers. The recovered installer contained recognizable ScreenConnect components, with no evidence that the underlying vendor binaries had been modified.

The script also attempts to configure Microsoft Defender exclusions covering installation paths and the msiexec.exe and powershell.exe processes.

4. RelayTrap Guest-to-Host Execution Attempt

SCKit's RelayTrap component attempts to manipulate legitimate ScreenConnect Guest sessions.

The TrapWatch.ps1 script registers a scheduled task named TrapWatch under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context. It monitors ScreenConnect services and attempts to replace selected Guest processes with a custom implementation.

The replacement Guest uses locally installed ScreenConnect assemblies and reconnects using the original Guest's connection parameters.

When a technician connects to the affected endpoint, RelayTrap attempts to send a malicious payload back to the technician's Host client through a file-transfer-and-execution request.

The selected payload is:

Run-Lateral-Full.bat

This behavior is associated with CVE-2026-84869, which affects ScreenConnect Host clients earlier than 26.6.5.9742.

Important investigation finding: Blackpoint reproduced the attempted transfer in a controlled test against a current ScreenConnect release. The malicious Guest queued the transfer, but the Host did not request or execute the file. The investigation did not establish successful technician compromise or a bypass of the vendor's security fix.

5. Technician Session Collection and Lateral Movement

The toolkit contains additional PowerShell functionality designed to operate on a technician's workstation if code execution is achieved there.

The Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 component attempts to locate .ASPXAUTH authentication cookies associated with ScreenConnect management panels.

Its collection methods include:

  • Searching Chromium-based browser cookie databases.

  • Attempting DPAPI and AES-GCM handling for supported browser formats.

  • Inspecting browser process memory for authentication strings.

  • Examining Firefox storage.

If a valid session cookie is recovered, the toolkit attempts to replay it against ScreenConnect management interfaces and obtain access tokens.

The recovered scripts also contain functionality to enumerate accessible systems and sessions, distribute execution events, and use the Shared Toolbox to deliver additional commands.

These actions depend on obtaining code execution on the technician's workstation and recovering a sufficiently privileged authenticated session. Successful cookie recovery and end-to-end command distribution were not established by the investigation.

Technical Analysis

The campaign demonstrates how attackers can abuse legitimate remote management software to establish persistence and potentially reach additional customer environments.

Key technical observations:

  • Existing ScreenConnect agents were used to execute commands across managed endpoints.

  • Unauthorized Access clients were installed to provide separate attacker-controlled remote access.

  • PowerShell scripts were delivered through encrypted and staged payloads.

  • RelayTrap attempted to replace legitimate ScreenConnect Guest processes.

  • The toolkit attempted to exploit the Guest-to-Host trust boundary associated with CVE-2026-84869.

  • Additional scripts attempted to collect .ASPXAUTH cookies from technician workstations.

  • Recovered components attempted to reuse authenticated management privileges for command distribution.

  • The toolkit attempted to create Microsoft Defender exclusions for selected paths and processes.

The presence of these capabilities does not mean every stage succeeded. The confirmed unauthorized deployments must be distinguished from the attempted Guest-to-Host execution and the unverified technician-session propagation chain.

Affected Products and Components

Component

Details

ConnectWise ScreenConnect

Legitimate remote support platform abused during the campaign

ScreenConnect Host client

Builds earlier than 26.6.5.9742 are affected by the CVE-2026-84869 behavior described in the report

ScreenConnect Guest client

Targeted for unauthorized replacement by RelayTrap

MSP-managed endpoints

Potentially exposed through unauthorized Access client deployments

Technician workstations

Potential targets of attempted reverse execution and session collection

Patch guidance: Verify that both technician-side Host clients and endpoint-side Guest clients are updated to 26.6.5.9742 or later, following ConnectWise guidance.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File Hashes – SHA-256

File / Component

SHA-256

Stage0Loader.ps1

81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781

SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1

a1937467fd862916f89342cdd61f55c4bc405fb35b6e1379e27cfbfdba77dcdc

p=4 decoder

338e37f58043635ebab64ee5fdc919935e55cb146ca97834b358f934e55e88ec

p=3 decoded bundle

8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4

RelayTrap.cs

3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4

TrapWatch.ps1

d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a

Panel-Lateral-free.ps1

94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11

ToolboxRelayUploader.exe

8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af

ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi

d85315bd7602b6f5c13dc0eada2c9cba0892c7cd3b1eb7dacb1bffdd536ceb21

Network Indicators

Indicator

Context

185.99.255[.]28

Attacker-associated ScreenConnect server

ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev

Initial staging and bootstrap domain

hxxps://ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php

Payload staging endpoint

sc[.]payproofkit[.]com

Configured Access installer source

cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com

Recovered Access MSI source

soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org

Relay embedded in recovered MSI

newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org

Configuration / skip-list indicator

ScreenConnect Client Identifiers

Identifier

Context

2588ef5c15954b10

Configured first Access client

ed630cc2c873b091

Configured second Access client

Host-Based Hunting Artifacts

Artifact

Description

C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi

Unauthorized ScreenConnect installer path

C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat

SCKit deployment batch script

sckit-decoder.ps1

Retrieved PowerShell decoder

C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\

SCKit component directory

TrapWatch

Scheduled task running as SYSTEM

RelayTrapLiteAlert

Registry Run-key persistence indicator

TrapWatch.ps1

ScreenConnect Guest monitoring and replacement script

Run-Lateral-Full.bat

Payload selected for the attempted Guest-to-Host transfer

ToolboxRelayUploader.exe

Shared Toolbox deployment component

k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1

Generated temporary PowerShell filename pattern

ScreenConnect Event ID 201

Investigate in context of file-transfer-and-run activity

IOC handling note: These indicators should be correlated with endpoint, network, and ScreenConnect telemetry. A match should trigger investigation and should not automatically be treated as proof of compromise.

Potential Impact

If the toolkit's intended capabilities succeed, organizations could face:

  1. Persistent unauthorized access: Additional ScreenConnect clients may provide attackers with remote access independent of legitimate management sessions.

  2. Technician workstation compromise: RelayTrap attempts to turn a legitimate support connection into a route for executing a payload on the technician's system.

  3. Session hijacking: Theft of .ASPXAUTH cookies could allow attackers to reuse authenticated ScreenConnect sessions.

  4. Cross-customer exposure: Compromised technician accounts and workstations may provide access to multiple customer environments.

  5. Security control evasion: Unauthorized Defender exclusions may reduce visibility or interfere with endpoint protection.

  6. Operational disruption: Malicious changes to ScreenConnect services, execution policies, and application-control settings may affect legitimate remote support operations.

The broader technician compromise and cross-customer propagation scenarios remain potential impacts, not confirmed outcomes of the reported campaign.

Recommendations

Immediate Actions

  1. Audit ScreenConnect deployments: Identify unauthorized Access clients and compare their configured relay addresses and client identifiers against approved management infrastructure.

  2. Review administrative activity: Investigate ScreenConnect operator sessions, Run Command history, and Shared Toolbox activity for suspicious commands or software deployments.

  3. Patch ScreenConnect clients: Ensure Host and Guest clients are updated to version 26.6.5.9742 or later, following vendor guidance.

  4. Avoid interactive sessions with suspected endpoints: Do not connect technicians to potentially affected systems until RelayTrap has been ruled out. Use an isolated response channel.

  5. Hunt for SCKit artifacts: Search for the RelayTrap directory, TrapWatch task, RelayTrapLiteAlert registry key, suspicious PowerShell scripts, and the listed IOCs.

  6. Review endpoint protection changes: Investigate unexpected Microsoft Defender exclusions involving msiexec.exe, powershell.exe, and suspicious installation paths.

  7. Investigate technician workstations: If a technician connected to a suspected endpoint, examine their workstation for unexpected process execution, browser-cookie access, and SCKit components.

  8. Revoke potentially exposed sessions: From a clean device, terminate potentially compromised ScreenConnect sessions and rotate affected credentials.

  9. Preserve evidence: Retain endpoint artifacts, PowerShell logs, ScreenConnect session history, authentication logs, and relevant network telemetry before remediation.

Preventive Actions

  1. Restrict access to ScreenConnect management interfaces and enforce strong authentication, including MFA.

  2. Maintain an inventory of approved ScreenConnect Access clients, Host clients, Guest clients, extensions, and relay infrastructure.

  3. Review independently developed RMM extensions and integrations with remote command capabilities.

  4. Apply least-privilege access to technician accounts and restrict administrative access across customer environments.

  5. Monitor unusual PowerShell execution, encoded commands, scheduled-task creation, and unexpected remote-access software installations.

  6. Alert on unauthorized ScreenConnect client registrations and communication with unapproved relay domains.

  7. Monitor browser credential and session-cookie access on technician workstations.

  8. Separate technician administration workstations from everyday browsing and general-purpose endpoints.

  9. Regularly review Defender exclusions and application-control policies for unauthorized modifications.

  10. Establish procedures for isolating affected endpoints without relying on potentially compromised remote management infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique

Name

Observed or intended behavior

T1219

Remote Access Software

Abuse and deployment of ScreenConnect clients

T1059.001

PowerShell

PowerShell-based payload delivery and execution

T1059.003

Windows Command Shell

Batch scripts used for deployment

T1105

Ingress Tool Transfer

Retrieval of scripts, installers, and supporting components

T1053.005

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

TrapWatch scheduled task persistence

T1555.003

Credentials from Web Browsers

Attempted collection of browser-stored authentication data

T1539

Steal Web Session Cookie

Attempted collection and reuse of .ASPXAUTH cookies

T1071.001

Web Protocols

HTTP/HTTPS communication with staging infrastructure

T1562.001

Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools

Attempted Microsoft Defender exclusion changes

Conclusion

The SCKit campaign highlights the risks associated with trusted remote management platforms, particularly in MSP environments where technicians can administer systems across multiple customer networks.

The investigation confirmed unauthorized ScreenConnect Access client deployments and recovered a toolkit designed to establish additional remote access, manipulate Guest sessions, and potentially compromise technician workstations through reverse file-transfer attempts and authenticated-session reuse.

However, the full propagation chain was not demonstrated. Blackpoint's controlled testing found that a current patched Host client did not retrieve or execute the attempted payload. This distinction is important when assessing actual compromise and prioritizing response activities.

Organizations using ScreenConnect should urgently validate client versions, investigate unauthorized Access deployments, review administrative command activity, and examine technician workstations that interacted with potentially affected endpoints.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1219T1059.001T1059.003T1105T1053.005T1555.003T1539T1071.001T1562.001