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HighThreat Intelligence · 10 min read

Three Phishing Campaigns Hide Malicious Lures in Images, Canvas and SVG QR Codes

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified three phishing campaigns that use graphics-based content to conceal malicious lures from conventional HTML and DOM-based inspection. Tracked between May and October 2026, the campaigns generated 1,740 detections. Rather than placing phishing text and form fields directly into webpage HTML, the campaigns render their lures through uploaded images, HTML5 canvas elements and SVG vector paths. These techniques allow attackers to display convincing account-verification cards, fake financial documents and QR-code login pages while leaving little readable phishing content in the Document Object Model (DOM). The three campaigns recorded: Campaign 1: 1,188 detections involving single-image preview lures. Campaign 2: 361 detections involving HTML5 canvas-rendered PDF and receipt lures. Campaign 3: 191 detections involving SVG-based QR-code lures. The findings demonstrate how phishing operators are adapting webpage construction techniques to make malicious content harder to identify through traditional HTML inspection.

Written by Vedanabhatla Sai Swetha·Published Nov 7, 2026

Description

Phishing campaigns traditionally rely on HTML text, links, input fields and forms to imitate legitimate services. Security products can inspect these elements to identify suspicious content, credential-harvesting forms and malicious redirects.

Unit 42's November 4, 2026 report describes three campaigns that reduce the visibility of phishing content by rendering it as graphics rather than ordinary HTML text.

The campaigns use three different approaches:

  1. Delivering a complete phishing verification card as a remotely hosted image.

  2. Drawing fake financial documents and receipts on HTML5 canvas elements.

  3. Constructing QR codes through SVG vector definitions and coordinate-based rendering.

The common technique is to make the visual content presented to victims different from what conventional DOM inspection reveals. A webpage may appear to contain a detailed financial receipt or login prompt while exposing few or no corresponding text elements in its HTML structure.

Technical Description

The Document Object Model (DOM) represents the structure and content of a webpage. Security inspection tools often examine DOM elements, visible text, form fields, links and scripts to identify phishing behavior.

The campaigns described by Unit 42 manipulate this relationship between webpage appearance and underlying structure.

Graphics-based phishing refers to presenting deceptive content through graphical elements instead of conventional HTML text and form structures.

The three observed implementation methods are:

TechniqueImplementationIntended effect
Uploaded imagePhishing content delivered as a preview imageHides lure text from ordinary DOM inspection
HTML5 canvasJavaScript draws fake documents and receiptsDisplays graphical content without equivalent HTML text
SVG vector pathsQR codes assembled from reusable vector shapesConceals QR-code construction inside SVG definitions and coordinate references

These techniques do not make phishing pages inherently undetectable. Instead, they can reduce the effectiveness of detection approaches that depend heavily on inspecting readable HTML content.

Attack Overview

Unit 42 tracked three campaigns from May through October 2026, recording a combined 1,740 detections.

Campaign 1: Single-Image Preview Lures

<text>Detection count: 1,188</text>

This campaign abuses an online collaboration and drawing-preview platform to display phishing content as a single image.

Victim experience

  1. The victim receives or opens a drawing-preview link.

  2. The preview displays an online retailer's account-verification card.

  3. The card contains a yellow Continue Verification button.

  4. A randomized document title is used to make the page appear legitimate.

  5. The victim is encouraged to interact with the verification prompt.

Technical implementation

Unit 42 examined an 83,214-byte top-frame DOM containing:

  • Zero visible words.

  • Zero input tags.

  • Zero canvas tags.

  • One empty SVG wrapper of approximately 1.4 KB.

Instead of embedding the verification text and interface directly into the webpage, the page retrieves the complete verification card as a 1200 × 630 preview image from a cloud-services-provider URL.

The image is then displayed inside the preview container.

This approach means that the phishing message is visually available to the victim but is not represented as ordinary readable text in the page's HTML markup.

Monthly detections

MonthDetections
May 2026178
June 2026231
July 2026274
August 2026153
September 2026196
October 2026156
Total1,188

July recorded the highest number of detections in this campaign.

Campaign 2: HTML5 Canvas-Painted PDF and Receipt Lures

<text>Detection count: 361</text>

The second campaign uses a fake PDF viewer to display blurred bank-transfer receipts and financial documents.

The pages imitate document-viewing experiences, encouraging victims to interact with what appears to be an encrypted or protected PDF.

Technical implementation

Unit 42 analyzed an 18,666-byte HTML document with the following characteristics:

  • Sets robots metadata to noindex, nofollow, noarchive.

  • Uses no-referrer as the referrer policy.

  • Loads custom PDF.js stylesheets.

  • Dynamically loads JavaScript ES modules named download-dialog.mjs and app.mjs.

  • Uses document.createElement('script') to inject module scripts.

The fake PDF viewer is structured inside:

div#viewer-container > div.document-preview-frame > div#pdf-viewer.pdfViewer

The page renders a blurred interbank wire-transfer receipt onto a 974 × 1260 HTML5 canvas, containing 1,227,240 square pixels.

A second hidden canvas element is also present.

An overlay button is displayed above the rendered document. Unit 42 identified the following buttons:

  • button.preview-eye[data-open-download]

  • button#open-file

Credential-harvesting mechanism

When the victim clicks the preview or open-file button, the page invokes the native HTML5 showModal() function to display a password dialog.

The dialog contains:

  • form#password-form

  • input#pdf-password[type="password"][autocomplete="off"][required]

The victim is asked to enter a password under the pretext of unlocking an encrypted PDF.

The campaign also includes a separate app-download dialog containing an a#download-app link, which can be used to deliver a mobile payload.

This combines document-themed social engineering, password collection and a potential mobile-payload delivery mechanism within a fake PDF-viewing experience.

Monthly detections

MonthDetections
May 202642
June 202637
July 202656
August 202652
September 202686
October 202688
Total361

October recorded the highest monthly detection count for this campaign.

Campaign 3: SVG Coordinate-Grid QR-Code Lures

<text>Detection count: 191</text>

The third campaign uses SVG vector graphics to construct QR codes that imitate the MAX Messenger web-login experience.

Instead of embedding a conventional QR-code image or drawing it on a canvas, the webpage constructs the QR code using SVG definitions, vector paths and coordinate transformations.

Technical implementation

Unit 42 analyzed a 322,322-byte DOM associated with a SvelteKit application.

The page imports JavaScript resources including:

  • /_app/immutable/entry/start.CP8bQY5P.js

  • /_app/immutable/entry/app.BHnh9mMq.js

It also registers /service-worker.js through a Trusted Types policy named sveltekit-trusted-types.

The webpage impersonates the MAX Messenger web-login interface and presents a QR-code sign-in experience.

The examined DOM contains:

  • Zero image tags.

  • Zero canvas tags.

  • Zero input tags.

  • Only 27 visible words.

  • Six SVG elements totaling approximately 315,960 bytes.

Two notable SVG components include:

  • A hidden icon sprite, svg#max-icons-sprite, measuring 251,859 bytes.

  • A QR-code SVG measuring 62,532 bytes.

The QR-code SVG uses a viewBox of 0 0 4059 4059 and is displayed at 220 × 220 pixels.

QR-code construction

The SVG defines 11 modular vector shapes inside its defs section, including:

  • rect#rect-0

  • path#empty-0

  • path#b-0

  • path#r-0

  • path#l-0

  • path#t-0

  • path#lt-0

  • path#lb-0

  • path#rb-0

  • path#rt-0

  • Finder pattern #point-0

The QR matrix is assembled through hundreds of coordinate-based transformations using:

g[transform="translate(X,Y)"] > use[xlink:href="#..."]

These elements are distributed across the 4059 × 4059 coordinate grid. The construction also overlays a center logo through:

clip-path="url(#logo-mask-0)"

This technique allows the QR code to be generated from reusable SVG components instead of a conventional image file.

The resulting visual experience imitates a legitimate MAX Messenger QR login page. QR-code login lures can expose victims to session-hijacking risks if they scan and authorize an attacker-controlled authentication flow.

Monthly detections

MonthDetections
May 202620
June 202654
July 202634
August 202622
September 202629
October 202632
Total191

June recorded the highest monthly detection count for this campaign.

Comparative Campaign Analysis

CampaignGraphics techniquePrimary lureDetections
Campaign 1Hosted preview imageRetailer account verification1,188
Campaign 2HTML5 canvasFake PDF and bank-transfer receipt361
Campaign 3SVG vector pathsMAX Messenger QR-code login191
Total1,740

Campaign 1 accounted for the largest share of detections. Campaign 2 focused on document and financial themes, while Campaign 3 used QR-code-based login deception.

The three campaigns demonstrate different ways of separating the visible phishing interface from conventional webpage text and form structures.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following URLs were listed by Unit 42 as campaign indicators. They are defanged for safe handling.

Campaign 1 — Single-Image Preview Lures

No.Phishing URL
1hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1PkpYjKXZjijUIdTtGzC3gKAGrWM3SjTq89FJ6OZ9ULg/preview?JggAl
2hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1c8Beah-y6ykV4egbSfLqakuNr7rjk-etkS0Ee7ksdXY/preview?ZIB95
3hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1pUWFVJkJJpoYqky3hzHMEMjb0bkAYM0NlgvxZYj4wik/preview?BcHpH
4hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1Lk8u8kvrgxHgjfoHl1NWcKp8sad3fCy4KcXzwLTEMyU/preview?uqrMX
5hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1d-rGOT7crc2txZ7vE_9xgsXXZNnIhbcaVbeH20YFNbI/preview
6hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1ufGqPEuWZK1uV__uSDP4gK84vgXJH3BTYw6WjIlbou0/preview?TNfEP
7hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1PjyZt0ZxiDFRo-FcrG5yB6bxeCyGfqHKqiIyUKidABI/preview?gbu6F
8hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1TrpKcBwrCxukLb1ajrMpkVhXjrr8N2exw-8Mv_AsYSw/preview

Campaign 2 — Canvas-Based Document and Receipt Lures

No.Phishing URL
1hxxps[:]//visualizadordepdf[.]com
2hxxps[:]//faq-log-trezor-io.pages[.]dev
3hxxps[:]//io-trezorstrtt.pages[.]dev/index.php?route=checkout/checkout
4hxxps[:]//jjenimi.pages[.]dev/index.php?route=checkout/checkout
5hxxps[:]//telegram-6q70dzzf.pages[.]dev
6hxxps[:]//htxx-lgon.pages[.]dev
7hxxps[:]//pub-434abe86553e4c99b30d1c3be588c762.r2[.]dev/f1nanc1al-sh33tsv2.3.html?centre=
8hxxps[:]//profound-bubblegum-158420.netlify[.]app/ingreso.html
9hxxps[:]//proviweb-d8764.firebaseapp[.]com
10hxxps[:]//www.ky8032162[.]cc/index.html?shareName=www.ky804234[.]cc

Campaign 3 — SVG QR-Code Login Lures

No.Phishing URL
1hxxps[:]//perehod[.]website
2hxxps[:]//verdepy-online.firebaseapp[.]com/cbmob/personas/index.html
3hxxps[:]//moltravi-zekun39471628.vercel[.]app
4hxxps[:]//submid-cotact136336.vercel[.]app
5hxxps[:]//spark-login.vercel[.]app
6hxxps[:]//solflare-mnemonic-to-keystore.pages[.]dev
7hxxps[:]//comcast-account.gitbook[.]io/comcast-account-docs
8hxxps[:]//gmininilogenix.gitbook[.]io/us/
9hxxps[:]//pub-fc87556782e141d88f0d4c70cc8e88ef.r2[.]dev/OfficialDocumentHandling.html

IOC handling note: These are phishing URLs reported by Unit 42. The source does not provide file hashes, dedicated malware samples, or confirmed IP addresses for these campaigns. Hosting-platform domains appearing in the indicators should not automatically be treated as malicious in every context; investigate the specific URL and associated activity.

Potential Impact

The campaigns present several security risks:

1. Credential theft

The fake PDF campaign displays a password prompt designed to collect credentials under the pretext of opening an encrypted document.

2. Account compromise

Retailer verification lures can trick victims into submitting account credentials or sensitive authentication information.

3. Session hijacking

QR-code login lures can expose users to session-hijacking risks when victims scan and authorize a malicious login request.

4. Mobile payload delivery

The fake PDF campaign includes an app-download dialog that can deliver a mobile payload. The supplied Unit 42 report does not establish the exact payload's behavior or impact.

5. Evasion of conventional inspection

Because the phishing content is rendered graphically, detection systems relying primarily on visible HTML text and conventional form inspection may fail to identify important parts of the lure.

Recommendations

Immediate Actions

  1. Block confirmed malicious URLs from the IOC list through appropriate web-filtering and security controls.

  2. Review proxy, DNS and secure web gateway logs for connections to the reported phishing URLs.

  3. Investigate suspicious login attempts following interactions with image-based verification pages, fake PDF viewers or QR-code login prompts.

  4. Reset credentials for users confirmed to have submitted them to phishing pages.

  5. Revoke active sessions and refresh authentication tokens where account compromise or session theft is suspected.

  6. Investigate mobile application downloads initiated from suspicious document-viewing pages.

  7. Preserve browser, proxy, endpoint and authentication logs for incident analysis.

Preventive Actions

  1. Inspect rendered content: Extend phishing detection beyond DOM text extraction to include screenshots, image analysis and visual-content inspection.

  2. Analyze canvas elements: Monitor pages that dynamically render financial documents, receipts or login interfaces using HTML5 canvas.

  3. Inspect SVG structures: Examine SVG definitions, vector paths, embedded references and coordinate-based rendering for suspicious QR-code construction.

  4. Strengthen QR-code security: Train users to verify the destination and authentication context before scanning QR codes or approving login requests.

  5. Restrict suspicious downloads: Apply controls to mobile application downloads initiated from untrusted or unexpected document-viewing pages.

  6. Improve browser protection: Use browser isolation, URL reputation services and anti-phishing controls to reduce exposure to suspicious preview links.

  7. Enable phishing-resistant MFA: Prefer FIDO2 security keys or passkeys where supported, particularly for accounts with sensitive access.

  8. Conduct user awareness training: Explain that image-based verification cards, unexpected encrypted-PDF prompts and QR-code login requests can be phishing lures.

Detection and Threat-Hunting Guidance

Security teams should avoid relying exclusively on HTML text and input-field inspection. The following behaviors can support investigation of similar campaigns.

AreaSuspicious behavior to investigate
Browser activityUnexpected drawing-preview links or document-viewer pages
Image renderingRemote image retrieval used as the primary account-verification interface
Canvas activityCanvas-rendered bank receipts or financial documents
Password dialogsPassword prompts displayed after clicking a document-preview button
Download behaviorUnexpected mobile application downloads from fake PDF viewers
SVG inspectionLarge SVG structures containing QR-code paths and coordinate-based references
AuthenticationUnusual login activity following QR-code scanning
Network activityConnections to the phishing URLs listed in the IOC section

Suggested investigation workflow

  • Retrieve the original URL and preserve the webpage and associated resources.

  • Capture the rendered page or browser screenshot for visual analysis.

  • Inspect the DOM for images, canvas elements, SVG definitions and dynamically loaded JavaScript.

  • Examine network requests to identify remotely hosted preview images and scripts.

  • Analyze QR-code destinations in an isolated environment without authorizing authentication requests.

  • Correlate browser activity with authentication logs to identify possible credential or session compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

The following mappings are relevant analytical associations based on the behaviors described in the report. They are not presented as mappings explicitly assigned by Unit 42.

TechniqueATT&CK IDRelevance
Phishing: Spearphishing LinkT1566.002Delivery of malicious drawing-preview, document and QR-login URLs
User Execution: Malicious LinkT1204.001Victims are encouraged to open and interact with phishing links
Steal Web Session CookieT1539Relevant to potential session compromise through QR-code login lures
Input Capture: Web Portal CaptureT1056.003Relevant to credential collection through fake password prompts

These mappings describe potential technique alignment. The report does not establish every downstream compromise behavior for all three campaigns.

Conclusion

The three phishing campaigns tracked by Unit 42 demonstrate how attackers are adapting the presentation layer of malicious webpages to evade traditional inspection techniques.

By using hosted images, HTML5 canvas rendering and SVG vector paths, attackers can display convincing phishing interfaces while keeping much of the visible content outside ordinary HTML text and form structures.

The 1,740 detections recorded between May and October 2026 highlight the importance of examining not only webpage source code but also how content is rendered and how users interact with it.

For defenders, effective phishing detection must combine DOM inspection with visual analysis, browser telemetry, network monitoring and authentication-event correlation. As phishing techniques become more graphics-driven, security controls must evolve beyond text-based detection.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1566.002 — Spearphishing LinkT1204.001 — Malicious LinkT1056.003 — Web Portal CaptureT1539 — Steal Web Session Cookie