The campaign abuses trusted remote management infrastructure rather than relying exclusively on a conventional malware delivery mechanism. Attackers used existing ScreenConnect management access and its built-in Run Command functionality to execute commands on managed endpoints under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context.
The deployment process installs additional ScreenConnect Access clients configured to communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure. It also deploys SCKit components under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, where they attempt to interfere with legitimate ScreenConnect Guest sessions.
The toolkit's RelayTrap component attempts to reverse the normal file-transfer relationship between a technician's Host client and a managed Guest endpoint. It prepares a malicious file-transfer-and-execution request associated with CVE-2026-84869. The vulnerability affects ScreenConnect Host clients earlier than version 26.6.5.9742; the vendor's 26.6.5 security update introduced the fix.
Additional SCKit components attempt to retrieve .ASPXAUTH session cookies from technician workstations and reuse authenticated management sessions. These capabilities could provide a route to further command execution across systems accessible to the technician.
The broader propagation chain remains unconfirmed. Defenders should prioritize identifying unauthorized ScreenConnect clients, reviewing management activity, checking technician workstations, and validating that Host and Guest clients are patched.
Technical Description
SCKit is a multi-stage malicious toolkit that combines unauthorized remote access deployment, encrypted PowerShell payload delivery, ScreenConnect Guest manipulation, and attempted browser-session theft.
The investigation identified several major components:
Stage0Loader.ps1: Initiates communication with the staging infrastructure and retrieves encrypted payloads.
SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1: Deploys unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients and prepares the endpoint for additional SCKit functionality.
TrapWatch.ps1: Monitors ScreenConnect services and attempts to replace selected Guest processes.
RelayTrap.cs: Implements the attempted Guest-to-Host file-transfer-and-execution technique.
Panel-Lateral-free.ps1: Attempts to collect local ScreenConnect authentication sessions and reuse technician permissions.
ToolboxRelayUploader.exe: Supports the attempted distribution of commands and bootstrap components through ScreenConnect's Shared Toolbox.
The toolkit uses encrypted delivery stages and PowerShell execution to make its deployment less straightforward to inspect.
Attack Overview
1. Abuse of Existing ScreenConnect Management Access
Attackers leveraged legitimate cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances and their built-in Run Command functionality to execute commands on managed endpoints.
The deployment sequence checks for existing ScreenConnect installations, downloads an attacker-controlled installer to:
C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi
The installer is executed silently to establish an additional remote access connection outside the organization's approved management infrastructure.
The same sequence creates a Base64-encoded batch script:
C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat
This script initiates the subsequent SCKit deployment stages.
2. Encrypted Payload Delivery
The batch script contacts the staging domain ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev and retrieves a PowerShell decoder through the EadF.php endpoint.
The loader uses the system's MachineGuid as part of its payload retrieval process. The recovered encryption process includes:
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation.
AES-256-CBC decryption.
GZip decompression.
Base64-encoded payload delivery.
Custom HTTP response headers, including
X-Lab-HalfandX-Lab-Salt.
The decrypted PowerShell content is written to a temporary file and launched through a hidden PowerShell process with execution policy restrictions bypassed.
Temporary PowerShell filenames follow a generated pattern:
k followed by 32 hexadecimal characters and the .ps1 extension.
3. Deployment of Rogue ScreenConnect Clients
The installation script deploys additional ScreenConnect Access clients using the following sources:
sc[.]payproofkit[.]comcdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com
The recovered installer configuration references the relay:
soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org:81
These unauthorized clients provide an additional remote access channel controlled by the attackers. The recovered installer contained recognizable ScreenConnect components, with no evidence that the underlying vendor binaries had been modified.
The script also attempts to configure Microsoft Defender exclusions covering installation paths and the msiexec.exe and powershell.exe processes.
4. RelayTrap Guest-to-Host Execution Attempt
SCKit's RelayTrap component attempts to manipulate legitimate ScreenConnect Guest sessions.
The TrapWatch.ps1 script registers a scheduled task named TrapWatch under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context. It monitors ScreenConnect services and attempts to replace selected Guest processes with a custom implementation.
The replacement Guest uses locally installed ScreenConnect assemblies and reconnects using the original Guest's connection parameters.
When a technician connects to the affected endpoint, RelayTrap attempts to send a malicious payload back to the technician's Host client through a file-transfer-and-execution request.
The selected payload is:
Run-Lateral-Full.bat
This behavior is associated with CVE-2026-84869, which affects ScreenConnect Host clients earlier than 26.6.5.9742.
Important investigation finding: Blackpoint reproduced the attempted transfer in a controlled test against a current ScreenConnect release. The malicious Guest queued the transfer, but the Host did not request or execute the file. The investigation did not establish successful technician compromise or a bypass of the vendor's security fix.
5. Technician Session Collection and Lateral Movement
The toolkit contains additional PowerShell functionality designed to operate on a technician's workstation if code execution is achieved there.
The Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 component attempts to locate .ASPXAUTH authentication cookies associated with ScreenConnect management panels.
Its collection methods include:
Searching Chromium-based browser cookie databases.
Attempting DPAPI and AES-GCM handling for supported browser formats.
Inspecting browser process memory for authentication strings.
Examining Firefox storage.
If a valid session cookie is recovered, the toolkit attempts to replay it against ScreenConnect management interfaces and obtain access tokens.
The recovered scripts also contain functionality to enumerate accessible systems and sessions, distribute execution events, and use the Shared Toolbox to deliver additional commands.
These actions depend on obtaining code execution on the technician's workstation and recovering a sufficiently privileged authenticated session. Successful cookie recovery and end-to-end command distribution were not established by the investigation.
Technical Analysis
The campaign demonstrates how attackers can abuse legitimate remote management software to establish persistence and potentially reach additional customer environments.
Key technical observations:
Existing ScreenConnect agents were used to execute commands across managed endpoints.
Unauthorized Access clients were installed to provide separate attacker-controlled remote access.
PowerShell scripts were delivered through encrypted and staged payloads.
RelayTrap attempted to replace legitimate ScreenConnect Guest processes.
The toolkit attempted to exploit the Guest-to-Host trust boundary associated with CVE-2026-84869.
Additional scripts attempted to collect
.ASPXAUTHcookies from technician workstations.Recovered components attempted to reuse authenticated management privileges for command distribution.
The toolkit attempted to create Microsoft Defender exclusions for selected paths and processes.
The presence of these capabilities does not mean every stage succeeded. The confirmed unauthorized deployments must be distinguished from the attempted Guest-to-Host execution and the unverified technician-session propagation chain.
Affected Products and Components
Component | Details |
|---|---|
ConnectWise ScreenConnect | Legitimate remote support platform abused during the campaign |
ScreenConnect Host client | Builds earlier than |
ScreenConnect Guest client | Targeted for unauthorized replacement by RelayTrap |
MSP-managed endpoints | Potentially exposed through unauthorized Access client deployments |
Technician workstations | Potential targets of attempted reverse execution and session collection |
Patch guidance: Verify that both technician-side Host clients and endpoint-side Guest clients are updated to 26.6.5.9742 or later, following ConnectWise guidance.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
File Hashes – SHA-256
File / Component | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
Stage0Loader.ps1 |
|
SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1 |
|
p=4 decoder |
|
p=3 decoded bundle |
|
RelayTrap.cs |
|
TrapWatch.ps1 |
|
Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 |
|
ToolboxRelayUploader.exe |
|
ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi |
|
Network Indicators
Indicator | Context |
|---|---|
| Attacker-associated ScreenConnect server |
| Initial staging and bootstrap domain |
| Payload staging endpoint |
| Configured Access installer source |
| Recovered Access MSI source |
| Relay embedded in recovered MSI |
| Configuration / skip-list indicator |
ScreenConnect Client Identifiers
Identifier | Context |
|---|---|
| Configured first Access client |
| Configured second Access client |
Host-Based Hunting Artifacts
Artifact | Description |
|---|---|
| Unauthorized ScreenConnect installer path |
| SCKit deployment batch script |
| Retrieved PowerShell decoder |
| SCKit component directory |
| Scheduled task running as SYSTEM |
| Registry Run-key persistence indicator |
| ScreenConnect Guest monitoring and replacement script |
| Payload selected for the attempted Guest-to-Host transfer |
| Shared Toolbox deployment component |
| Generated temporary PowerShell filename pattern |
ScreenConnect Event ID | Investigate in context of file-transfer-and-run activity |
IOC handling note: These indicators should be correlated with endpoint, network, and ScreenConnect telemetry. A match should trigger investigation and should not automatically be treated as proof of compromise.
Potential Impact
If the toolkit's intended capabilities succeed, organizations could face:
Persistent unauthorized access: Additional ScreenConnect clients may provide attackers with remote access independent of legitimate management sessions.
Technician workstation compromise: RelayTrap attempts to turn a legitimate support connection into a route for executing a payload on the technician's system.
Session hijacking: Theft of
.ASPXAUTHcookies could allow attackers to reuse authenticated ScreenConnect sessions.Cross-customer exposure: Compromised technician accounts and workstations may provide access to multiple customer environments.
Security control evasion: Unauthorized Defender exclusions may reduce visibility or interfere with endpoint protection.
Operational disruption: Malicious changes to ScreenConnect services, execution policies, and application-control settings may affect legitimate remote support operations.
The broader technician compromise and cross-customer propagation scenarios remain potential impacts, not confirmed outcomes of the reported campaign.
Recommendations
Immediate Actions
Audit ScreenConnect deployments: Identify unauthorized Access clients and compare their configured relay addresses and client identifiers against approved management infrastructure.
Review administrative activity: Investigate ScreenConnect operator sessions, Run Command history, and Shared Toolbox activity for suspicious commands or software deployments.
Patch ScreenConnect clients: Ensure Host and Guest clients are updated to version
26.6.5.9742or later, following vendor guidance.Avoid interactive sessions with suspected endpoints: Do not connect technicians to potentially affected systems until RelayTrap has been ruled out. Use an isolated response channel.
Hunt for SCKit artifacts: Search for the
RelayTrapdirectory,TrapWatchtask,RelayTrapLiteAlertregistry key, suspicious PowerShell scripts, and the listed IOCs.Review endpoint protection changes: Investigate unexpected Microsoft Defender exclusions involving
msiexec.exe,powershell.exe, and suspicious installation paths.Investigate technician workstations: If a technician connected to a suspected endpoint, examine their workstation for unexpected process execution, browser-cookie access, and SCKit components.
Revoke potentially exposed sessions: From a clean device, terminate potentially compromised ScreenConnect sessions and rotate affected credentials.
Preserve evidence: Retain endpoint artifacts, PowerShell logs, ScreenConnect session history, authentication logs, and relevant network telemetry before remediation.
Preventive Actions
Restrict access to ScreenConnect management interfaces and enforce strong authentication, including MFA.
Maintain an inventory of approved ScreenConnect Access clients, Host clients, Guest clients, extensions, and relay infrastructure.
Review independently developed RMM extensions and integrations with remote command capabilities.
Apply least-privilege access to technician accounts and restrict administrative access across customer environments.
Monitor unusual PowerShell execution, encoded commands, scheduled-task creation, and unexpected remote-access software installations.
Alert on unauthorized ScreenConnect client registrations and communication with unapproved relay domains.
Monitor browser credential and session-cookie access on technician workstations.
Separate technician administration workstations from everyday browsing and general-purpose endpoints.
Regularly review Defender exclusions and application-control policies for unauthorized modifications.
Establish procedures for isolating affected endpoints without relying on potentially compromised remote management infrastructure.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Technique | Name | Observed or intended behavior |
|---|---|---|
T1219 | Remote Access Software | Abuse and deployment of ScreenConnect clients |
T1059.001 | PowerShell | PowerShell-based payload delivery and execution |
T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Batch scripts used for deployment |
T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Retrieval of scripts, installers, and supporting components |
T1053.005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | TrapWatch scheduled task persistence |
T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | Attempted collection of browser-stored authentication data |
T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | Attempted collection and reuse of |
T1071.001 | Web Protocols | HTTP/HTTPS communication with staging infrastructure |
T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | Attempted Microsoft Defender exclusion changes |
Conclusion
The SCKit campaign highlights the risks associated with trusted remote management platforms, particularly in MSP environments where technicians can administer systems across multiple customer networks.
The investigation confirmed unauthorized ScreenConnect Access client deployments and recovered a toolkit designed to establish additional remote access, manipulate Guest sessions, and potentially compromise technician workstations through reverse file-transfer attempts and authenticated-session reuse.
However, the full propagation chain was not demonstrated. Blackpoint's controlled testing found that a current patched Host client did not retrieve or execute the attempted payload. This distinction is important when assessing actual compromise and prioritizing response activities.
Organizations using ScreenConnect should urgently validate client versions, investigate unauthorized Access deployments, review administrative command activity, and examine technician workstations that interacted with potentially affected endpoints.
