Description
ClickFix is a social-engineering technique that persuades users to copy and execute commands under the pretext of completing a verification check, fixing an issue, or accessing software. Instead of exploiting a vulnerability directly, the attacker manipulates the victim into initiating the infection.
ROMULUS extends this technique by providing reusable infrastructure for staging scripts and delivering different payloads. During its investigation, Forescout identified two primary routes:
Route A: A trojanized MSI installer abuses a legitimate Stardock executable to load malicious code through DLL sideloading.
Route B: An obfuscated PowerShell script downloads encrypted archives containing an artificially oversized executable that ultimately loads LegionLoader.
Huntress previously documented a related ClickFix campaign that used malicious ChatGPT Custom GPTs as an initial lure and distributed trojanized software. AhnLab's independent LegionLoader research also describes ClickFix pages disguised as Cloudflare CAPTCHA screens, including delivery through spear-phishing emails.
These reports show that ClickFix is being used across multiple delivery campaigns, while ROMULUS provides evidence of reusable infrastructure that can support more than one malware-delivery route.
Technical Description
ROMULUS exposes a web-based panel and token-based delivery endpoints. Forescout documented the following patterns:
/s/<token>— delivers a PowerShell staging script./app/<token>— delivers an MSI installer./api/login— handles authentication to the ROMULUS interface.
The observed tokens were 12-character hexadecimal strings. Different tokens were associated with different delivery routes, including the Stardock-based installer and the LegionLoader chain. Some additional MSI routes were not fully analyzed, so their payloads cannot be confirmed from the investigation alone.
The staging scripts used obfuscation and download logic to retrieve the next stage. In the LegionLoader route, encrypted archives concealed their contents, while an executable with extensive padding increased the file size to approximately 883 MB.
The final LegionLoader stage communicated with smashshape[.]com using the /nfront.php and /nback.php endpoints. Forescout also observed Chrome Local State key handling, indicating potential collection of sensitive browser information.
Attack Overview
Route A — Stardock DeElevation
The victim encounters a ClickFix lure and executes a supplied command.
PowerShell retrieves an obfuscated staging script.
The script downloads a trojanized MSI installer from ROMULUS infrastructure.
The installer runs silently and launches
DeElevate64.exe.The executable loads a patched
DeElevator64.dll.The modified DLL introduces a dependency on
I++u.dll, which transfers execution to the malicious loader.
Route B — LegionLoader
The victim executes a command supplied through a ClickFix lure.
PowerShell retrieves an obfuscated staging script.
The script downloads encrypted archive content from
orbitflownetwork[.]lol.Password-protected archives are extracted using the legitimate
7zr.exeutility.An oversized executable decrypts embedded content through multiple stages.
A custom loader executes the final LegionLoader payload.
LegionLoader communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure and can handle additional payloads.
Related campaign context
Huntress documented a campaign using malicious ChatGPT Custom GPTs to lead users to ClickFix lures, followed by PowerShell execution, trojanized installers, DLL sideloading, and persistence mechanisms.
AhnLab separately observed LegionLoader distributed through fake CAPTCHA pages and spear-phishing. These observations are useful for identifying broader ClickFix patterns, but they should not be treated as proof that those campaigns were operated by the ROMULUS developers.
Technical Analysis
Reusable delivery infrastructure
Forescout identified six IP addresses exposing a similar ROMULUS interface. The platform's token-based routes supported different delivery paths, suggesting that it was not restricted to one hard-coded payload.
The investigation did not establish whether ROMULUS was a privately operated panel, a commercial cybercrime service, an affiliate framework, or software shared between operators.
PowerShell obfuscation
The staging scripts reconstructed executable content from obfuscated data and used download-and-execute logic to retrieve subsequent stages. Forescout highlighted long PowerShell scripts executed from %TEMP%, decimal-formatted IP addresses, and hidden or bypass-style PowerShell arguments as detection opportunities.
Decimal IP notation is particularly relevant because an address such as 1614733393 can resolve to 96.62.224[.]81, potentially bypassing simple rules that look only for conventional dotted-decimal addresses.
MSI execution and DLL sideloading
In Route A, a trojanized MSI installed files under a Stardock-related application directory. A legitimate-looking executable then loaded a modified DLL from its application directory, enabling execution of a malicious loader.
This makes process ancestry and module loading important detection signals. A familiar application name or executable signature alone does not establish that the complete installation package is trustworthy.
Encrypted archives and oversized executable
Route B used nested password-protected archives and a legitimate 7-Zip utility to extract the next stage. The resulting executable was approximately 883 MB, largely because of artificial padding in its PE relocation section.
This can interfere with security workflows that impose file-size limits on uploads, sandbox analysis, or static inspection. Defenders should investigate suspicious executable sizes alongside file structure, process lineage, and the source of the download.
LegionLoader communication and browser-data handling
Forescout identified smashshape[.]com as the command-and-control domain for the analyzed LegionLoader sample. The malware used /nfront.php for registration and command retrieval and /nback.php for reporting results.
The observed HTTP requests used a form-urlencoded content type but carried a single Base64-encoded, encrypted message rather than ordinary form fields. Forescout also observed handling of Chrome Local State encryption-key data.
AhnLab independently reported LegionLoader variants capable of collecting browser profile information and handling browser encryption keys. This corroborates the relevance of browser-data access as a hunting opportunity, but does not establish that AhnLab's samples used the ROMULUS infrastructure.
Attribution and confidence
High confidence: Forescout observed ROMULUS infrastructure, two delivery routes, and the associated malware artifacts.
High confidence: Huntress documented the related ChatGPT Custom GPT and ClickFix delivery activity.
Separate reporting: AhnLab documented other LegionLoader delivery activity using ClickFix.
Unconfirmed: ROMULUS operator identity and common ownership of the associated malware families.
Not established: A direct connection between ROMULUS and the separate RomulusLoader activity associated with Silver Fox.
Potential Impact
Malware deployment: Multiple payloads can be delivered through reusable staging infrastructure.
Credential and browser-data exposure: LegionLoader may collect sensitive browser information and encryption-key material.
Follow-on compromise: Loaders can enable additional payloads, depending on commands received from the operator.
Persistence: Related ClickFix chains have used registry Run entries and scheduled tasks to maintain execution.
Detection evasion: Obfuscated PowerShell, DLL sideloading, encrypted archives, decimal IP notation, and binary padding can complicate detection and analysis.
Operational disruption: A successful infection may require endpoint isolation, forensic investigation, credential protection, and recovery.
Recommendations
Immediate Actions
Search endpoint, DNS, proxy, and firewall telemetry for the listed indicators.
Investigate PowerShell commands containing URLs, obfuscated content, decimal IP addresses, or hidden and execution-policy-bypass arguments.
Hunt for PowerShell launching
msiexec.exeagainst an MSI downloaded into%TEMP%, particularly with silent-installation options.Inspect suspicious DLL loads from user-writable application directories, including the documented Stardock-related path.
Look for archive extraction using
7zr.exe, nested password-protected archives, and unusually large executable files.Investigate HTTP POST requests with a form-urlencoded content type whose body consists of a single Base64-encoded value.
Review suspicious non-browser processes accessing Chrome Local State or browser encryption-key data.
If compromise is confirmed, isolate the endpoint, preserve relevant evidence, investigate persistence, and assess possible credential or browser-data exposure.
Preventive Actions
Use EDR detections that correlate command execution, downloads, MSI installation, DLL loading, and network connections.
Enable appropriate PowerShell logging and centralize endpoint telemetry.
Apply application control and least-privilege restrictions to reduce unauthorized script and installer execution.
Monitor executable-to-DLL relationships and validate software packages from trusted sources.
Ensure malware scanning and sandboxing can handle unusually large files and nested encrypted archives.
Train users not to paste commands into PowerShell or the Windows Run dialog when instructed by an untrusted website.
Keep endpoint security products and operating systems updated.
Maintain threat-intelligence records that distinguish confirmed indicators from related but unconfirmed infrastructure.
Revalidate indicators before blocking or attributing them, especially where a report states that a host was not individually analyzed.
Conclusion
ROMULUS demonstrates how reusable delivery infrastructure can distribute different malware through ClickFix-based infection chains. Forescout documented a Stardock-based DLL-sideloading route and a separate LegionLoader route involving encrypted archives and an artificially oversized executable.
The linked Huntress and AhnLab investigations provide valuable context about related social-engineering and malware-delivery techniques. However, those reports describe distinct observations, and the available evidence does not justify treating every indicator or campaign as part of one operator's activity.
For defenders, the most useful approach is to combine IOC matching with behavioral hunting for suspicious PowerShell execution, silent MSI installation, DLL sideloading, unusual archive extraction, and encoded command-and-control traffic.
