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ShinyHunters Renew Oracle PeopleSoft Attacks Using CVE-2026-35273 WAF Bypass

Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant have reported renewed mass exploitation of CVE-2026-35273 targeting Oracle PeopleSoft environments. The ShinyHunters-associated group UNC6240 adapted its exploit to bypass path-based web application firewall rules using URL-encoded requests. Reported activity includes web shell deployment, fileless command execution, SIDEEYE backdoor installation, and tunneling for potential internal access and data theft. Organizations running PeopleSoft should apply Oracle's security update, restrict the Environment Management Hub, and investigate web, endpoint, and network telemetry for signs of compromise.

Written by ThreatBeaconX Research Team·Published Oct 28, 2026

Executive Summary

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant have identified renewed mass exploitation of CVE-2026-35273 in Oracle PeopleSoft environments by UNC6240, a threat actor associated with ShinyHunters.

Initially exploited as a zero-day in May and June 2026, the vulnerability became the subject of renewed activity after Oracle released a security alert. In the later campaign, the attackers modified their requests to bypass web application firewall (WAF) rules that relied on literal URL-path matching.

Reported intrusions involved exploitation of PeopleSoft's Environment Management Hub, web shell deployment, fileless command execution, and installation of additional tools, including the SIDEEYE backdoor and Neo-reGeorg tunneling components. Organizations across higher education, technology, healthcare, government, transportation, and other sectors were reportedly targeted.

The campaign demonstrates that WAF rules alone are insufficient when the underlying application remains vulnerable. Organizations should apply Oracle's security update, reduce external exposure of the Environment Management Hub, and investigate systems for unauthorized files, processes, credentials access, and outbound communications.

Description

CVE-2026-35273 affects Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools, specifically functionality associated with the Updates Environment Management component.

Oracle's June 10, 2026 security alert describes the vulnerability as remotely exploitable without authentication and potentially capable of enabling remote code execution. Oracle identifies PeopleTools versions 8.61 and 8.62 as affected in the advisory.

The renewed campaign demonstrates how attackers adapted their exploitation technique to circumvent existing perimeter defenses. According to Mandiant, the attackers used URL encoding to access the vulnerable endpoint while evading WAF rules that matched only the literal /PSEMHUB/ path.

The campaign progressed beyond vulnerability testing to web shell installation, command execution, remote management tooling, and potential data theft. Organizations that implemented WAF rules without applying Oracle's security update may therefore remain exposed.

Technical Details

  • CVE ID: CVE-2026-35273

  • Vendor: Oracle

  • Affected Product: Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools

  • Affected Versions: 8.61 and 8.62, as listed in Oracle's advisory

  • CVSS Score: 9.8 (Oracle's published score)

  • Vulnerability Category: Remote code execution and related exploitation paths

  • Attack Vector: Network

  • Authentication Required: No, according to Oracle's advisory

  • Threat Actor: UNC6240, associated with ShinyHunters

  • Exploitation Status: Active exploitation reported by Google/Mandiant

Vulnerability Analysis

The reported exploitation involves PeopleSoft's Environment Management Hub (EMHub), including the PSEMHUB application and vulnerable servlet functionality.

The Zero Day Initiative's analysis describes multiple related issues within PeopleSoft components, including server-side request forgery (SSRF) and deserialization-related remote code execution. Oracle addressed the reported exposure under CVE-2026-35273. ZDI notes that multiple distinct vulnerabilities were reported and that coordination was underway to assign separate CVEs.

The attack path can allow requests to reach internal or vulnerable PeopleSoft functionality and may ultimately result in code execution under the application service account. The consequences depend on the exploited component, server configuration, and privileges available to the compromised process.

WAF Bypass Technique

Mandiant observed requests using the encoded path:

/%50SEMHUB/

The character %50 represents the letter P. A WAF or reverse proxy that checks the literal request path before URL decoding may not recognize this path as /PSEMHUB/. The PeopleSoft application server subsequently decodes the path and routes the request to the vulnerable endpoint.

This technique can defeat path-based rules that were intended to block direct access to the vulnerable service.

Key takeaway: Blocking the literal /PSEMHUB/ path is not a substitute for patching. Defenders should normalize and inspect request paths and follow Oracle's mitigation guidance.

Attack Lifecycle

1. Target Discovery and Validation

The attackers sent repeated POST requests to /%50SEMHUB/hub, including serialized Java objects, to determine whether targeted systems were vulnerable.

Mandiant reported that some validation activity occurred without immediately writing files to disk. Consequently, an initial exploit-related request may be present even when no obvious web shell is discovered.

2. Exploitation and Initial Access

The attackers used the vulnerable PeopleSoft functionality to execute commands or deploy web shells. The observed methods included:

  • Deploying JSP web shells in the PSEMHUB application directory.

  • Executing commands through HTTP requests without necessarily creating a persistent file.

  • Repeating requests to ensure web shells reached application nodes behind load balancers.

3. Persistence and Payload Deployment

The campaign included the deployment of JSP-based components and a Windows executable named Ple64.exe, identified as a trojanized installer delivering the SIDEEYE backdoor.

Mandiant also observed Neo-reGeorg tunneling components, including tunnel.jsp and tunnel.jspx, which can route traffic through HTTP connections.

On Linux systems, the attackers reportedly deployed MeshAgent, a legitimate remote management agent, to maintain access.

4. Post-Exploitation Activity

Reported activity included host and user discovery, process verification, access to application configuration files, and use of remote access and tunneling tools.

PeopleSoft application servers may contain database connection strings, Integration Broker credentials, and other sensitive configuration data. Access to these resources could enable further compromise and facilitate data theft or extortion.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were published in Google Cloud/Mandiant's reporting. Validate them against your environment and current threat intelligence before blocking or taking containment action.

Network Indicators

IndicatorTypeReported context
5.199.162.157IPv4Attack controller, scanner, and HTTP callback receiver
104.219.234.138IPv4Exfiltration staging and remote management host
162.219.30.165IPv4SIDEEYE backdoor command-and-control
winmanage-me.networkDomainStaging and MeshCentral-related infrastructure

File Indicators

File nameSHA-256Description
x.jsp48b4a0827da7bbfce9fb52464f8a659dea7a035189c52c506c0bfb4b1c3fe494Primary execution web shell
u.jsp2bee941fb40519d0d1ec52bd79a8f63fc65aac6455c8f2d6b668e3360dfdb5d7Execution stager servlet
tunnel.jsp419c571ee38b7e7266d130c4b6bbc4dd0ef44d6e5f3bc02cc2cf73b762f07c86Neo-reGeorg JSP tunnel
tunnel.jspxba14419beb2ec0bb94cab6298c14d7fb3e1d819366fe378290c0c2a4d97f7e07Neo-reGeorg JSPX tunnel
Ple64.exe3ba215692665513abfffd4e815c5c45f2d41e5dcc4283a2a3b740930c5c417c3Trojanized installer delivering SIDEEYE

IOC limitations: Mandiant notes that the x.jsp hash may vary because of additional newline characters, and tunnel hashes may vary depending on the key used. Do not rely on exact hashes alone to identify every variant.

Host and URI Indicators

Review the following locations and request patterns:

  • <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/x.jsp

  • <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/u.jsp

  • <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/Ple64.exe

  • <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/tunnel.jsp

  • <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/tunnel.jspx

  • Requests to /%50SEMHUB/hub and other URL-encoded or mixed-case variants of the PSEMHUB path.

These paths and filenames are hunting leads; their presence should be investigated in context and compared with the expected contents of the installed product.

Potential Impact

Successful exploitation may result in:

  • Remote code execution: Unauthorized execution of commands in the context of the PeopleSoft service account or a more privileged account.

  • Web shell persistence: Continued access through malicious JSP files deployed to application directories.

  • Credential exposure: Access to database credentials, application configuration files, and other secrets readable by the service account.

  • Lateral movement: Tunneling and remote management tools may enable access to additional internal systems.

  • Data theft and extortion: Access to business, student, employee, or other sensitive records may facilitate data exfiltration and extortion.

  • Business disruption: Unauthorized changes, loss of system integrity, and the need to isolate or rebuild compromised PeopleSoft infrastructure.

Recommendations

  1. Apply Oracle's security update: Follow the official CVE-2026-35273 advisory and install the applicable patch for the deployed PeopleTools version.

  2. Reduce EMHub exposure: Disable the Environment Management Hub in multi-server configurations where appropriate, or remove the PSEMHUB application in single-server configurations, following Oracle's guidance.

  3. Do not rely solely on WAF rules: Review URL normalization and encoded-path handling. Restrict external access to administrative and system-to-system endpoints.

  4. Inspect application directories: Examine PSEMHUB and related application directories for unexpected JSP, JSPX, EXE files, and unauthorized modifications.

  5. Review WebLogic process activity: Investigate unexpected cmd.exe, /bin/sh, or bash processes spawned by the WebLogic Java process, including cases where no web shell file is found.

  6. Hunt for the published IOCs: Search network, DNS, proxy, firewall, and endpoint telemetry for the listed IP addresses, domain, file hashes, and encoded request paths.

  7. Check all application nodes: In load-balanced deployments, inspect every relevant WebLogic node because web shells may have been deployed across multiple servers.

  8. Rotate exposed credentials: If compromise is confirmed or strongly suspected, rotate credentials accessible from the PeopleSoft tier, including database connection strings, Integration Broker credentials, and reachable cloud credentials.

  9. Investigate potential data theft: Review database audit logs, unusual archive creation, outbound transfers, and suspicious use of tools such as tar, zstd, rsync, sshpass, and curl.

  10. Preserve evidence and contain compromised systems: If malicious web shells or backdoor activity are discovered, preserve logs and forensic evidence, isolate affected systems as appropriate, and follow the organization's incident response process.

Conclusion

The renewed exploitation of CVE-2026-35273 by UNC6240 demonstrates how threat actors can adapt published exploits to bypass perimeter defenses and compromise exposed enterprise applications.

The reported deployment of web shells, SIDEEYE, tunneling tools, and remote management agents indicates that exploitation may progress beyond initial access to persistence, credential access, and potential data theft.

Organizations using Oracle PeopleSoft should prioritize Oracle's security update, restrict access to the Environment Management Hub, and investigate application, endpoint, and network telemetry for evidence of compromise. WAF protections should be treated as an additional defensive layer rather than a replacement for remediation.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1190T1505.003T1059.003T1059.004T1027T1082T1552.001T1090T1219T1048 Copy MITRE tags