Description
Storm-2603 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft as a distinct group. The group has previously been associated with ransomware activity following the exploitation of vulnerabilities in internet-facing, on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers.
In its November 2026 investigation, Kaspersky examined an intrusion in which the attackers exploited the ToolShell vulnerability chain to compromise a SharePoint environment and establish a memory-resident webshell.
The implant operated within the legitimate IIS worker process, w3wp.exe, rather than relying on a conventional malicious ASPX file stored on the server.
This technique allowed the attackers to maintain their command-and-control functionality inside the ASP.NET application runtime. The implant remained active for the lifetime of the affected application domain and was removed from memory when the application pool was recycled or IIS was restarted.
The attackers subsequently expanded their access through additional tools, remote-management utilities, network tunnels, and privilege-escalation mechanisms.
Kaspersky attributed the activity to Storm-2603 with moderate confidence, based on similarities with the group's previously documented SharePoint exploitation, Velociraptor deployment, EDR-killing attempts, and Warlock ransomware activity.
Technical Description
1. Initial Access – Microsoft SharePoint ToolShell Vulnerabilities
The intrusion involved two Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities:
CVE-2025-53770
CVE-2025-53771
These vulnerabilities were associated with the ToolShell exploitation chain affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint infrastructure.
The attackers targeted the SharePoint ToolPane administrative endpoint using crafted HTTP requests. The exploitation chain enabled remote code execution through the ASP.NET application environment.
Successful exploitation allowed the attackers to execute malicious code within the IIS worker process, w3wp.exe.
2. Fileless Webshell Injection
The attackers injected a modular C# implant directly into the ASP.NET runtime.
Unlike a traditional webshell, which is stored as a file on the compromised server, this implant operated in memory.
Its primary component, G.cs, controlled the implant's execution lifecycle, request interception, and command-and-control functionality.
The implant used ASP.NET's VirtualPathProvider mechanism to manipulate virtual resource handling and maintain its functionality without requiring a conventional malicious file.
3. Custom Command-and-Control Communication
The implant implemented a custom binary communication protocol with XOR-based obfuscation.
It inspected incoming HTTP requests for a specific User-Agent value. Requests matching the attacker's expected pattern triggered the malicious functionality, while unrelated requests were processed without activating the implant.
The implant could also establish bidirectional TCP tunnels through the compromised SharePoint server, allowing communication with internal network systems.
4. Post-Exploitation Framework
After establishing access, the attackers deployed Velociraptor version 0.73.4.0, an open-source digital forensics and incident response platform.
In this incident, Velociraptor was abused as a post-compromise execution framework to support:
System discovery.
Command execution.
Data collection.
Persistence.
Additional payload deployment.
Network access and tunneling.
The deployed version was associated with CVE-2025-6264.
5. Defense Evasion and Ransomware Activity
The attackers uploaded a vulnerable driver identified as rsndispot.sys, which can be abused to terminate endpoint detection and response solutions.
They also used a malicious DLL associated with Warlock ransomware's antivirus-killing functionality in a DLL side-loading attack.
The attackers subsequently attempted to execute Warlock ransomware. Kaspersky Endpoint Security blocked the ransomware process, preventing the observed execution attempt from succeeding.
Attack Overview
Kaspersky reconstructed the intrusion as a sequence of reconnaissance, exploitation, memory-resident execution, post-compromise activity, and attempted ransomware deployment.
Stage 1 – Vulnerability Fingerprinting (December 20, 2025)
The first observed interaction was an HTTP request targeting the SharePoint ToolPane administrative endpoint.
The request was associated with infrastructure used by ONYPHE, an internet-scale attack-surface discovery and vulnerability-validation platform.
The purpose was to determine whether the exposed SharePoint system was vulnerable to CVE-2025-53770.
Approximately 12 minutes later, another connection originated from infrastructure associated with Pfcloud UG. Researchers considered this possible follow-on reconnaissance, but did not establish that exploitation occurred during this connection.
Stage 2 – Tactical Latency (December 21–23, 2025)
A three-day period of inactivity followed the initial probe.
This gap initially made it difficult for investigators to correlate the first vulnerability-validation request with the subsequent exploitation activity.
The delay demonstrates why security teams should retain and correlate low-priority reconnaissance events instead of treating them as isolated scanning activity.
Stage 3 – Active Exploitation (December 24, 2025)
The attacker returned to the same SharePoint server and sent a crafted request from:
45.91.94[.]204
The request triggered the ToolShell exploitation chain and resulted in webshell execution inside w3wp.exe.
The payload was loaded directly into the ASP.NET runtime instead of being written to disk.
Stage 4 – Fileless Persistence and Command-and-Control
The implant registered a custom VirtualPathProvider and modified ASP.NET runtime behavior.
It intercepted HTTP requests using a specific User-Agent condition and exchanged data through an obfuscated binary protocol.
The attacker could establish bidirectional TCP tunnels, using the compromised SharePoint server as a proxy to communicate with internal systems.
Stage 5 – Privilege Escalation and System Discovery
The implant included modules for collecting information about:
Logged-on users and their sessions.
Running processes and executable paths.
Network interfaces and active connections.
Local and remote IP addresses and ports.
It also contained functionality based on EfsPotato-style named-pipe impersonation to attempt SYSTEM-level privilege escalation.
Additionally, the attackers implemented administrative-account creation through the native Windows Security Account Manager RPC subsystem.
Stage 6 – Deployment of Velociraptor and Remote-Access Tools
The compromised IIS worker process launched msiexec.exe to install a Velociraptor MSI package hosted on Supabase cloud storage.
The attackers then deployed multiple independent remote-access and tunneling mechanisms, including:
Zoho Assist Unattended Support.
Visual Studio Code CLI tunneling.
Cloudflare Tunnel.
A lightweight reverse-proxy utility.
These mechanisms provided alternative access paths that no longer depended exclusively on the original SharePoint webshell.
Stage 7 – Endpoint Security Termination Attempt
The attackers uploaded a vulnerable driver:
C:\ProgramData\rsndispot.sys
A malicious DLL associated with Warlock ransomware's antivirus-killing functionality was also identified.
These activities indicated an attempt to weaken endpoint protection before executing further malicious payloads.
Stage 8 – Warlock Ransomware Deployment Attempt
The attackers attempted to launch Warlock ransomware against the compromised environment.
However, Kaspersky Endpoint Security's Proactive Defense Module blocked the ransomware process.
The investigation therefore documents an attempted ransomware deployment, not a confirmed successful encryption event.
Technical Analysis
1. Abuse of the IIS Worker Process – w3wp.exe
The most important technical finding is the abuse of the IIS worker process as an in-memory execution and communication platform.
IIS uses w3wp.exe to process web requests and execute applications.
Because it is a legitimate Windows process, its presence alone is not suspicious. However, attackers can abuse it to execute malicious code within the application's trust boundary.
In this incident, the webshell was injected into the ASP.NET runtime and used to intercept incoming requests, process attacker-controlled data, and establish network tunnels.
Why this matters: File-based antivirus scanning may not identify a memory-resident implant that has no conventional webshell file on disk.
2. Modular Webshell Architecture
Kaspersky identified multiple components in the malicious C# implant.
| Component | Function |
|---|---|
G.cs | Main controller, runtime integration, request interception and C2 |
Prog.cs | Execution entry point and task dispatcher |
London.cs | Command orchestration and privilege-escalation functionality |
FileDownloader.cs | Downloads additional files from attacker-controlled URLs |
LoggedOnUsers.cs | Enumerates logged-on users and sessions |
ProcessList.cs | Collects running process information |
NetworkInfo.cs | Collects network connections and interface information |
MSI.cs | Installs and executes downloaded MSI packages |
User.cs | Creates administrative accounts using native SAM RPC functionality |
SAMRPCNative | Provides native Windows Security Account Manager RPC operations |
The modular design allowed the attacker to invoke different capabilities independently.
3. VirtualPathProvider-Based Runtime Manipulation
The primary implant registered a custom ASP.NET VirtualPathProvider.
A VirtualPathProvider allows an ASP.NET application to resolve virtual resources without requiring those resources to exist as conventional physical files.
The implant used reflection to manipulate application compilation behavior and registered its custom provider within the application's runtime.
It also used GetCacheKey() as an interception point for incoming requests.
This allowed malicious functionality to operate within the application without depending on an ordinary webshell file.
4. Custom Command-and-Control and Network Pivoting
The implant implemented a custom binary protocol with XOR-based obfuscation.
It inspected incoming HTTP headers for a specific User-Agent value and processed matching requests as attacker-controlled commands.
The implant also established full-duplex TCP tunnels, allowing the attacker to communicate with internal network hosts through the compromised SharePoint server.
Kaspersky identified the use of the suo5 traffic-proxying tool.
This transformed the compromised server into a potential network pivot point for additional activity.
5. Privilege Escalation Through EFSRPC
The implant contained functionality based on EfsPotato-style token impersonation.
The technique abused the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) and named-pipe impersonation to attempt to obtain a SYSTEM-level security token.
The observed functionality depended on the IIS worker process having the necessary SeImpersonatePrivilege.
Successful privilege escalation could provide the attacker with administrative control beyond the original application-level access.
6. Velociraptor Abuse
Velociraptor is a legitimate open-source digital forensics and incident response platform.
In this incident, attackers abused it as a post-compromise execution framework.
The deployed version was 0.73.4.0, associated by Kaspersky with CVE-2025-6264.
The framework supported system discovery, command execution, data collection, persistence, and additional payload deployment.
This demonstrates how legitimate security and administration tools can become dual-use resources when operated by unauthorized actors.
7. Multiple Remote-Access Mechanisms
The attackers deployed several independent remote-access and tunneling tools.
These included Zoho Assist, VS Code CLI tunneling, Cloudflare Tunnel, and a reverse-proxy utility.
Using multiple communication paths can make incident response more difficult because removing one malicious tool may not eliminate the attacker's access.
8. EDR Evasion and Ransomware Attempt
The investigation identified a vulnerable driver and a malicious DLL associated with Warlock ransomware's antivirus-killing functionality.
The attackers attempted to weaken endpoint protection before launching ransomware.
Kaspersky Endpoint Security blocked the observed ransomware process, preventing successful execution in the investigated environment.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The following indicators were published by Kaspersky. They are provided for defensive threat hunting and should be validated against current threat-intelligence sources before automated blocking.
Network Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
45.91.94[.]204 | Safing Privacy Network node used during exploitation |
49.51.132[.]100 | Safing Privacy Network node |
91.224.92[.]121 | Bulletproof-hosted C2 server |
204.76.203[.]219 | Bulletproof-hosted C2 server |
199.232.210[.]172 | C2 traffic relay |
hxxps://vdfccjpnedujhrzscjtq[.]supabase[.]co/storage/v1/object/public/image/v4[.]msi | Velociraptor package download URL |
hxxps://auth[.]qgtxtebl[.]workers[.]dev/ | Velociraptor server URL |
hxxps://github[.]com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/latest/download/cloudflared-windows-amd64[.]msi | Abused legitimate tunneling-tool download URL |
hxxps://files[.]catbox[.]moe/8f7vex[.]msi | Abused Zoho Assist download URL |
File Hashes
| Hash | Description |
|---|---|
0xFD91321BF7FF7245DDA9B7B5D791ACE8 | vskp2 webshell implant |
0x3A55D8F8F29716C694671834D8C6CB29 | Velociraptor executable |
0x991EC6E04413F2D4D29341C17A8A54D5 | Abused legitimate VS Code |
0x3D553B9061C03F891CE97D7D2E64DDEE | VS Code Insiders used for tunneling |
0x2C32E44A013CBFC5A323EFB7694701D2 | Abused tunneling-tool executable |
0x112A86ECA3CB5A0B5E20AB744CC5AF93 | 7z.exe renamed for DLL side-loading |
0xA930F81E3FB0A226EC5904D9043A17B8 | Zoho Meeting unattended agent archive |
0x054a32d6033b1744dca7f49b2e466ea2 | Vulnerable driver |
Host and Runtime Artifacts
w3wp.exe– IIS worker process hosting the in-memory implant.App_Web_toolpane.aspx*– Dynamically compiled ASP.NET assembly associated with ToolPane processing.Microsoft.GeneratedCode– Generated helper assembly that may appear during serialization workflows.ObjectDataProvider– Type associated with dangerous deserialization object graphs.ExpandedWrapper– Object structure relevant to the observed deserialization detection.LosFormatter– Serialization/deserialization mechanism associated with the vulnerable application path.C:\ProgramData\rsndispot.sys– Vulnerable driver associated with the EDR termination attempt.
IOC handling note: Some of these artifacts and tools can occur in legitimate environments. Investigators should correlate them with suspicious ToolPane requests, assembly-loading activity, runtime modifications, unexpected network connections, and endpoint behavior rather than treating each indicator as standalone proof of compromise.
Detection and Threat Hunting
The investigation provides several valuable detection opportunities for SOC analysts and incident responders.
1. Monitor Suspicious ToolPane Requests
Review requests targeting SharePoint's ToolPane administrative endpoint.
Correlate suspicious requests with:
Unexpected ASP.NET compilation.
App_Web_toolpane.aspxassembly loading.Microsoft.GeneratedCodeappearing in the same application domain.Deserialization-related type names and generated helper assemblies.
2. Investigate IIS Worker Process Behavior
Monitor w3wp.exe for activity inconsistent with normal SharePoint operations.
Investigate:
Unexpected outbound network connections.
Unexpected child processes, particularly
msiexec.exe.Connections to internal systems not normally accessed by SharePoint.
Unusual memory and runtime behavior.
Suspicious remote-management software installation.
3. Detect Dangerous Deserialization
Kaspersky recommends monitoring Common Language Runtime (CLR) assembly-loader events and inspecting memory and metadata for suspicious deserialization artifacts.
Relevant indicators include:
Microsoft.GeneratedCodeApp_Web_toolpane.aspx*ObjectDataProviderExpandedWrapperLosFormatter
These indicators should be correlated with the suspicious request and runtime context. Their presence in isolation is not conclusive.
4. Detect VirtualPathProvider-Based Runtime Implants
Monitor unexpected VirtualPathProvider registration and inconsistencies between IIS virtual-resource mappings and the actual filesystem.
Kaspersky identifies the Microsoft-Windows-IIS-Configuration ETW provider as an important telemetry source.
| ETW Event ID | Detection relevance |
|---|---|
| 25 | Records ConfigPath to PhysicalPath mapping |
| 47 | Records configuration-path-to-directory mapping |
| 17, 18, 19, 21 | Associated with normal disk-backed file-change monitoring |
A suspicious condition occurs when IIS resolves a virtual resource to a physical path, but the corresponding file does not exist on disk and the expected file-change monitoring chain is absent.
5. Monitor Privilege Escalation
Investigate suspicious named-pipe activity, token impersonation, and unexpected SYSTEM-level process creation originating from IIS worker processes.
6. Investigate Unauthorized Remote-Access Tools
Monitor for unexpected installation or execution of:
Velociraptor.
Zoho Assist Unattended Support.
VS Code CLI tunneling.
Cloudflare Tunnel.
Reverse-proxy utilities.
Validate these tools against approved software inventories and administrative deployment records.
7. Monitor EDR Tampering
Investigate suspicious driver installation, security-product termination attempts, unexpected DLL side-loading, and abnormal endpoint protection behavior.
Potential Impact
Successful exploitation of vulnerable SharePoint infrastructure can create several security risks.
1. Remote Code Execution: Attackers may execute malicious code within the compromised SharePoint application environment.
2. Stealthy In-Memory Persistence: A memory-resident webshell can operate without a conventional malicious file, complicating filesystem-based detection.
3. Internal Network Access: Bidirectional tunneling can allow attackers to reach internal systems through the compromised SharePoint server.
4. Privilege Escalation: Token impersonation may provide SYSTEM-level access, enabling more extensive control over the compromised host.
5. Unauthorized Administrative Accounts: Malicious account creation can provide additional access and persistence.
6. Endpoint Security Disruption: Vulnerable-driver abuse and malicious DLL side-loading can weaken endpoint protection.
7. Ransomware Risk: The attempted Warlock deployment demonstrates how an application-level compromise can progress toward destructive activity. In the investigated incident, the ransomware process was blocked.
8. Business Disruption: A compromised SharePoint server can expose organizational information, affect business operations, and increase incident-response and recovery costs.
Recommendations
Immediate Actions
Patch Microsoft SharePoint: Apply the latest applicable security updates addressing CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771. Verify remediation against Microsoft's official guidance.
Investigate IIS worker processes: Examine
w3wp.exefor suspicious memory activity, unexpected child processes, outbound connections, and unusual runtime behavior.Review ToolPane activity: Investigate suspicious requests and correlate them with CLR assembly-loading and deserialization events.
Hunt for in-memory implants: Do not rely exclusively on filesystem scanning. Preserve memory evidence and inspect ASP.NET runtime behavior and VirtualPathProvider registrations.
Rotate exposed credentials and MachineKeys: Following confirmed exploitation, rotate SharePoint MachineKeys and potentially exposed credentials as part of a coordinated recovery process.
Review administrative accounts: Identify unexpected local or domain accounts, newly granted privileges, and suspicious account-creation activity.
Inspect remote-access mechanisms: Investigate unauthorized Velociraptor, Zoho Assist, VS Code tunneling, Cloudflare Tunnel, and reverse-proxy deployments.
Investigate EDR tampering: Examine vulnerable driver installation, security-product termination attempts, and suspicious DLL side-loading.
Preserve forensic evidence: Collect IIS logs, Windows event logs, ETW telemetry, endpoint alerts, network records, and memory evidence before disruptive remediation wherever operationally feasible.
Conduct full incident response: If exploitation is confirmed, isolate affected hosts, investigate lateral movement, identify persistence mechanisms, and validate the environment before restoring production services.
Preventive Measures
SharePoint and Application Security
Keep on-premises SharePoint infrastructure fully patched.
Minimize internet exposure of administrative endpoints.
Restrict access to SharePoint management interfaces.
Review application permissions and configuration changes.
Monitor unusual ASP.NET runtime behavior and deserialization activity.
Endpoint and Server Security
Deploy EDR with behavioral monitoring and memory inspection capabilities.
Enable protection against vulnerable-driver abuse.
Monitor suspicious child processes launched by IIS worker processes.
Restrict unauthorized driver installation.
Centralize logging for Windows, IIS, and endpoint activity.
Network Security
Restrict outbound connections from SharePoint servers to approved destinations.
Segment SharePoint infrastructure from sensitive internal systems.
Monitor unusual TCP tunnels and proxy traffic.
Alert on unexpected communication with remote-access and tunneling services.
Identity and Access Management
Apply least-privilege permissions to application pools and service accounts.
Monitor administrative account creation and privilege changes.
Protect privileged credentials and rotate potentially exposed secrets.
Investigate suspicious token impersonation and SYSTEM-level process creation.
Incident Response Readiness
Maintain a documented SharePoint compromise response procedure.
Include memory forensics and runtime inspection in server investigations.
Correlate reconnaissance events with later exploitation activity.
Conduct threat hunting after remediation.
Validate that unauthorized remote-access tools and persistence mechanisms have been removed.
Conclusion
The Storm-2603 intrusion demonstrates why traditional file-based malware detection is no longer sufficient to defend critical web infrastructure.
By exploiting Microsoft SharePoint ToolShell vulnerabilities, the attackers established a fileless webshell directly inside the IIS worker process. The implant used runtime manipulation, custom command-and-control communication, and bidirectional network tunneling to maintain access and reach internal systems.
The subsequent deployment of Velociraptor, use of additional remote-access mechanisms, privilege-escalation capabilities, and attempts to disable endpoint protection illustrate how quickly an application-level compromise can develop into a broader infrastructure incident.
Although the attempted Warlock ransomware execution was blocked, the investigation shows the importance of identifying the complete attack chain rather than focusing only on the initial vulnerability.
For defenders, the central lesson is clear: a clean filesystem does not necessarily mean a clean server. Effective detection must include memory analysis, IIS runtime monitoring, application telemetry, identity activity, and network behavior.
Organizations operating on-premises SharePoint should prioritize patching, monitor unexpected activity from w3wp.exe, preserve forensic evidence, and conduct comprehensive threat hunting whenever exploitation is suspected.
