1. Description
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) depend on interconnected telecommunications infrastructure to provide international roaming, voice calls, SMS messaging, and mobile data services.
These services require operators to exchange signalling information through protocols such as:
SS7: Primarily associated with 2G and 3G networks.
Diameter: Used in 4G LTE networks for authentication, authorization, and mobility management.
GTP: Used to establish and transport mobile data sessions.
HTTP/2-based protocols: Used in 5G service-based network architectures.
These interconnected environments are essential for global mobile communication. However, the trust relationships between operators and their interconnection providers also create opportunities for sophisticated threat actors.
Enea's research highlights how attackers can compromise mobile network infrastructure and abuse signalling protocols to conduct surveillance against subscribers and other interconnected operators.
The investigation focuses on two distinct threat activities:
LIMINAL PANDA: A threat actor using GTPDoor and additional telecom-focused tools to establish covert communication channels, explore compromised environments, and retrieve information.
SilentAir: A newly identified threat actor abusing SS7 and Diameter signalling operations to track subscribers, collect information, and intercept communications.
Although similarities were identified in their operational activities, their relationship remains unconfirmed.
2. Technical Description
To understand these attacks, it is important to examine the telecommunications protocols and infrastructure involved.
A. SS7 – Signalling System No. 7
SS7 is a signalling protocol suite traditionally used in 2G and 3G mobile networks.
It supports operations such as:
Call establishment and routing.
SMS delivery.
Subscriber mobility management.
International roaming.
Weaknesses in signalling security can allow attackers with access to the relevant network infrastructure to manipulate subscriber-related operations, track locations, and potentially intercept communications.
B. Diameter
Diameter is a signalling protocol used in LTE and 4G networks.
It supports authentication, authorization, accounting, and subscriber mobility-related operations.
Improperly validated or malicious Diameter requests can expose subscriber information and create opportunities for unauthorized signalling operations.
C. GTP – GPRS Tunnelling Protocol
GTP is used to support mobile data communication between network elements.
It consists of two important components:
Component | Function |
|---|---|
GTP-C | Control-plane communication used to establish and manage data sessions |
GTP-U | User-plane communication used to transport user data |
Enea observed LIMINAL PANDA using GTP-C for covert command-and-control communications. A newer GTPDoor version was subsequently identified using GTP-U.
D. IPX – IP Packet Exchange
IPX provides interconnection between mobile network operators and supports multiple signalling and communication technologies.
It evolved from the earlier GPRS Roaming Exchange (GRX) infrastructure.
Because IPX connects mobile operators, roaming hubs, signalling providers, and other intermediaries, compromising one connected environment can create opportunities to target other interconnected networks.
Enea emphasizes that IPX connections should not automatically be considered trusted.
3. Attack Overview
The investigation describes two different but potentially related attack activities.
A. LIMINAL PANDA – GTPDoor-Based Network Compromise
Enea detected ongoing LIMINAL PANDA activity during 2026 across multiple mobile network operators.
The investigation identified GTPDoor, a Unix-based remote-access implant designed to use GTP signalling for covert command-and-control communication.
The observed activity involved:
Compromise of mobile network infrastructure.
Establishment of covert communication through GTP interfaces.
Use of GTPDoor to relay commands and communicate with compromised systems.
Network discovery and lateral movement using additional tools.
Retrieval and transfer of information through covert communication channels.
Termination of communication tunnels and malware processes after information retrieval.
Enea observed hundreds of attempted covert communications and evidence pointing to 5–10 infected mobile operators, with potentially dozens more affected.
B. SilentAir – Malicious Signalling and Subscriber Interception
SilentAir represents a different approach to telecom network compromise.
Enea identified malicious signalling activity associated with compromised network nodes across at least six Asian countries.
The primary target observed was Taiwan, although subscribers in more than a dozen additional countries and territories were also targeted.
Its observed activities included:
Subscriber location tracking.
Collection of subscriber-related information.
Manipulation of subscriber location updates.
Interception of incoming SMS messages.
Interception of voice calls.
Attempts to obtain two-factor authentication codes.
Large-scale use of silent SMS messages.
Enea also observed instances where intercepted two-factor authentication codes were received immediately following communication interception, suggesting possible attempts to access other accounts belonging to targeted subscribers.
4. Technical Analysis
The investigation reveals several important technical developments in telecom-focused cyber espionage.
A. Evolution of GTPDoor
One of the most significant findings was the discovery of a newer GTPDoor variant known as GTPDoor v3, also referred to as GTP-U-Door or GTPDoor(U).
Earlier GTPDoor versions used GTP-C for covert communication. The newer version uses GTP-U.
This development is significant because:
GTP-U carries substantially higher traffic volumes than GTP-C across IPX connections.
Its traffic contains multiple protocol layers, increasing inspection complexity.
Malicious communications may be more difficult to distinguish from legitimate user-plane traffic.
Traditional monitoring focused only on GTP-C may fail to identify relevant malicious activity.
Enea also identified the use of libpcap for packet capture in the newer variant, replacing the raw-socket receive mechanism used in earlier versions.
B. Additional Tools Used by LIMINAL PANDA
Enea identified several tools associated with the group's activities.
Tool | Observed purpose |
|---|---|
GTPDoor | Covert command-and-control communication |
EchoBackdoor | Command execution and lateral movement |
SGSNemu | Communication tunnel establishment or management |
SCTPE / SIGweaver | SS7 and Diameter signalling operations |
SIGTRANslator | Signalling-related operations |
Cordscan | Network discovery and reconnaissance |
These tools demonstrate how telecom-focused attackers can combine malware, signalling manipulation, and network discovery to operate within compromised mobile network environments.
C. SilentAir's Abuse of SS7 and Diameter
SilentAir's activities involved malicious signalling requests designed to manipulate subscriber-related operations.
Enea observed the use of:
SS7
UpdateLocationoperations.Diameter
Update-Location-Requestoperations.Subscriber information harvesting.
Signalling operations supporting communication interception.
These activities can manipulate the network's understanding of a subscriber's current location and potentially redirect communications through compromised network nodes.
D. Silent SMS as a Stealth Technique
One of SilentAir's notable techniques involved the use of silent SMS messages.
Silent SMS messages are designed to reach a mobile device without displaying a normal notification or visible message to the subscriber.
Enea observed two possible operational uses:
During the day: Silent SMS messages were used to test whether earlier subscriber location manipulation operations had successfully enabled SMS interception.
During nighttime: Large volumes of silent SMS activity were observed, particularly targeting Taiwanese subscribers. Enea suggested that this may help verify whether previously manipulated subscriber connections remained active.
Another interesting observation was that some silent SMS messages contained ordinary-looking promotional or motivational text.
Enea believes this may help disguise the messages if an intermediary SMS centre removes the silent-message characteristics and delivers the text visibly to the recipient.
Examples included generic messages about health, happiness, energy, and wellness.
E. Possible Relationship Between LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir
Enea identified several similarities between the activities of the two threat actors:
Shared timing: Some SilentAir activity overlapped with known LIMINAL PANDA infections.
Shared targeting: Some affected mobile operators appeared in both investigations.
Similar capabilities: Certain SilentAir activities resembled capabilities associated with SCTPE, a Linux-based signalling-related tool.
However, Enea could not successfully analyse the hypothetical SilentAir malware binary.
The observed SilentAir behaviour also exceeded some known capabilities of the SCTPE binary, creating uncertainty about a direct relationship.
Therefore, Enea considers a connection possible but does not directly attribute SilentAir to LIMINAL PANDA.
The possibility that different threat actors share access to compromised mobile operators also remains open.
5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Enea published the following MD5 hashes as malware sample references.
Malware sample | MD5 hash |
|---|---|
GTPDoor v3 |
|
SCTPE |
|
IOC notes:
These hashes identify the referenced malware samples.
The hashes should be used as detection references, not as standalone proof of compromise.
6. Potential Impact
The activities described in Enea's investigation create serious risks for mobile network operators, subscribers, and organizations that depend on mobile communications.
Subscriber Privacy Exposure: Unauthorized access to subscriber information and location data.
Communication Interception: Potential interception of voice calls and SMS messages.
Account Compromise: Intercepted authentication codes may support unauthorized access to online accounts.
Telecom Infrastructure Compromise: Attackers may establish persistent access to mobile network environments.
Cross-Operator Attacks: Compromised interconnection infrastructure may provide opportunities to target other operators.
Cyber Espionage: Targeting of political figures, government personnel, and other high-value individuals.
Operational Security Risks: Malicious activity can undermine the confidentiality and integrity of telecommunications signalling systems.
The most significant concern is that compromising one trusted network environment can create opportunities to exploit relationships with other interconnected mobile operators.
7. Recommendations
Immediate Recommendations
Investigate suspicious GTP-C and GTP-U traffic across mobile network interconnections.
Search for the published GTPDoor v3 and SCTPE MD5 hashes in relevant security monitoring systems.
Review SS7 and Diameter signalling logs for unusual location-update requests and unexpected subscriber-information queries.
Investigate suspicious network nodes generating signalling traffic inconsistent with their expected roles.
Monitor unusual SSH activity, covert communication tunnels, and unexpected data transfers.
Coordinate with roaming partners and interconnection providers to investigate suspicious signalling sources.
Preventive Recommendations
Deploy GTP Security Controls: Implement security monitoring and firewalling for both GTP-C and GTP-U interfaces.
Strengthen SS7 and Diameter Security: Validate signalling requests and restrict unauthorized subscriber-related operations.
Treat IPX as an Untrusted Environment: Apply security controls to interconnection traffic instead of relying on implicit trust.
Improve Cross-Protocol Visibility: Correlate GTP, SS7, Diameter, DNS, ICMP, and other relevant network telemetry.
Strengthen Internal Network Monitoring: Monitor signalling activity within mobile network environments, not only at external boundaries.
Integrate Telecom and IT Security: Connect telecom signalling detections with enterprise SOC and incident-response processes.
Secure Administrative Access: Review SSH access, shared credentials, privileged accounts, and access to network infrastructure.
Review Managed Network Security: Ensure outsourced core-network operations provide sufficient visibility, investigation access, and security accountability.
These recommendations reflect Enea's emphasis on coordinated, cross-protocol security rather than isolated signalling protections.
8. Conclusion
The investigation into LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir demonstrates how sophisticated threat actors can exploit trusted mobile network infrastructure to conduct espionage, monitor subscribers, and intercept sensitive communications.
LIMINAL PANDA's evolution of GTPDoor into GTP-U highlights the increasing complexity of detecting malicious activity within telecom data traffic. Meanwhile, SilentAir's abuse of SS7 and Diameter demonstrates how compromised network nodes can manipulate subscriber signalling and intercept communications.
Although a direct connection between the two actors remains unconfirmed, their activities reveal a common security challenge: mobile network interconnections must not be treated as inherently trusted environments.
Telecom operators must strengthen signalling security, improve cross-protocol monitoring, and integrate telecommunications infrastructure protection with broader cybersecurity operations.
The findings reinforce the importance of securing the entire mobile network ecosystem, including interconnection providers, roaming partners, and internally managed network infrastructure.
