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HighThreat Intelligence · 8 min read

Fake Amazon Music Sponsorship Uses YouTube Creator Data to Steal Google Accounts

Malwarebytes identified a phishing campaign targeting YouTube creators through a fake Amazon Music sponsorship offer. The fraudulent website, amazonyt[.]com, presents itself as an invitation-only creator portal and uses publicly available YouTube channel statistics to make the offer appear genuine. Victims are asked to verify ownership of their YouTube channel using a fake Google sign-in window hosted through a second domain, youtubechannelverification[.]com. The phishing page is designed to collect Google email addresses, passwords, and multi-factor authentication (MFA) verification information. After submitting their details, victims may be redirected to a convincing sponsorship dashboard displaying a personalized offer and a confirmation that their request has been received. This can delay suspicion and give attackers more time to misuse stolen credentials. The campaign highlights how brand impersonation, personalized public data, and deceptive authentication interfaces can be combined to compromise Google accounts and potentially take over YouTube channels.

Written by Jakka Lakshmi Koumudi·Published Oct 22, 2026

1. Description

The attackers impersonate Amazon Music by advertising an exclusive collaboration opportunity for YouTube creators. The fake portal promises advertising partnerships, estimated earnings, and campaign packages based on the creator's channel performance.

The lure takes advantage of a genuine Amazon–YouTube Shopping partnership, making the fraudulent offer appear more credible. However, the legitimate partnership concerns product tagging and affiliate commissions; it does not establish the authenticity of the alleged Amazon Music sponsorship portal.

The fake site asks visitors to provide their YouTube channel URL. It then displays real public information, including subscriber counts, views, recent uploads, playlists, and thumbnails. This personalization helps build trust before the victim is prompted to verify the channel.

The verification stage is a phishing trap designed to capture Google login credentials and MFA information.

2. Technical Description

The campaign uses a multi-stage phishing website rather than relying on a malicious executable or conventional malware infection.

Key components include:

  • Fake sponsorship portal: amazonyt[.]com impersonates an Amazon Music creator program.

  • Public data collection: The site retrieves public YouTube channel information to personalize its dashboard.

  • Google login impersonation: A fake verification window appears when the visitor clicks the “Continue with Google” button.

  • Second-stage phishing domain: youtubechannelverification[.]com supplies the credential-collection interface.

  • Credential and MFA collection: The analyzed phishing code sends submitted email addresses and passwords to the attacker's server and supports MFA challenge steps.

  • Deceptive completion flow: The site can return the victim to an apparently successful sponsorship dashboard, reducing the likelihood of immediate suspicion.

Malwarebytes reported that the page included genuine Google sign-in code, but its configuration was inactive. The displayed button instead opened a full-screen frame controlled by the second-stage site.

3. Attack Overview

The observed attack sequence is as follows:

  1. A YouTube creator visits a fake Amazon Music sponsorship website.

  2. The website asks for the creator's YouTube channel URL.

  3. The site retrieves publicly available channel data and displays a personalized dashboard.

  4. The creator is told to verify channel ownership to unlock a sponsorship offer.

  5. Clicking the Google-branded button opens a deceptive login frame sourced from youtubechannelverification[.]com.

  6. The phishing page collects the creator's Google credentials and can handle MFA challenge information.

  7. The victim may be redirected to a fake success page showing an unlocked offer and a request confirmation.

  8. Stolen authentication details can put the creator's Google account, YouTube channel, and connected services at risk.

The source describes a credential-phishing campaign. It does not establish that every targeted creator was successfully compromised or that all collected credentials were used to take over accounts.

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 Brand impersonation and sponsorship bait

The website uses Amazon Music branding and an invitation-only sponsorship narrative to create a sense of exclusivity. It offers several campaign packages, including Shorts promotions, integrations in planned videos, dedicated videos, and larger campaign arrangements.

An earnings calculator allows visitors to enter channel statistics and select promotional options to generate estimated payouts. Although the calculator functions, its calculations do not establish that the advertised sponsorship or payments are genuine.

The lure is effective because it resembles a business opportunity rather than an obvious security threat.

4.2 Collection of public YouTube data

After a creator enters a channel link, the website displays information such as subscriber counts, total views, recent videos, playlists, topics, and thumbnails.

Malwarebytes found that the site queried YouTube's public API directly from the browser. Its code contained 20 Google API keys and switched between them if a key was rejected or reached its usage limit.

The channel information was public, so its retrieval was not itself credential theft. Instead, the data was used to personalize the fake offer and make the site appear to have legitimately evaluated the creator.

4.3 Fake Google authentication interface

The phishing page's Google-branded button does not activate a configured legitimate Google authentication flow. Instead, it opens a full-screen frame that loads content from youtubechannelverification[.]com.

The frame has an almost transparent background, making the second-stage content appear to sit over the original Amazon-branded website. Meanwhile, the browser's actual address bar may continue to display amazonyt[.]com.

This technique can confuse victims who judge a login prompt by its appearance rather than checking the actual authentication domain.

4.4 Credential and MFA theft

Malwarebytes examined a version of the second-stage code that transmitted the email address and password entered into the form to the attacker's server. The code also supported steps for handling MFA challenges.

This means that simply enabling MFA may not prevent compromise if a victim is tricked into submitting both their password and a verification code to the phishing flow.

The exact account-takeover outcome depends on the credentials collected, the authentication method, and whether the attacker can successfully reuse the information.

4.5 Fake verification success

The phishing flow is designed to keep victims reassured. After the second-stage page responds, the site can show a “Verification failed. Please try again” message. The analyzed configuration also contained a success route that marked the channel as verified and unlocked the fake sponsorship dashboard.

The unlocked dashboard displays a fit score, campaign tier, budget range, estimated reach, and an apparent collaboration request form. After submission, the site shows a confirmation that the request has been received.

This provides a plausible ending to the interaction and may delay the victim's realization that their login information has been stolen.

4.6 Reusable phishing infrastructure

Malwarebytes identified leftover error messages in the site's code that referenced unrelated product or channel verification workflows. The second-stage URL also carried a reference value that its code stored as a worker identifier.

These findings may indicate that the infrastructure was adapted from a reusable phishing kit or supports more than one traffic source. However, Malwarebytes stated that it could not confirm how the kit was shared or operated.

4.7 Related YouTube account-targeting campaigns

Malwarebytes also referenced earlier campaigns that targeted YouTube creators through fake collaboration offers and copyright notices. Such campaigns can seek access to established channels because the audience and reputation attached to a compromised account can be valuable to attackers.

These related reports provide context for the broader threat to creators, but they do not establish that the campaigns were operated by the same individuals.

5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Malwarebytes identified the following domains associated with the phishing campaign.

IOC TypeIOCAssociated Activity / Purpose
Domainamazonyt[.]comFake Amazon Music creator portal and sponsorship lure
Domainyoutubechannelverification[.]comSecond-stage phishing interface used to collect Google credentials and MFA information

IOC note: The source does not provide confirmed malicious IP addresses or file hashes for this campaign. The two domains above are the primary indicators identified in the report. Defanged domains are provided for safer handling.

6. Potential Impact

  • Google account compromise: Stolen credentials may allow attackers to access the victim's Google account.

  • YouTube channel takeover: Attackers could gain control of a creator's channel and misuse its established audience.

  • MFA compromise: Victims who submit authentication codes may allow attackers to overcome an additional layer of account protection.

  • Business and financial losses: Creators may lose access to their channels, sponsorship opportunities, advertising revenue, or related business accounts.

  • Reputational damage: A hijacked channel could be used to publish fraudulent promotions or cryptocurrency scams.

  • Further account exposure: Depending on the account permissions and access obtained, connected Google services and stored information may also be at risk.

The report documents a credential-theft mechanism, but does not establish that every targeted account was successfully taken over or that financial losses occurred in every case.

7. Recommendations

Immediate Actions

  1. Verify sponsorship offers independently. Contact Amazon Music through its official website or verified business contacts instead of using links supplied in unsolicited messages.

  2. Inspect the browser address bar. Enter Google credentials only on Google's genuine authentication domain, accounts.google.com.

  3. Do not submit MFA codes to third-party pages. A Google-branded button or familiar login design does not prove that the authentication flow is legitimate.

  4. If credentials were entered, change the Google password immediately using Google's official website.

  5. Review Google Account security activity. Check unfamiliar devices, active sessions, recovery details, and recent security events.

  6. Inspect YouTube Studio permissions. Remove unfamiliar users and review Brand Account permissions if the channel is associated with one.

  7. Revoke suspicious third-party access. Remove applications or sessions that are not recognized.

  8. If an MFA code was submitted, treat the account as potentially compromised. Secure the account and review any unexpected authentication approvals.

  9. Report the phishing domains through the appropriate browser, hosting-provider, and security-reporting channels.

Preventive Actions

  1. Educate creators and marketing teams about fake sponsorship offers, invitation-only promotions, and channel-verification lures.

  2. Require independent verification of business offers before submitting credentials or account information.

  3. Use phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, such as passkeys or security keys, where available.

  4. Use a password manager that recognizes legitimate domains and does not autofill credentials into lookalike websites.

  5. Regularly review YouTube channel managers, Brand Account permissions, and connected third-party applications.

  6. Monitor for unusual account sign-ins, unexpected permission changes, unfamiliar uploads, and changes to recovery information.

  7. Use browser protections and endpoint security tools that block known phishing domains.

  8. Keep recovery methods current and maintain a documented process for recovering a compromised creator account.

8. Conclusion

The fake Amazon Music sponsorship campaign shows how attackers can combine brand impersonation, public YouTube data, and a deceptive Google login interface to target creators. By personalizing the offer with real channel statistics and presenting a convincing success screen, the operators make the phishing flow appear legitimate.

The main security risk is the theft of Google credentials and MFA information, which can lead to account compromise and YouTube channel takeover. Creators should verify sponsorships through official channels, carefully inspect authentication domains, and secure their accounts immediately if they interact with the phishing page.

The available research identifies two principal domains but does not establish the identity of the operators or confirm that every targeted creator suffered a successful account takeover.


MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1566.002 — Phishing: Spearphishing Link